

## *Cosmopolitanism and (E)Urope: Translating the Other*

Not until we have learned to see our own country from without and to understand foreign countries from within as the natives of these countries understand them, can we acquire a European outlook, can we realize that these various countries are complementary parts of a single whole. (...) For this reason [one] must pursue the path by which the nationalist becomes a citizen of the world and acquires a "European soul".<sup>1</sup>

But while our pessimism is understandable, it is contradicted by the empirical flow of events in the second half of the century. . . . the appearance of democratic forces in parts of the world where they were never expected to exist, the instability of authoritarian forms of government, and the complete absence of coherent *theoretical* alternatives to liberal democracy force us to raise Kant's old question anew: Is there such a thing as a Universal History of mankind, taken from a point of view far more cosmopolitan than was possible in Kant's day?<sup>2</sup>

When the Other is recognised as such, difference is positive, but when the Other is represented as a threatening stranger, difference is negative. This dichotomy between Self and Other has been pivotal in the making of European identity.<sup>3</sup>

To what extent does today's cultural, political and economic process of European integration differ from the ideals of those of "great Europeans" like Romain Rolland or Stefan Zweig, members of the cosmopolitan intellectual elite of the beginning of this century? What is left of their seemingly naive idealism and humanism? Although the need for "European" integration is felt ever more urgently, so many "European" questions remain without answers. Instead it appears that the possibility to distinguish between being inside and outside (the "one" nation, "one" culture, "one" language etc.) on which the above quotation from Stefan Zweig relies has become extremely problematical since, as much as the fundamental dialectics involved in his aspiration towards (global, cosmopolitan, universal) unity. Instead, the humanist ideals connected with a cosmopolitan view of Universal History have been identified as being political strategies that have to be seen within a postmodern and multicultural context of difference and alterity. The question within any process of European integration is therefore: how are these two concepts, difference and alterity, related to the notion of stereotype and the construction of identity.

### *I. Stereotype*

We all create images of things we fear or glorify. These images never remain abstractions: we understand them as real-world entities. We assign them labels that serve to set them apart from ourselves. We create "stereotypes".<sup>4</sup>

Sander L. Gilman in *Difference and Pathology* emphasises the cognitive necessity of stereotypes for basic categorisation. Stereotypes are instruments of power that are aimed at containing the fear that arises out of the encounter with otherness or others. They set off a differentiating process of representation which helps control the otherwise uncontrollable otherness by turning it into difference. Furthermore, this cognitive function is necessary to create one's own "self", or to perceive oneself as individual. Thus, an imaginary line is created between oneself and the other to maintain the "illusion of an absolute difference between the self and Other . . . [which] is as dynamic in its ability to alter itself as is the self" (Gilman, *Difference* 18).

"Stereotypes arise when self-integration is threatened" (*Difference* 18). They are a result of anxiety projected onto the other, "externalising our loss of control" (*Difference* 20) and thus creating an illusion of "order":

The loss of control is projected not onto the cause or mirror of this loss but onto the Other, who, unlike the self, can do no wrong, can never be out of control. Categories of difference are protean, but they appear as absolutes. They categorize the sense of the self, but establish an order -- the illusion of order in the world. (Gilman, *Difference* 25)

This dimension of Gilman's argument concerning the creation of difference may be called socio-psychological. There is, however, another equally important idea that runs through these passages. Broadly speaking, this consists in a psychoanalytical discourse on the pathology of stereotyping.

Since one cannot help but create stereotypes, and since human beings almost as soon as they are born have to differentiate between self and object/other in order to control both their self and the world, one is forced to think in manichean terms of "good" and "bad". The discourse on stereotypes must therefore replicate these values and speak of "normal" and "pathological" stereotyping. "We can and must make the distinction between pathological stereotyping and the stereotyping all of us need to preserve our illusion of control over the self and the world" (Gilman, *Difference* 18). The "clinical" line is drawn between the pathological vision that cannot overcome the initial and inevitable stereotypical representation and instead veers off into paranoia seeing the entire world in stereotypical colours:

The pathological personality's mental representation of the world supports the need for the line of difference, whereas for the non-pathological individual the stereotype is a momentary coping mechanism, one that can be used and then discarded once anxiety is overcome. The former is consistently aggressive toward the real people and objects to which the stereotypical representations corresponded; the latter is able to repress the aggression and deal with people as individuals. (Gilman, *Difference* 18)

By setting up the distinction between normal and abnormal stereotyping activity Gilman's argument inevitably repeats -- and Gilman is, of course, aware of this -- the attempt to control the other, on a theoretical level. It is a powerful (meta)discourse on order versus pathology, that does not escape its own manichean stereotyping system:

Pathology is disorder and the loss of control, the giving over of the self to the forces that lie beyond the self. It is because these forces actually lie within and are projected outside the self that the different is so readily defined as the pathological. Such definitions are an efficient way of displacing the consciousness that the self, as a biological entity subject to the inexorable rules of ageing and decay, ultimately cannot be controlled. (Gilman, *Difference* 24)

It is certainly no coincidence that Gilman develops his notion of what is normal and pathological stereotyping from a reading of German history, literature and identity that takes place within the American discipline of "German Studies". It is designed for explaining the unexplainable, that is the Holocaust.<sup>5</sup> It is obvious that, in order to preserve the uniqueness of the Holocaust, every attempt to historically explain and situate or settle it must be seen as a form of "relativization":

The West Germans seem now to have entered into a phase in their writing of academic history - - and I am certain this attitude will (if it has not already) spread to the world of literary and cultural studies -- in which there is an attempt to relativize the Holocaust, to make it a past which must be understood in its historical context. For me such a move corrupts the study of the German . . . (Gilman, *Inscribing* 18)

Although this was published in 1991, it does not seem to take the historical development of German reunification into account, which created a substantial shift in the German work of mourning. But what is maybe even more important to note is that a socio-historical "relativization" of the Holocaust would also entail a critique of Gilman's notion of stereotype as an inevitable form of mental representation that needs to be and actually can be overcome like a disease. As Gilman explains himself, he is concerned with the cultural context that permitted a pathological stereotyping on a large scale: "My own work centers on the question of how the German saw the Jew, what in his or her history of the understanding of the Jew (and the Jew's understanding of his or her self) permitted the pathological demonization which

led to the view of the Jew as a vermin, as a disease within the body politic" (Gilman, *Inscribing* 18).

This critique of Gilman's views should, however, not be understood as another form of German "revisionism" following the notorious *Historikerstreit*. It is certainly not an (other) attempt at deculpabilisation of a nation. Instead, the suggestions to follow are interested in finding out to what extent the discourse on the uniqueness of the Holocaust as epochal event - - the second half of the 20th century being the post-Holocaust age, the age of postmodernism as the question of survival -- relies itself on compromised notions of (national) identity, difference and alterity. In the context of European integration it becomes more crucial than ever to be aware of any necessary adjustments as far as the relation between identity, difference and otherness is concerned.

## II. *Cosmopolitanism*

... und dieses gibt Hoffnung, daß, nach manchen Revolutionen der Umbildung, endlich das, was die Natur zur höchsten Absicht hat, ein allgemeiner *weltbürgerlicher Zustand*, als der Schoß, worin alle ursprünglichen Anlagen der Menschengattung entwickelt werden, dereinst einmal zu Stande kommen werde.<sup>6</sup>

Kant's writings on the philosophy of history and cosmopolitanism have recently received renewed attention by two quite opposed, important contemporary thinkers: Jürgen Habermas, in *Die Einbeziehung des Anderen*,<sup>7</sup> and Jacques Derrida, *Cosmopolites de tous les pays, encore un effort!*<sup>8</sup> It is not surprising that in the age of economic "globalisation" and cultural "mondialatinisation"<sup>9</sup> Kant's notion of cosmopolitanism is continually subjected to careful scrutiny. While only few people really intend to question the validity of the fundamental values of the cosmopolitan idea of a common humanitarian destiny guaranteeing equality, tolerance and justice, the ethical and political implications of how to achieve any of these ideals is subject to fierce discussions or even (so-called "humanitarian") wars. The unfinished project of modernity (as the age of enlightenment) itself has suffered many blows, but as Kant says, what gives hope that the state of global "*Aufklärung*" may be reached, ironically, lies in the very existence of warring bourgeois (nation)states. The question therefore, within the

context of European integration, takes on the form of a political debate about the role of the nation(state). A revival of cosmopolitanism today consequently bears the marks of the different views on the future of the various European nations. It may be understood as "transnationalism", the creation of a (widely dreaded) "superstate" and a global (probably ultra-capitalist) free market economy and liberal democracy.

The halcyon days of cosmopolitan idealism, however, the golden age of Stefan Zweig's Vienna, seem to have vanished into postmodern relativist plurality. If anything the increased number of cosmopolitans and the intensification of intercultural contacts has led to an increase in difference rather than any form of "integration". As Ulf Hannerz puts it: "There is now a world culture, but we had better make sure what this means: not a replication of uniformity but an organization of diversity, an increasing interconnectedness of varied local cultures, as well as a development of cultures without an anchorage in any one territory."<sup>10</sup> Since the number of contacts with the "other" has grown so, if one follows Gilman's logic, has the necessity for stereotypical categorisation. Since (cultural, national, group, etc.) identity has never been so precarious, the danger of "pathological" stereotyping must be reaching a new peak. So what can it mean today to say that one is (a) cosmopolitan, or is this just another stereotype? And what could the relation between a cosmopolitan world view and alterity be?

Habermas -- directed against what in an Anglo-American context may be called poststructuralist or postmodernist relativism -- agreeing to a great extent with communitarian ideas calls for an "*Einbeziehung*" of the other. *Einbeziehen* translates as "include" or "incorporate", but Habermas explains that -- avoiding both the passivity of the other expressed in the objective genitive construction (of being subjected to an inclusion or being incorporated) *and* the meaning of the subjective genitive of incorporation by the other (*Einbeziehung durch den Anderen*): "Einbeziehung heißt hier nicht Einschließen ins Eigene und Abschließen gegens Andere. Die 'Einbeziehung des Anderen' besagt vielmehr, daß die Grenzen der Gemeinschaft für alle offen sind -- auch und gerade für diejenigen, die füreinander Fremde sind und Fremde bleiben wollen" (*Einbeziehung*, 8).<sup>11</sup> Against the French tradition of philosophers of difference like Deleuze, Lyotard and Derrida, Habermas has always insisted on the possibility of an emancipated form of universalism which alone would

be able to assure the validation of otherness (*Andersheit*) and difference. Habermas sees the contemporary European nation states threatened from within by centrifugal multiculturalism and from without by economic and cultural globalisation. What seems clearly a specifically German problem in Habermas's argumentation is his concern with the differentiation between a civic and republican "*Staatsbürgernation*", which allows for a benign form of "*Verfassungspatriotismus*", and an ethnic and naturalistic "*Volksnation*", which always contains an aggressive potential. The ambivalence of the nation remains harmless: "solange ein kosmopolitisches Verständnis der Staatsbürgernation Vorrang behält vor der ethnozentrischen Deutung einer Nation, die sich auf Dauer im latenten Kriegszustand befindet. Nur ein nicht-naturalistischer Begriff von Nation fügt sich nahtlos mit dem universalistischen Selbstverständnis des demokratischen Rechtsstaates zusammen" (*Einbeziehung*, 139).<sup>12</sup> Although the inclusion of the other is supposed to respect difference, the republican democratic model remains nevertheless inevitably participatory and integrative so that the "other" has to relinquish, at least in part, his or her difference.<sup>13</sup>

An entirely different approach to the problems arising from global migration, multiculturalism and hospitality within the context of European integration is suggested in Derrida's writings. In *Cosmopolites*, a speech that was originally read *in absentia* at the first congress of the towns of asylum (*villes-refuges*) held at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg in March 1996, engages with the double meaning of "*polis*" as town and state. The ancient tradition of the town of asylum and their concept of "radical", that is unrestrained, hospitality was revived in 1995 when the presidents of the International Parliament of Writers, Salman Rushdie, Adonis, Pierre Bourdieu, Édouard Glissant and Jacques Derrida created a new network of towns ready to grant asylum to persecuted intellectuals. The aim is to reinvent the solidarity of cosmopolitan cities in the age of the global renegotiation of international law. This reinvention of the town of asylum as prime actor in the politics of migration -- as opposed to the restrictive (im)migration politics of the (European) nation states -- is the attempt at what Derrida calls today's need for a "*cosmopolitique*": which would be a way of thinking through the horizon of Kant's cosmopolitan idea of worldwide peace as universal hospitality:<sup>14</sup>

Qu'il s'agisse de l'étranger en général, de l'immigré, de l'exilé, du réfugié, du déporté, de l'apatride, de la personne déplacée (autant de catégories à distinguer prudemment), nous invitons ces nouvelles villes-refuges à infléchir la politique des États, à transformer et à refonder les modalités de l'appartenance de la cité à l'État, par exemple dans une Europe en formation ou dans des structures juridiques internationales encore domonés par la règle de la souveraineté étatique, règle intangible ou supposée telle, mais règle aussi de plus en plus précaire et problématique. (*Cosmopolites*, 14)<sup>15</sup>

The suggested new "cosmopolitics" of the other town -- or the town of the other -- could not come at a better time, namely when the "new" Europe, while opening its "internal" frontiers, increasingly resembles not necessarily an economical but a socio-political fortress, and is careful to restrict "non-European" (im)migration by law. It also comes at a time when hospitality becomes a "crime"<sup>16</sup> and the immigrant the prime scapegoat for the current economic crisis.

The ethics of (*archi*-)hospitality on which Derrida's cosmopolitics relies is derived from a critical reading of Emmanuel Lévinas's work.<sup>17</sup> Lévinas's (ultra)ethics sees the other as always preceding any notion of being. This means that being presupposes an inescapable responsibility for the other as a structural necessity on which any form of ontology must rely and which forms an absolute ethical imperative that always precedes any ontological and political forms of being. This ethics of alterity is interpreted by Derrida as an unconditional "Law of Hospitality" before being -- which alone makes being as dwelling possible. It is the ethical horizon of radical hospitality which, henceforth, remains to be measured against its slow and painful, political and juridical implementation through international law.

Given the priority of the other, there is in fact no alternative to hospitality. In this radical sense even hostility towards the other -- which would include any form of stereotyping -- has already to be seen within the context of an always preceding idea of hospitality as the condition for an "interruption of (one)self" [*interruption de soi*]: "hospitality, is this not an interruption of (one)self [*soi*]?" (*Adieu*, 96). The subject is a hostage [*(h)ôte*] of this dwelling/remaining without dwelling [*demeurer sans demeure*], in which "the home [*le chez-soi*] of the dwelling place [*demeure*] does not signify the closure but the place of Desire towards the transcendence of the Other" (*Adieu*, 163).

What follows from the presentation of these very different views on the role of otherness in relation to cosmopolitanism -- a "Habermasian" view, which, in a problematical sense may be also the dominant view according to a certain Germano-Anglo-American-

Christian notion of multiculturalism, on the one hand, and a mainly "French-Jewish" notion of radical difference and irreducible plurality, on the other hand -- is that they both need to be taken seriously if one is to salvage cosmopolitanism as a useful concept. A more self-reflective notion of cosmopolitanism, as Hannerz also remarks, "would entail a greater involvement with a plurality of contrasting cultures to some degree on their own terms . . . A more genuine cosmopolitanism is first of all an orientation, a willingness to engage with the Other" (*Transnational Connections*, 103). But it is crucial to embrace and distinguish both concepts, difference and alterity, within their separate spheres. Otherness remains central to the ethical context of radical hospitality and can never be reduced to either similarity or difference, while any statement about difference is necessarily a political one and needs to be recognized and evaluated as such. Difference is always claimed or attributed, it belongs to the realm of representation and stereotype. Alterity, however, as it is part of the preontological sphere of first ethics, dissolves into difference as soon as it is claimed by or attributed to some "one". Any radical cosmopolitan understanding therefore relies on two aspects: first, the acceptance of an ethics of alterity before any sense of "self". This idea of otherness provokes a certain self-displacement and enhances the precarious nature of identity. This is maybe comparable to Julia Kristeva's sense of being "a stranger to oneself" on which a differential community can be built:

Une communauté paradoxale est en train de surgir, faite d'étrangers qui s'acceptent dans la mesure où ils se reconnaissent étrangers eux-mêmes. La société multinationale serait ainsi le résultat d'un individualisme extrême, mais conscient de ses malaises et de ses limites, ne connaissant que d'irréductibles prêts-à-s'aider dans leur faiblesse, une faiblesse dont l'autre nom est notre étrangeté radicale.<sup>18</sup>

The second would concern the problem of translation in a world of radical plurality that constantly has to negotiate between universal and local truths, essentialist and universalist tendencies, and the violence involved in particularisation and generalisation.

### *III. Translation and (E)Urope*

Translation necessarily marks the border crossing where, if anywhere, one culture passes over to the other, whether to inform it, to further its development, to capture or enslave it, or merely to open a space between the other and itself.<sup>19</sup>



In the political discussion about European integration, translation and (un)translatability -- of the diverse concepts of European cultural, political, economic, juridical, linguistic, etc. integration -- usually do not play an important part although these seem far from being self-evident. This already presupposes a certain politics of language which ignores that translation is at once necessary and impossible, and that it always produces difference while relying on the otherness of language(s). The coming of a "new" Europe, however, will have to be regarded as something that remains to be translated, the *à-traduire*, relying on an (impossible) contract between languages.<sup>20</sup>

"Overcoming" stereotypes will be of great importance within this process. Stereotypes, almost like proper names and puns, cannot be translated in the strict sense of the word. In a more loose sense, however, there is nothing that demands translation more urgently than stereotypes to further intercultural and interlingual understanding. Nothing calls for translation more insistently than the "other", although this other in its otherness, of course, resists translation. This does not mean that one can avoid translation, but it means that translation as an ethical imperative derives from the other and contradicts the phantasm of the "one" language. It also recognises translation as a process of inevitable, but not necessarily negative, "alteration":

... pour respecter le tout autre de l'altérité, il faudrait que l'altération même -- qui suppose toujours un contact, ou une intervention, une transformation socio-politique, psycho-etc. -- il faudrait qu'une altération même ne fût pas possible. Si l'autre est à une distance infinie, et c'est à cette condition qu'il est autre, il ne peut non seulement pas me toucher, m'affecter, mais pas même altérer quoi que ce soit. Ce rapport au tout autre, au fond laisserait les choses inchangées, non altérées. Et c'est une logique irréfutable que l'altérité pure ne devrait pas être compatible avec la logique d'altération. Il y a un moment où je sens qu'il faut réengager la négociation -- c'est un souci politique, disons, historique. C'est que si on s'en tient au respect pur de cette altérité sans altération, on risque toujours de prêter la main à l'immobilisme, au conservatisme, etc., c'est-à-dire, à l'effacement de l'altérité même.<sup>21</sup>

Contemporary cosmopolitanism finds itself in the position of this form of "altering translation".<sup>22</sup> What does this mean for the process of European integration?

In 1935, Edmund Husserl backdated the crisis of European thought -- the "alienation from rationalism" -- to the enlightenment. Husserl, at this historic moment, foresaw two possible futures for Europe: a decline into anti-rationalism and barbarity; or a renaissance of European reason. Although one might have the impression today of walking a similar tightrope, things, if certainly as urgent, have become infinitely more complex. It is the very

notion of the one Reason which is being disputed in postmodernism. Ever since Zeus abducted a Phoenecian virgin named Europe and brought her to Crete -- probably the origin of Europe's (im)migration problems -- our continent has tried to recover its purloined identity. After the first so-called "peaceful European revolution", in 1989, marking the end of the Cold War, there may be an opportunity to overcome this negative power that has always urged European culture to look for its identity elsewhere (one suggested etymology of "Europe" derives from Greek: *evrys/ops*, the look outward, into the distance). Unfortunately, most public debates focus on purely economic aspects of European integration. Already Nietzsche had this notion that "the mere question of money will force Europe to conglomerate and form a *single* power."<sup>23</sup> And he also believed in the necessity for Europe to "seriously come to an understanding with Britain" (a question which poses itself in the larger context of Anglo-American globalisation). But what Nietzsche (and, in fact, any purely economically dominated discourse on Europe) have in mind is, in fact, "the struggle for world leadership."

The play on (E)U-rope is restricted to the English language, a linguistic particularity due to the fact that two very distinct concepts in Ancient Greek have become homophonous and thus confusable: namely the prefixes οὐ (meaning "radically different"; the absolute negative), and εὖ ("good; best") which are rendered graphically in English by either 'u-' as in 'utopia' or 'eu-' as in 'euphoria'. Both are pronounced [ju:]. After the Cold War, the postcommunist age, which was believed to announce the end of history, utopian thinking, in Germany in particular, was also pronounced dead. But what has been severely questioned is, in fact, what one could call E-utopian thinking. The difference between 'u-topia' ("non place, unknowable or other place, place of the other and the other of place) and 'eu-topia' ("better, ideal place", i.e. recognised according to its differences with the existing) in this context has become crucial.

The majority of traditional "utopian" thought is, in fact, E-utopian, i.e. looking for a better place and thus annihilating from the start the possibility of alterity by always referring back to the similar, the different and the same. It is an appropriation or denial of otherness and its (non)place. The logic of E-utopian thought, which may be called the form of modern European thought *par excellence*, is based upon an economy of appropriation and

incorporation, on violence and colonialism. It is inspired by a profound desire for the other *as* different. U-topian thinking is therefore an im/possible necessity in view of a (E)Urope which remains to come. Working through the beginnings of εὐρωπη [evr'opi] one must try to understand the E-utopian logic upon which E-european identity is based and create an opening for a U-rope to come.

However, it becomes ever more obvious that there is not only Europe, and not only one Europe. There is more than Europe and more than one Europe -- a reality that once again stresses the im/possible necessity of translation. Taking the example of E-utopia/E-urop and U-topia/U-rope, one can see the impossibility of translating this argument into another language. Nevertheless, this untranslatability has already arrived through several other translations (from Greek and Latin into English). And the fact that one would not even be able to translate it "back" into these languages increases its importance. On the other hand, of course, there has done nothing else translation in showing that this untranslatability has (always) already been translated.

A (E)Uropean identity will always have to acknowledge the untranslatability of the otherness which it excludes, i.e. "within and without" its own borders -- this is its chance that lies in its impossible possibility (and also its possible impossibility). Instead of being E-european this im/possible identity must remain radically open in its u-topian "location". This is of particular importance within the contemporary cultural context of displacement, (im)migration and globalisation --all too often experienced as fundamental threat to the survival of Western civilisation -- and a certain revival of cosmopolitan and humanist ideals in reaction to this. The irreducible alterity preceding *and* creating identity, difference and stereotypes -- which pose substantial problems for any form of European integration -- remains the undiscussed ethical horizon of U-rope.

Un spectre hante en effet l'Europe, aujourd'hui. C'est bien, pour la première fois, l'Europe elle-même.<sup>24</sup>

**Stefan Herbrechter**

Trinity and All Saints University College, Leeds

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<sup>1</sup>Stefan Zweig, *Romain Rolland: The Man and His Work*, New York: Thomas Seltzer, 1921, p. 207.

<sup>2</sup>Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992, p. 70.

<sup>3</sup>Gerard Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*, London: Macmillan, 1995, p. 5.

<sup>4</sup>Sander L. Gilman, *Difference and Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race and Madness*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1985, p. 15. See also Gilman, *Inscribing the Other*, Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1991, pp. 1-27.

<sup>5</sup>"The Holocaust remains for me -- and must remain for me and, I hope, for my students -- the central event of modern German culture, the event toward which every text, every moment in German history and, yes, culture, inexorably moved" (Gilman, *Inscribing the Other* 17).

<sup>6</sup>Immanuel Kant, "Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht", in *Werke in Zehn Bänden, Bd.9: Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik*, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983, p. 47.

... and this gives rise to the hope that after many revolutions of transformation, at last, that which is nature's highest intention will come into being, namely a general *cosmopolitan condition* as the womb in which all original tendencies of humankind are developed. [All translations in this paper unless stated otherwise are mine.]

<sup>7</sup>Jürgen Habermas, *Die Einbeziehung des Anderen: Studien zur politischen Theorie*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996.

<sup>8</sup>Jacques Derrida, *Cosmopolites de tous les pays, encore un effort!*, Paris: Galilée, 1997.

<sup>9</sup>Cf. "Foi et savoir: les deux sources de la 'religion' aux limites de la simple raison," in *La Religion: Séminaire de Capri sous la direction de Jacques Derrida et Gianni Vattimo*, Paris: Seuil, 1996. See in particular pp. 21 and 58: "the mondialatinisation (this strange alliance between Christianity as experience of the death of God and tele-techno-scientific capitalism) ... which becomes henceforth [*desormais*] Europeo-Anglo-American in its idiom ..."

<sup>10</sup>Ulf Hannerz, "Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture", *Transnational Connections*, London and New York: Routledge, 1996, p. 102.

<sup>11</sup>Inclusion here does not mean including into the proper and excluding others. The 'inclusion of the other' rather states that the borders of the community are open to everyone, also and especially to those who are strangers to one another and those who want to remain strangers.

<sup>12</sup>... as long as a cosmopolitan understanding of the civic nation prevails over an ethnocentric interpretation of the nation, which remains in a continuous state of latent war. Only a non-naturalistic notion of the nation harmonises with a universalist self-understanding of the democratic constitutional state.

<sup>13</sup>This notion presupposes the discursive ethics developed by Hans Otto Apel and Habermas which depends on the fundamental possibility of participation and articulation of the different (as criticised by Jean-François Lyotard). The Habermasian idea of plurality, as outlined in his "The Unity of Reason in the Diversity of Its Voices", *Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays*, trans. W.M. Hohengarten, Cambridge, Mass., and London: MIT Press, 1992, 113ff., however, relies on the fundamental translatability of (the One) "communicative reason": "... the unity of reason only remains perceptible in the plurality of its voices -- as the possibility in principle of passing from one language into another -- a passage that, no matter how occasional, is still comprehensible. This possibility of mutual understanding, which is now guaranteed only procedurally and is realized only transitorily, forms the background for the existing diversity of those who encounter one another -- even when they fail to understand each other" (p. 117).

<sup>14</sup>Ulf Hannerz equally points out the special importance of the city for contemporary cosmopolitanism, see "The Cultural Role of World Cities", *Transnational Connections*, pp. 127-139.

<sup>15</sup>Whether it be the stranger in general, the immigrant, the exile, the refugee, the deportee, the stateless, the displaced person (all categories to be carefully distinguished), we invite these new towns of asylum to bend the politics of the State, to transform and re-found the modalities of the city's belonging to the State, for example within a Europe that is in the making or within the structures of international law which are still dominated by the rule of the sovereign State, a rule which is intangible or supposed to be so, but also a rule which is becoming increasingly precarious and problematic.

<sup>16</sup>Derrida refers to the "*délit d'hospitalité*", a law project (*loi Toubon*) aimed at stiffening the "*loi Pasqua*", and which makes granting hospitality to "illegal" immigrants a criminal offence.

<sup>17</sup>Cf. Derrida, *Adieu: à Emmanuel Lévinas*, Paris: Galilée, 1997.

<sup>18</sup>Julia Kristeva, *Étrangers à nous-mêmes*, Paris: Gallimard, 1988, p. 290.

A paradoxical community is forming itself which is composed of strangers who accept themselves to that extent that they acknowledge to be strangers to themselves. The multinational society would thus be the result of an extreme individualism, but conscious, however, of its uneasiness and its limitations. A society that would only know members who are irreducible ready-to-helpers in their weakness, a weakness whose other name is our radical strangeness.

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<sup>19</sup>Sanford Budick, "Crises of Alterity: Cultural Untranslatability and the Experience of Secondary Otherness", in Budick and Wolfgang Iser, eds., *The Translatability of Cultures: Figurations of the Space Between*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996, p. 11.

<sup>20</sup>Cf. Jacques Derrida, "Des Tours de Babel", *Psyché - inventions de l'autre*, Paris: Galilée, 1987, p. 219.

<sup>21</sup>Jacques Derrida, in Derrida and Pierre-Jean Labarrière, *Altérités*, Paris: Osiris, 1986, p. 31.

... in order to respect the entirely other of alterity it would be necessary that alteration itself -- which always presupposes a contact, or an intervention, a socio-political, psycho-etc. transformation -- it would be necessary that alteration itself would not be possible. If the other is at an infinite distance, and it is on this condition that he is other, he not only cannot touch me, affect me, but cannot alter anything at all. This relation to the entirely other, in fact, would leave things unchanged, unaltered. And it is of an unrefutable logic that pure alterity should not be compatible with the logic of alteration. There is a moment when I feel *it is necessary* to restart negotiating -- it is a political, let us say, historical concern. It means that if one limits oneself to the pure respect of this alterity without alteration one constantly runs the risk of lending one's hand to immobilism, to conservatism, etc., which means the obliteration of alterity itself.

<sup>22</sup>This process is certainly not unrelated to the various notions of "hybridity" in cultural theories. Compare for example, Ien Ang, "On Not Speaking Chinese: Postmodern Ethnicity and the Politics of Diaspora", *New Formations* 24 (Winter 1994), 1-18.

<sup>23</sup>Quoted in Jean-Pierre Faye, *L'Europe une: les philosophes et l'Europe*, Paris: Gallimard, 1992, p. 230.

<sup>24</sup>Jean-Pierre Faye, *L'Europe une: les philosophes et l'Europe*, p. 47.

A spectre, indeed, is haunting Europe today. It is, in fact, for the first time, Europe itself.

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