Chapter 1:
Golding and “the Other Human” (William Golding, The Inheritors)

We know nothing. We look at the appalling mystery of plain stuff. We stand where any upright food-gatherer has stood, on the edge of our own unconscious, and hope, perhaps, for the terror and excitemt of the print of a single foot.¹

‘Intriguing specimen, behold the jaw…’
Beholding him, I wonder what befell when prophets found no future to foretell. Those furrowed brows, I wonder what he saw standing where oblivion whipped him raw with chilly winds? What encroaching hell drove him to the caverns of Dussel to die, with what raw hunger in his craw? What hunger for tomorrow had that race evolving deathward down an aberrant track? – limping to extinction without grace because the Breeder overlooked some lack unknowable to us. ‘Behold the jaw…’
Unfutured race, I wonder what it saw.²

Mr Neander’s great merit isn’t so much the simple fact of being there, but of having already been there, having been there then, before so many. Precedence is a quality no one would wish to deny Mr Neander. However much … even before that, as further research has demonstrated – and as you yourself can confirm, isn’t that right, Mr Neander? – we find traces, many traces and on a number of continents, of human beings, yes, already human humans…³

Marijane Allen’s short poem about the Neanderthal expresses all the ambiguity and consternation Homo sapiens feels with regard to “his” prehistoric past and these other human species that for some reason didn’t make it into the present. All these “unfutured races”, who were they? Why us, not them? What makes us different? Or will we suffer the same fate? After all, what does it mean to be human? Equally telling is the shift from “him” to “it” – how “human” was this other human? Are there other humans “before” humanity, then? Is there a dark secret that lies buried in the unrecoverable origins our “race”? Are we the sole survivors by merit, chance, or even worse? How to do justice to our ancestors and lost cousins?

It is impossible to read William Golding’s The Inheritors (1955) without these questions in mind.⁴ The novel is part of a subgenre that has been called “prehistoric fiction”. This chapter seeks to do justice

⁴ William Golding, The Inheritors, London: Faber and Faber, 1955. All references are to this edition. Golding wrote another “prehistoric” (short) novel, “Clonk Clonk”, which interestingly thematises and subverts notions of gender difference within a fictional tribe of prehistoric humans. However, it does so much more in the form of a fable than The Inheritors and thus maybe lacks the metaphysical “depth” of the paleoanthropological
to Golding’s novel as a fictional intervention within paleontology and the critical discussion it produced in literary studies and linguistics. However, it also engages with some more general philosophical problems that the notion of “ancestrality” raises, especially with regard to our investigation of “before humanity” and “how we became human”.

1. **Prehistoric fiction and “ancestrality”**

   Good [prehistoric fiction] also tells us about ourselves today, but does so by reminding us of the great journey in time that we have travelled to get here. It provides speculative scenarios of *hominization*, namely, the evolutionary process that made us the kind of species that we are.5

   In his *Literary Darwinism* (2004), Joseph Carroll writes that the “relative” and “unmerited obscurity of *The Inheritors* can be accounted for in part by its genre”.6 The genre that Carroll refers to is what he calls “Paleolithic fictions” and which:

   [b]y their very nature... do not engage a full and detailed array of modern social and psychological concerns... The minds they depict are rudimentary, the social order primitive, and the manners rough... Good Paleolithic fiction creates a world of harsh conditions in which the characters are dominated by brute necessity, driven by elemental passions, and capable of only inchoate reflection.7

   It thus seems that paleolithic fiction, or fiction that is set within the prehistory of modern humans and their “minds” (i.e. “prehistoric fiction”), would inevitably suffer from a lack of “empathy”. The characters it can depict following the rules of paleontological realism will therefore hardly appeal to the modern reader, which means that it will have a hard time creating the kind of empathy between reader and character that makes a good story. At first, this critical judgment seems equally true for Golding’s *The Inheritors*, whose narrative technique “presents special difficulties”, as Carroll explains:

   He speaks from within the perspective, and often from within the idiom, of the Neanderthals, that is, of inarticulate and semi-human creatures who do not themselves fully understand the events they witness.8

   Golding – who did “serious research into paleoanthropology”9 – nevertheless succeeds in showing “what the world looked like from within those skulls”. For Carroll, who is in search of “adaptionist criteria of literary value” (this is the context in which he discusses Golding), the novel manages to provide a credible Neanderthal perspective by:

   a) placing the organism in intimate cognitive relation to the physical and social conditions of its environment,
   b) regulating the proportions of sensory perception and abstract reflection in the stream of its mental events,

---

7 Carroll, p. 177.
8 Ibid., p. 177.
9 Ibid., p. 179-80.
c) coordinating language use with the level of cognitive complexity, and
d) calibrating the horizon of temporal anticipation suitable to its behaviour.¹⁰

We will return to some of these criteria in more detail below. Following Carroll’s reading of The Inheritors will enable us to present an overview of the kind of interpretation the novel has been receiving more recently. The most remarkable thing about The Inheritors is not only the fact that it is one of the very few and “successful” (although it remains to be clarified what “success” means in this context) attempts to write from the perspective of “another (human) species”, but also that it foregrounds, thematises and problematizes the inevitably modern anthropocentric viewpoint of the “successor” that the reader will necessarily have to embody. The most remarkable feature of the novel, in fact, is that it is written from the point of view of the Neanderthal character Lok (at least up to the middle of the eleventh (of twelve) chapters). On page 216 (of 233) the insider’s Neanderthal perspective on the strange and violent goings-on during the first encounter with the successor species (i.e. our direct ancestors), a tribe of Cro-Magnon people, is abandoned and a third person and apparently omniscient narrator provides the first “outside” perspective and description of Lok, as “The red creature” (rather like the pronominal turn in Marijane Allen’s poem quoted above, a shift from “he” to “it”). In chapter twelve, the narrator slips into a Cro-Magnon character, the shaman Tuami, who provides the reader with the viewpoint of “modern man”, the inheritor, i.e. us. However, there is no triumphalism in Golding’s change of perspective, the differend between the two visions and versions of events remains unresolved, even though our empathy must “naturally” lie with Tuami, our ancestor (what exactly the “nature” of this “naturally” means, in this context, will be discussed later). As Carroll explains:

Golding’s sympathy for Tuami is not less than his sympathy for Lok. In the final words of the novel – “he could not see if the line of darkness had an ending” – Golding’s own perspective and that of his Cro-Magnon protagonist converge into a single point of view… The interplay between the points of view of the Neanderthal and the Cro-Magnons provides a medium for articulating Golding’s ambivalent vision of human nature, and it thus mediates the largest thematic purposes of the story. The Neanderthals are both entranced and horrified by the new people. By looking at the Cro-Magnons from the Neanderthal perspective, Golding evokes the strange and singular fascination of modern humanity, with all its ingenuity, its grotesque social and mental complications, and its cruelty. From the other direction, looking at the Neanderthals from the modern perspective, Golding conveys a sense of the simpler, more elemental realities of human life.¹¹

The problematic nature of Carroll’s statements in this absolutely intriguing passage will hopefully become clearer as we go along unpicking it. The ambivalence Carroll locates in Golding’s change of narrative perspective is very much his own and, from a humanist point of view, inevitably that of every reader. It is the ambivalence that derives from the very idea of evolution and thus from the point of view of the “survivor” as such. And it is this ambivalence that encourages us here to strategically counter the “post-” or latecoming of the survivor with the “pre-”, “proto-”, “paleo-”, “ana-” etc. dimensions contained in the phrase “before humanity”.

“Before humanity”, amongst other things, challenges the retrospective teleology and inevitability of “inheriting” (the future). It also questions the kind of humanist morality that Carroll attributes to Golding (cf. his “large and generous moral nature”):

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 179.
¹¹ Ibid., p. 184.
Without preaching, without didacticism, simply by enabling us to share in his own achievement of imaginative sympathy, Golding gives new depth and breadth to our capacity for sharing in the experience of other creatures. He takes us outside the limitations of our own particular identities and our own local cultural values. He enables us to register our common nature not merely on the level of “human universals” but on the level of universals that extend beyond the characteristics of our own species... one of his central motives is the insight into the experience of other sentient creatures. Neither the Neanderthals nor the Cro-Magnons function merely to reflect ideological values or to serve as vehicles for narcissistic fantasy. They are not idealized, sentimentalized, or glamorized. They are treated with respect as figures of inherent interest and value.\textsuperscript{12}

The attempt here is to legitimate an idea of an inclusive “human nature” by turning Golding’s novel into a moral project while negating its “didacticism”. It is interesting to see the use of “sympathy” and “experience” as the ultimate validation of “human universals” that nevertheless stress the particularism and the difference of the two species – Neanderthals and Cro-Magnons. The parallel between this discourse and that of contemporary multiculturalism and “race” is striking. It betrays the ambiguity that underlies the ambivalence – the true moral dilemma – that Golding’s text (and with it, arguably, the entire discipline of paleontology) raises: what to do – from the modern point of view – with all these “other humans”? A question that inevitably has as many contemporary as “prehistoric” reverberations and a question which demonstrates the necessity of a critical posthumanist approach to both what it meant and what it means to be human. For, at the very centre of the passage from Carroll just quoted, hidden behind the three dots after “our own species”, lies the crux of the problem, namely the irreducible difference and the question of what to do with it:

When the point of view shifts to the Cro-Magnons, the whole cognitive landscape changes. It becomes more complex and sequential; there are layers of suppression and deceit, complex emotions of shame, embarrassment, and remorse, and the capacity for complex symbolic thought.\textsuperscript{13}

So, just as the very idea of evolution as such, it is all about the comparison of difference, about development and progress, barely disguised in the notion of “complexification”. Let us stress, however, that this is not to question the legitimacy of evolution as the best explanation there is for the biological development of human and nonhuman life but an investigation into some of its conceptual and philosophical moves and strategies.

Before we return to Golding’s text, however, a few points need to be raised about the genre of “prehistoric” or “paleolithic” fiction and the curious temporal logic it partly shares with the idea of “before humanity”. In fact, prehistoric fiction is closely aligned with science fiction. The online \textit{Science Fiction Encyclopedia (SFE)}, which carries entries on “Prehistoric SF”, “Origin of Man” and “Evolution”, explains why:

Prehistoric fiction became yoked to sf partly because... H G Wells effectively annexed the territory with “A Story of the Stone Age” (1897). Another notable prehistoric work by Wells, part essay and part narrative, is “The Grisly Folk” (1921). These short pieces embody two recurring themes of prehistoric sf: the discovery and development of Weapons or other tools.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., pp. 182-83.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 182.
in the first, and the assumed clash between modern humans and their Neanderthal predecessors in the second.\textsuperscript{14}

Golding’s \textit{The Inheritors}, which begins with an epigraph from H.G. Wells’ “The Grisly Folk”, which it takes as a counterfoil, is also mentioned in the entry, namely as a novel developing “the gulf between old and new cultures… with considerable, even hallucinatory, force from the Neanderthal viewpoint”. The analogy between prehistoric fiction and science fiction is further developed in a collection of stories entitled \textit{Dawn of Time: Prehistory Through Science Fiction}. In their introduction, the editors give the following justification for aligning both genres:

Science fiction is generally thought to be fiction about future. But that is very much an oversimplification. Science fiction is, in Robert A. Heinlein’s phrase, \textit{speculative} fiction; and, though it is perhaps more natural to speculate about the future than the past, times gone by are just as fertile grounds for science-fictional speculations as times to come… What science fiction primarily does, after all, is to carry the reader into an unknown situation and explore a realm of strangeness in meticulous and logical detail – and why is the Mars of A.D. 2500 any more strange, any less accessible to experience, than the Earth of sixty million B.C.? Both are distant, bizarre, alien places, and our only hope of “knowing” them is through imaginative reconstruction of scientific projection.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{14} “Prehistoric SF”, \textit{SFE Science Fiction Encyclopedia}, \url{http://www.sf-encyclopedia.com/entry/prehistoric_sf} (accessed 6 September 2018). There is also a well-documented resource website dedicated to the literary genre of prehistoric fiction available at \url{http://www.trussel.com/f_prehis.htm} (accessed 6 September 2018). See also Marc Angenot and Nadia Khouri’s “An International Biography of Prehistoric Fiction”, \textit{Science Fiction Studies} 8.1 (1981): 38-53; and the rejoinder by Gordon B. Chamberlain, “The Angenot-Khouri Bibliography of Prehistoric Fiction: Additions, Corrections, and Comment”, \textit{Science Fiction Studies} 9.3 (1982): 342-46. The first monograph dedicated to the genre of prehistoric fiction is Charles de Paolo’s \textit{Human Prehistory in Fiction}, Jefferson: McFarland & Co., 2003. De Paolo produces a quite problematic classification of prehistoric fiction according to its either critical, progressive or doctrinal, regressive representations of human prehistory. In what he refers to as “the authenticity problem” prehistoric fictional texts may be appreciated according to what extent they engage with the scientific realism of their time. On this account, both Well’s hominids in “The Grisly Folk”, and Golding’s revision in \textit{The Inheritors} are faulted by De Paolo as “scientifically flawed” and “discredited by modern paleoanthropology” (p. 5): “Rehabilitation [of the Neanderthals] is Golding’s intention, but his efforts are unsuccessful because they rely on unauthorized science” (p. 144). The problem with De Paolo’s “authenticity problem”, however, is that it invests too much authority, and maybe believes a little too uncritically, in the accuracy of scientific discourse, rather than acknowledging the inevitably speculative nature of science’s “realism” as far as the “great outdoors” (in Meillassoux’s sense; see Ancestrality 1 above) is concerned. The second and more recent monograph on the topic, Ruddick’s \textit{The Fire in the Stone}, is more inclusive in that respect:

[T]hose ‘restorations’ of human prehistory… are worth reading as fiction, regardless of their scientific accuracy… Today, we know so much more about the great antiquity and tangled lineage of our species, and we may often be tempted to chastise early prehistorians for their naiveté or presumption. Yet it is probably more useful to demonstrate as frankly as possible what these pioneers felt or believed about human prehistory and to explain why they did so. (pp. xi-xii)


\textsuperscript{15} Robert Silverberg, Martin Harry Greenberg and Joseph D. Olander, “Introduction”, \textit{Dawn of Time: Prehistory Through Science Fiction}, New York: Elsevier, 1979, p. 9 (original emphasis). The collection also contains an interesting reversal of the scenario presented in \textit{The Inheritors} where Lok is presented as a human who is undergoing the transformation from Neanderthal to Cro-Magnon. Lok is here understood as the \textit{literal} (missing) link (cf. Cleve Cartmill’s short story “The Link”, pp. 100-114). It is worth noting that the collection
The speculative nature of the “great outdoors” (as Quentin Meillassoux would call the time “before humanity” and, incidentally, also “after humanity”), is what is shared by prehistoric and futural, or “posthistoric” (SF) fiction. For the moment, it is worth pointing out that the second shared element between prehistoric and science fiction identified by the editors of Dawn of Time is that both rely on “the imaginative reconstruction of scientific projection” — or, one might say, a specifically scientific imaginary. Indeed, the entire discipline of paleontology would be unthinkable without such a scientific imaginary, as the editors explain:

These stories generally have attempted to work within established scientific knowledge, bringing the past to life by using paleontological and anthropological data as the foundation for imaginative speculations. Once again, then, science fiction serves as our time machine. We can never directly experience the Cretaceous or the Pleistocene or even the late Paleolithic, any more than we can visit the world of a million years hence; but we can make vicarious journeys of the imagination to those far harbors of time, and come away enriched, stimulated, aware of the texture and quality of those other worlds of time, and heightened in our perceptions not only of our own era but of those that went before.16

It is the fascination with time travel, both “forward” and “backward”, that the vehicle of the time machine carries, as a metaphor of narrative, and which is capable of producing fictional experience that is enabled by scientific progress as well as producing the access that science needs to (further) progress.

There are also important differences between prehistoric fiction (pf) and science fiction (sf), of course, as Nicholas Ruddick points out:

Sf is pre-eminently the fiction of the human or posthuman future. Both sf and pf are speculative genres, though in slightly different ways. The logic of temporality — time’s one-way arrow — debars all witnesses to the future. In contrast, there were human witnesses to prehistory or we would not be here today. Yet there are no eyewitness accounts of prehistory: by definition, a surviving eyewitness account of an event signifies that history has begun. The prehistoric past and the future are both ultimately unknowable from the position of the present. The historic past, on the other hand, defined by its bequest of written documentation to the present, may be undecidable but it is not unknowable.17

It is the knowledge of the undecidability of the human prehistoric past that is captured by what Quentin Meillassoux refers to as “ancestrality”, and it is the knowledge that other humans came “before the human” — witnesses whose accounts were never recorded — that informs the speculation at work in pf and which gives it a somewhat more “real” dimension, in the psychoanalytic sense, namely as an unrecoverable, repressed truth that nevertheless structures, traumatically and symptomatically, the imaginary and symbolic order of surviving humans.

While pf may be understood as a “speculative literary genre dependent on extrapolations from scientific or quasi-scientific discourse”,18 there is also another, “anthropological”, route that may serve as a “time machine” to both prehistoric and posthistoric times. The SFE points out that “the attitude and method of sf writers are easily comparable to the difficult but fundamental task facing anthropologists, who must detach themselves from the inherited attitudes of their own society and

---

16 Silverberg et al., p. 10.
17 Ruddick, p. 3 (original emphasis).
18 Ibid., p. 2.
immerse themselves in the life of an alien culture without ever losing their ability to stand back from their experience and take the measure of that culture as objectively as possible”. This alien perspective – alien past, or alien future – thus requires an “alien phenomenology” (to use Ian Bogost’s phrase encapsulating his take on speculative realism and OOO), precisely, like the one that is at work in Golding’s The Inheritors. It is therefore no coincidence that Peter Alterman refers to “Aliens in Golding’s The Inheritors”. According to Alterman, the novel “makes use of science-fiction concepts” like “alien creatures, carefully shown to be non-human [who] meet a monstrous threat which destroys them”. The peculiar reversal, however, lies in the fact that the aliens are not the monsters this time. It is us, i.e. the surviving humans, who are the monsters. Moreover, the superhuman sensory capacity of Golding’s Neanderthals, their moral superiority, their psychic and emotional differences, their telepathic “mind-sharing” and their nonhuman memories, clearly mark their “alienness from human experience”:

The Neanderthals have further sensory characteristics which differentiate them from Homo sapiens. These traits, while secondary to the major differences of hearing, smelling, and touch, serve to relate them more firmly to the natural landscape, to reveal more fully their difference from the new men. They have excellent night vision, for example, and they can inhibit their scent. As befits creatures who exist almost exclusively in nature, they are furry. To our eyes, they are animal-like.

As with every alien, the “purpose served by the alien beings in The Inheritors is, then, to comment upon the very nature of human modes of thought, perception, and behaviour”, as Alterman explains. The Neanderthals “define what is human and what is not, by contrast and comparison”. Since aliens, telepathy and superhuman sensory experience “are tools from the science fiction writer’s bag”, Alterman concludes that in Golding’s case “science fiction can no longer be differentiated from other forms of fiction”, including prehistoric fiction.

2. The Inheritors: morality, ideology, humanism

Fictions and fabulations are often contrasted, or opposed, to scientific methods of understanding the world. But in fact, there are powerful resonances between them; they are both processes of speculative extrapolation.

Golding himself was somewhat taken aback when he was told that he was writing science fiction. In “Utopias and Antiutopias (1977)”, he nevertheless granted that he was becoming less of an

---

19 “Anthropology”, SFE Science Fiction Encyclopedia, http://www.sf-encyclopedia.com/entry/anthropology (accessed 6 September 2018). See also the important collection Anthropology Through Science Fiction, eds. Carol Mason, Martin Harry Greenberg and Patricia Warrick, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1974. In their introduction, the editors point out the shared interest in technology by anthropology and sf. Both are concerned with the question “how much control does a society have over its technology?” (p. ix). And both could be said to be (proto-)posthumanist in the sense that they “have looked for the commonalities of ‘humanness’ and tried to account for the differences that divide us” (x).
21 Ibid., p. 3.
22 Ibid., p. 4.
23 Ibid., p. 10.
24 Ibid., p. 10.
“antiutopian” (and more of a “moral utopian”). In fact, he concludes his speech with the following plea:

It is, then, a moral question. Well, we have had australopithecus, homo habilis, homo neanderthalensis, Mousierian Man, Cromagon Man, homo sapiens – has nature done with us? Surely we can search that capacious sleeve and find something a bit better! We had better decide we are Lamarckian and make it work. We must produce homo moralis, the human being who cannot kill his own kind, nor exploit them nor rob them. Then no one will need to write utopias, satires or antiutopias for we shall be inhabitants of utopia...  

The moral and neo- or even ultrahumanist concern that underlies Golding’s “fable” of how we became human, all too human, and nevertheless still not human enough, is clear from the outset. The epigraph from Wells’s Outline of History, in which Wells famously identifies the Neanderthal with timeless “ogre” because of his strange, ugly and hairy appearance sets the tone. To right this wrong, Golding makes one of Wells’s “gorilla-like monsters” his main protagonist. It is through Lok, the Neanderthal’s eyes that the reader experiences the arrival of modern humans – our direct ancestors. As Mark Kinkead-Weeks points out:

...in The Inheritors we have both the most wonderfully imagined of Golding’s fictions because it is the most inno-sensually realized (led by eyes wholly un-sapient, non-egotistic, at one with what they see); and also a terrible focus on the nature of our difference, through our ability to understand what those innocent eyes can see but never take in. Situation after situation comes extraordinarily alive as we see through Lok’s eyes, but page after page we have to decipher, between the lines, what lies behind that other kind of seeing that turns him into an image of murderous and ravenous cruelty on the rock face... It is only we who can really see in The Inheritors, by focusing Lok’s eyes with our own. 

Seeing oneself through the eyes of an “other” is the necessary detour for a number of eminently (and for many, exclusively) human conceptual operations: empathy, consciousness, self-reflexivity, but also narcissism, alienation and power. The implications of Golding’s “alienation device” therefore, unsurprisingly, have provoked a very mitigated response by literary critics. It is probably fair to say that Golding’s second novel, after Lord of the Flies, has received considerably less and also much less appreciative attention. For our purposes, and despite some obvious parallels between the first two novels, it is entirely irrelevant whether this critical judgment might be deserved or undeserved. A brief engagement with some of the established Golding scholarship and what it has to say about The Inheritors, however, will be useful to illustrate the main interpretations the work has produced. With regard to the representation of the “other human”, each reading reveals as much about the work as about the ideological positioning of its interpreter (our own included, of course).

Mark Kinkead-Weeks and Ian Gregor’s William Golding: A Critical Study (1967) is one of the earliest full-length studies of Golding’s novels. Kinkead-Weeks and Gregor begin their reading of The Inheritors by pointing out the “opacity and puzzle” that the reader feels at the beginning of the novel, especially when coming “fresh from Lord of the Flies”. In their conclusion, however, they arrive at the verdict that “in some ways the book gives a sense of perfection; of being one of those

---

27 Golding, “Utopias and Antiutopias”, p. 184 (original emphasis).
29 See for example Philip Redpath’s and James Gindin’s contributions to the Modern Critical Interpretations volume, ed. Harold Bloom, William Golding’s Lord of the Flies, Philadelphia: Chelsea House, 1999, pp. 133-51 and 153-67 respectively.
rare novels which seems to encompass the whole of its subject".  

Even though Golding’s second novel may be “the most perfect of his works”, they nevertheless find it of a “perfection which suggests its own limitations”, which is due to its investment with what they call “archetypal myth”. By this they mean, for example that as far as character is concerned, “the search is for the being of Man rather than the complexities of the individual” and “with defining the essential nature of relationships”. For Kinkead-Weeks and Gregor, *The Inheritors* can thus only represent an intermediary stage in Golding’s work as it progresses towards an “exploration of individual man in society”. Needless to say that this reflects very much the “ideology of the time” as far as literary criticism is concerned, with its emphasis on the author’s greatness, the aesthetic value of (usually) his works and their social duty of portraying the liberal humanist individual.

A few years later, Virginia Tiger’s reading of *The Inheritors* takes an entirely different approach. The guiding principle Tiger takes from Golding himself is the view that “the proper end of literature is imaginative discovery; it is not the level of knowledge that literature can raise, but the level of knowing”. As Tiger writes, almost as a direct reply to Kinkaed-Weeks and Gregor:

> Golding explores the possible origins of man’s guilt and violence in the evolutionary appearance of *homo sapiens* but the fable, mythic in impulse, consciously tries to construct a mythopoeia relevant to contemporary man by using anthropological conventions in the same way as *Lord of the Flies* used the literary convention of the desert island.

Tiger thus stresses the existentialist-humanist message of *The Inheritors* and the centrality of the reader to “build the bridge between the two views, and thus we are the inheritors of the new conjunction”, whose task is to “reconcile the opposites” the encounter between the “prelapsarian” and the “new people” produces and to understand “that the downward path of the innocent and the upward path of the guilty are essentially related”. The dark side of becoming *homo sapiens* lies in the “loss of innocence”: “humanity’s biological and evolutionary superiority in consciousness was an incalculable asset gained at an enormous price”. Thus, for Tiger, in line with the ambient cultural pessimism of his time, Golding “saw guilt as the result of technological, linguistic and, intellectual power”. Golding’s strategy was “to implicate [his] readers in the experience of, and responsibility for, a loss of innocence” and to share the insight that “[b]iological evolution would seem to be moral devolution”. Golding’s “moral diagnosis”, according to Tiger, is that “individuals abstract from their own shortcomings and project them as a fear of something Other, which will haunt or destroy”. The reader is thus forced to become complicit in the “dehumanization” process committed by the “new people” with regard to the “red creature”, because following Golding’s moral critique, “knowledge implicates us”. “That the sources and means of power and active creation are also the source and means of destruction is (for Golding) humanity’s long and tragic tension”, as Tiger concludes.

---

31 Kinkead-Weeks & Gregor, pp. 117-18.
32 Ibid., p. 118.
35 Ibid., p. 68.
36 Ibid., p. 69.
37 Ibid., p. 70.
39 Ibid., p. 60.
40 Ibid., p. 73.
41 Ibid., p. 74.
42 Ibid., p. 77.
43 Ibid., p. 82.
while it becomes clear that between Tiger’s earlier reading, in 1974, and her revised interpretation, in 2003, the entire focus on “the humanity of humanity” has changed and has, indeed, become once more a major issue, Tiger’s problematic conclusion remains unchanged:

The effect is to deliberately complicate the possibility of us choosing between two communities: the sensuous innocence of the clown and the intellectual guilt of the artist, so that the reader experiences both the sense of loss and the sense of gain. By means of ideographic structure, defamiliarizing focalization, and confrontation scene, the reader encounters dark and light, moving beyond simple experience/guilt or simple innocence/love to an apprehension of some future possibility of reconciling binary opposites.44

While the fundamentally humanist endeavour of “reconciling opposites” – be they internal or external to “human nature” – remains intact, what has changed within a few decades is Golding’s tone, which has grown somehow darker, or more desperate, maybe even tragic.

A “tragic humanism” is however already at work in Golding’s Catholicism and the notion of “original sin” that impregnates his work. As Arnold Johnston explains, “[f]ar from merely presenting humanity for unfavourable contrast with a gentler race, Golding offers a complex, and indeed sympathetic, exploration of man’s essential dilemma”.45 Johnston’s reading consequently stresses a slightly less romantic view of the Neanderthals:

…the Neanderthals are marked for extinction because, like most animal species, they are controlled by their environment. Their more obviously human traits are insufficiently developed to enable them to change that environment. Thus, if The Inheritors is an ironic revelation of man’s fallen state, it also demonstrates that there seems no alternative to that state, no hope of a return to innocence. In Golding’s world the meek cannot inherit the earth.46

The great difference between Tiger and Johnston – and this is usually the main point of argument in the reception of The Inheritors as well as, as we will see, among palaeontologists more generally – turns on the ambiguity with regard to the Neanderthal’s humanity and our “meekness” in refusing to see them as the “animals” they really are – in other words, our “anthropomorphism” is our weakness (and meekness). The positive humanist lesson that Johnston, in 1980, still manages to derive from the reversal of perspective at the end of the novel lies in the promise of some form of redemption in human art and creativity: “The possibility of redemption exists in commitment to creation rather than destruction; for Golding the primary symbol of creation is the artist, who can interpret us, if he is heeded, the truths of the human condition”.47 But what exactly it is that might guarantee that the art of creation might not turn itself into an act of destruction remains an open question, just like the idea of a “human condition” as such.

The same argument and the same quietly triumphant tone can still be found in Boyd’s reading of The Inheritors – between “innocence and experience”: “Our fallen nature leads to many misfortunes and enormities but it also makes possible the creation of art which has depth and emotional power of tragedy”.48 However, the use of the word “tragedy” already contains an important, existential(ist)
The belief is now in the tragic reaffirmation of humanness as part of a more intricate casuistry of redemption:

The potential in the new people for the creation of great and tragic art is perhaps one chink of light in the general gloom of *The Inheritors*. Another cause for cautious optimism is the adoption into the new people of “the new one”, the infant survivor of Lok’s people. The baby can be suckled by a human, perhaps one day there will be interbreeding between the new people and this last Neanderthaler. Perhaps something of the goodness and gentleness will thus be introduced into human kind and thus we would be the inheritors of that race too. After all, the experience of reading the novel shows that we can feel sympathy for the alien Neanderthals and that we are also capable of shame at the excess of our own kind. Our meeting with the new people is a little like the myth of Pandora’s box: we uncover all the troubles and miseries in the world, but at the last there is still a token of hope. The word “pathetic” springs to mind – in all its senses. The humanizing (em)pathos that is supposedly generated by the reading – arguably the most fundamental legitimation of reading for modern liberal humanism – constitutes the only tragic “hope” that lies in the yearning for a better (future) human – a yearning, by the way, that still informs most forms of transhumanism and ideas of technological human enhancement, and that, at the same time, can still be used as the most conservative legitimating device for human exceptionalism. Some bizarre comfort may be derived from the fact that at least our killing or the extinction of those poor Neanderthals – the other human – will have ultimately served a noble cause. The whole “logic” here turns on the curious use of “sympathy” (or empathy, more generally), as will be discussed below.

The full range of contradiction as far as “our” sympathy with Golding’s Neanderthals is concerned can be seen in another reading of the novel from the same year: 1988. It is the “misplaced” human “sympathy for the Neanderthals over human beings” that generates “inhumanity”, according to Philip Redpath’s self-declaredly “humanist” reading of *The Inheritors*:50 “What the third-person narrative is doing... is emphasizing the fact that the Neanderthals are not human and that we are mistaken if we sympathize and pity them as one human being for another”.51 Redpath here echoes the language-centred justification of human superiority (a point we take up below and in separate intermezzo in this volume) that runs throughout philosophy, anthropology and paleontology and for which, of course, a novel that attempts to create a linguistic “experience” of a “pre-symbolic mind”, is an easy target:

... it is not the Neanderthal point of view but an approach to their perspective represented in our language. This is the language of the third-person narrative which emphasized the difference between Neanderthal and human... As human beings neither Golding nor ourselves can enter a nonhuman consciousness when the only medium we possess through which to do so is language – our human medium of consciousness... We cannot get out of our language any more than Lok can break into our consciousness.52

---

49 Ibid., p. 45. Evidently, there is today scientific near-consensus that interbreeding between Neanderthals and *homo sapiens* did occur and that many modern humans indeed still carry a small percentage of Neanderthal genes (see the discussion in the next section below).


51 Ibid., p. 34.

52 Ibid., p. 34 (original emphasis). The problem of “other minds” that Redpath here posits as irreducible has been a central arguing point of contemporary discussions between posthumanism, animal studies, object-oriented-ontology, speculative realism and new materialisms. A good starting point for a problematisation of the cognitive and phenomenologist (maybe less so the more strictly linguistic-hermeneutical) some of the
As intuitive as this claim might sound, it is of course a standpoint that relies on language as a “transcendental”, which means as a self-legitimating device, which is highly questionable both from a logical as well as from a cognitive science point of view. Redpath’s tirade against too sympathetic readings of Golding’s Neanderthals takes quite an ugly turn towards the end:

We do not condone the new people killing the Neanderthals, but when we see how they appear to the new people we can understand their actions – and this understanding is a possession the Neanderthals do not have... They do not need to externalize their fear: the Neanderthals are there for them to be afraid of. When we move into the point of view of the new people we see that the red creature is regarded as a red devil driving man away from the security of the island to the wilds of the plains. If we sympathize, it must be with the terrified human beings rather than with the non-human red creatures. After all, *homo sapiens* are the inheritors referred to in the title of the book, and our last glimpse of the new people is of their sailing away into modernity. *The Inheritors* is about man and not Neanderthals.53

It is probably unnecessary to point out how bewildering this passage must sound for a postcolonial critic, especially with reference for example to the North American context of white settlement and the encounter with “red” Indians. What it also shows is the underlying logic of (Western) modernity, progress, reason, enlightenment and capitalism that drives the temporal logic of rightfully assumed “inheritance”. While the Neanderthals lack “the human capacity to invent and change” due to their “static philosophy” which eventually leads to their extinction, “Man must keep moving, progressing, and changing. To become static is to invite destruction”.54 It is indeed this modern logic of inheritance through transformation and supersession that the phrase “before humanity” problematizes.

The ideological nature of all these readings could not be more obvious. Whether they interpret the encounter between “modern” humans and their “ancestral” others as a fall or a fortunate fall,55 determines what side of humanism Golding ends up on. While Redpath sees Golding as a staunch humanist who affirms the ability of human value judgment and the capability of choosing between right and wrong – “it is our humanity that *The Inheritors* helps us to understand”56 – Dickson refers to Golding’s “anthihumanism”: “Ironically, Golding’s new people inherit a moral blindness that makes them externalize their own evil and then mistakenly exorcise self-made devils”.57

---

53 Redpath, pp. 39-40.
54 Ibid., p. 38.
55 Another reading, put forward by James Gindin, corroborated by some paleontological attempts to see the Neanderthals as our direct ancestors, not our “cousins” (see below), is to understand the Neanderthals’ extinction as a “fall into humanity”:

In the process of evolution, Golding symbolically suggests, the Neanderthals have fallen into humanity and attention shifts to the already human creature who can experience guilt and self-knowledge, just as he can adapt and master the log..., which defeated the “people” in the initial episode of the novel. The fall into humanity is both a lost innocence and a “fortunate” fall, fortunate in its recognition of human consciousness and the possibility, however dim, of redemption. (James Gindin, “The Fictional Explosion: *Lord of the Flies* and *The Inheritors*”, in *William Golding’s Lord of the Flies, Modern Critical Interpretations*, ed. Harold Bloom, Philadelphia: Chelsea House, 1999, p. 166.

Thus, following this somewhat contorted logic, it is the contact with the humans that compromises the projected innocence of the Neanderthals. Is it their fall which is our fortune, or the reverse?

56 Redpath, p. 40.
3. Paleontology and the Neanderthal

If evolution forces us to rethink the nature of species, perhaps we must also rethink the nature of human nature... No single species concept seems adequate.58

It’s unclear whether bioengineering could really resurrect the Neanderthals, but it would very likely bring down the curtain on Homo sapiens. Tinkering with our genes won’t necessarily kill us. But we might fiddle with Homo sapiens to such an extent that we would no longer be Homo sapiens.59

Today, every educated person knows that we are all Homo sapiens — members of a single species — and that the biological differences between one human group and another are trivial at most. But the dehumanizing impulse operates at the gut level, and easily overrides merely intellectual convictions. To understand why it has this power, we’ve got to answer a fundamental question. What exactly goes on when we dehumanize others?60

The moral ambivalence that Golding’s Neanderthals have encountered in literary criticism is indeed typical and indicative of their place in human evolution more generally. David Livingstone Smith’s round-up of scientific dissensus on the relationship between the Neanderthals and homo sapiens captures the impression that readers of paleontological and evolutionary biology literature must have as well:

Some scientists equate human with both modern human beings and Neanderthals, while others speak about the split between Neanderthals and humans (in which case humans are equated with Homo sapiens sapiens). Others describe all members of the genus Homo as human, while still others reserve the term human for all of the species in our lineage after our common ancestor with the chimpanzee. In short, biologists’ use of human is all over the map. The reason for this is a simple one. Human belongs to a completely different taxonomy — a pre-Darwinian folk-taxonomy that owes much more to the great chain of being than it does to modern biological systematics. The two frameworks are incommensurable.61

One might that say that this incommensurability of human and homo has been used as a legitimation for numerous processes and occasions of dehumanization and rehumanization in the history of human self-explanation. Both strategies with their symbolic and real effects, however, depend on what we might call prehumanization – which is the strategy our own approach in this volume is concerned with more strictly and which is the kind of reverse or reconstructed teleology that underlies so many (pseudo)evolutionary accounts of how we (apparently) became human. We cannot provide a very detailed survey of the field here but we produce some representative voices from a variety of disciplines on the human-Neanderthal relationship and the problem of ancestrality.

To stick with our literary example we start with the two main volumes of literary criticism on Golding that have analysed the way in which The Inheritors portrays the difference between Neanderthals and their successors, after which we turn to some key interventions in more recent paleontological debate. As mentioned, De Paolo ultimately dismisses Golding’s portrayal of the Neanderthals as well-intentioned but “flawed”: “Although congruent with scientific authority in 1955, his hominids are as

---

61 Smith, p. 85.
flawed as Wells’s”. 62 De Paolo had already designated the Neanderthal in *The Inheritors* as “Golding’s Imbecile”, in an article for *Science Fiction Studies* in 2000. 63 The main criticism levelled at Golding is that he relies heavily on Marcellin Boule’s “phrenological” and “craniometrical” misconstruction of the Neanderthals’ cognitive “deficiency” and, as a result, de Paolo argues that by “[d]irectly correlating neuroanatomy to intelligence, Golding imagines a brain dysfunction for his Neanderthal population”. 64 Golding’s Neanderthals thus “suffer from sensory overload and cognitive deprivation”, and he thus “presents a fragmented mind, the nature of which is extrapolated incorrectly from endocasts”. 65 In de Paolo’s view, this presents us with a “conservative image of the Neanderthal as a benign imbecile”. 66

An entirely different picture is given by Ruddick whose agenda is opposed to de Paolo’s scientism and who, on the contrary, believes that “one of the reasons that *The Inheritors* is a great novel... is because to read it is to inhabit the consciousness of ‘benign imbeciles’ yet to feel no contempt for them”. 67 Ruddick, importantly, discusses the *racial* dimension that underlies the discussion of the Darwinian evolutionary “descent of man” and in which the Neanderthal has come to act as modern humanity’s original “racial other”. As Ruddick explains: “The atavistic Neanderthal used in racial

---

64 De Paolo, “Wells, Golding, and Auel”, p. 428. See also the even stronger statement in *Human Prehistory in Fiction*, p. 72:

> The be “abnormally” receptive to sense stimuli but deficient in abstract thought, to my mind, may be the right balance for a cheetah pursuing a gazelle, but, for a human being in the Würm glaciation, these qualities are liabilities. I therefore agree with Redpath [discussed above]: Golding’s Neanderthals are, for some reason, cognitively deficient.

De Paolo here refers to the same Redpath whom we criticised earlier for his problematic (colonial/imperialist/quasi-racist) views. De Paolo’s argument that Golding’s use of science was “conservative” (see next quote) seems somewhat weak if compared to his own use of animal metaphors in the above passage. We will discuss the details of the cognitive “alienation effects” used by Golding in the next section.

66 De Paolo, *Human Prehistory in Fiction*, p. 5. Even though “[r]ehabilitation is Golding’s intention... his efforts are unsuccessful because they rely on unauthorized science” (p. 144). Especially as far as such a young but central discipline to “our own self-understanding” as paleontology or even more specifically paleoanthropology is concerned, the use of “authorized” seems somewhat rash. Knowledge about human origins, common or uncommon ancestors discovered on a regular basis and new scientific methods due to technological developments make paleoanthropology a rather unstable and quickly changing knowledge base, as Ruddick explains (and as any survey of recent scientific texts would not fail to demonstrate):

> ...paleoanthropology in its short history has never been a body of knowledge stable enough to be theoretically “normalized” in the manner of, say, physics or chemistry. The study of human origins is a highly speculative hybrid discipline... based on a very small body of physical evidence. The accidental discovery of one or two fossil bone fragments has the potential to bring about a revolution in the field. (Ruddick, *The Fire in the Stone*, p. 11)

As a result, it is a discipline that is “ideologically highly charged” due to what it “promises to reveal about our origins and it is extremely vulnerable to subjective distortion because the objects of its scrutiny are very closely related to the scrutineers themselves” (pp. 11-12).
67 Ruddick, *The Fire in the Stone*, p. 12. Ruddick’s follow-on claim that “our sympathies are enlarged even as we are brought harshly up against the constraints of our human nature” (p. 12), will occupy us in the section on empathy, below.
opposition to the progressive Aryan is often found in early [prehistoric fiction]...". In fact, whether “polygenists” (defenders of the idea of ancient divergence of human origins and “multiregional evolution”) or “monogenists” (i.e. people who take the view that all humans developed out of one *homo* species “out of Africa”) are correct still remains to be seen. Ruddick, in any case, in an almost Rortyan move (albeit in an evolutionist framework) suggests:

...we can, however, say that the truth that humanity is one species is more likely to conduce to our survival – and is therefore more important and valuable – than the truth that individual human beings show great phenotypic diversity. Similarly, pf (or indeed any artistic product) that affirms that, despite our differences, all human beings are united in their fundamental humanity, is likely to be more culturally valuable and aesthetically praiseworthy than counterclaims that our differences are unbridgeable because of primal racial incompatibilities.

As pragmatic and commonsensical as this proposition might sound, it is not without its own problems. It is indeed unclear how this well-intentioned approach would differ from humanist universalism and the very notion of human nature which has been at issue in the current debate about the “posthuman”. Nevertheless, it is quite obvious that early dehumanization and later rehumanization attempts of the Neanderthal, whether paleoanthropological or literary, are connected to contemporary attitudes towards race and racism. As Ruddick writes, with reference to Golding’s *The Inheritors*:

William Golding, writing with Wells in mind in the aftermath of the Second World War, would suggest in *The Inheritors* that there was a human disposition to genocide that long predated Nazi Germany. Be it in the Upper Paleolithic or today, our inhibitions against murder can be overridden if we can be persuaded to view our victims as biologically subhuman.

Golding’s “ironic inversion of ‘racial’ stereotypes” – his portrayal of the Neanderthals as peaceful and the Cro-Magnon as cannibalistic and violent – would thus be inspired by more or less the same anti-racist humanist desire for an inclusive and essential human identity.

The ambiguity and unease that provokes either a strong emotional defence of the Neanderthal or an equally strong sense of modern superiority lies in the fact that the Neanderthal is not only “our” primary, primate and primal *racial* other but also our *ontological* other more generally. This is, in fact, what constitutes the imperative meaning contained in the phrase “before humanity”: as survivors we stand before this incredible ontological “injustice” – why us, not them? What happened to them while be became “human”? Neanderthals can function as our other, firstly, because of relatively numerous and well-preserved fossil finds – which is related to the Neanderthals’ customary burying of their dead. We thus know their anatomy better than that of any other hominids, which somewhat overdetermines the relatively few but significant anatomical differences between

---

68 Ruddick, p. 154.
69 Ibid., p. 155. As Ruddick goes on to explain with regard to the cultural reactions to the first fossil finds of Neanderthals in the 19th century:

Neanderthal limb bones are relatively more massive than most modern humans’ and the brow ridges of Neanderthal skulls are more prominent. In the Darwinian aftermath it was almost inevitable that these features would recall the gorilla, the most massive living ape and the one with the largest superciliary ridge. (158)

The question of the “ape/man” that develops out of this comment, especially in conjunction with the “before humanity” dynamic that is at the centre of our project is discussed in Intermezzo 1 below.

70 Ibid., p. 162.
Neanderthals and modern humans (their stockiness, compactness, muscularness, etc.). The biggest mystery that surrounds them, however, remains the manner of and reason for their disappearance, as well as that of their legacy – all subject of both intensive scientific research and fictional (as well as fact-based) speculation. The main biological, evolutionary and paleoanthropological shift since their first discovery has been the one from questions of ancestry to questions of interbreeding. Since Neanderthals and Cro-Magnon had coexisted for tens of thousands of years, it is clear that the Neanderthals and us are not direct relations, but “brothers” (or, indeed, cousins) at most, with common ancestors. And since extinction usually requires a reason, and reasons are used by way of justification the necessarily question arises of what was the Neanderthals’ “deficiency”, or why did they fail to “adapt”? Was it for ecological reasons (climate change, increased competition for food or overexploitation), or more demographic ones like illnesses, the small size of communities, low life-expectancy, or indeed cultural ones, like their apparent lack in symbolic thought and the resulting “underperformance” as far as hunting techniques and technological innovation more generally are concerned? While the hypothesis – evoked in Golding’s The Inheritors – of a direct confrontation between Neanderthals and Cro-Magnons remains probable, a radical supersession (i.e. a genocide) of Neanderthals by the Cro-Magnons has been more or less dropped due to lack of evidence and the gradualness of the Neanderthals’ disappearance. A connection between “our being here” and “their absence”, however, cannot be denied, and hence our “before humanity” conundrum remains, probably as long as we and our species identity persist, or we are in turn superseded by our successors.\(^1\)

We begin our short and admittedly highly selective survey of paleoanthropological literature on the encounter with the Neanderthals with Robert Foley. The title of his Humans Before Humanity (1995) signals an affinity with our own approach, even though it does not exploit the multiple meanings of the word “before”. Foley understands paleoanthropology as that branch of “paleobiology” that is concerned with the question of “under what conditions will the human phenotype be adaptive… in terms of how particular features gave hominids and humans advantages over contemporary competitive alternatives at particular times”.\(^2\) Even though Foley does not discuss Neanderthals in much detail, his account is helpful in what he says about extinction more generally: “The problem of extinctions is one of the most fascinating and poorly understood in human evolutionary biology”.\(^3\) More importantly, he spells out the fascination that the phrase “before humanity” barely manages to hide:

There may be only one living species in the hominid family, but in the past there have been many more. The extinct hominids demonstrate the continuity between humans and other apes. In other words, they show that the principle of continuity applies as much to humans as to other animals. Extinct hominid species also show that the perceived gap between humans and other animals – one basis for arguing that evolutionary ideas do not apply to humans – is an illusion. It is created by the accident of extinction. If living apes become extinct, then the gap will become greater; if a living Neanderthal were to be found in the tundra of Siberia, the gap would have become smaller, and yet nothing would actually have changed in humans.\(^4\)

\(^{71}\) Clive Finlayson articulates this most clearly in his The Humans Who Went Extinct: Why Neanderthals Died Out and We Survived, Oxford: OUP, 2009. The question whether evolution continues and whether humans are still subject to or now subject of evolution is a question that the debate around the posthuman has reignited. We will be dealing with this question more directly in the conclusion to this volume.


\(^{73}\) Foley, Humans Before Humanity, p. 104.

\(^{74}\) Ibid., p. 29. Foley’s view of Neanderthals (and other hominids) as “missing links” between modern humans (as opposed to hominids) and a common ancestor no longer correspond to the latest scientific information, however, which shows Neanderthals to be a parallel species co-existing with modern humans for several ten
What Foley terms “humans before humanity” are all those hominids – Neanderthals included – who through their fossilised bones give us access to who we are today. What is intriguing in this instrumentalization of the “other humans”, however, is that it requires at least their partial dehumanization: “Humans before humanity were not truly humans, but species in their own right that survived in many cases for hundreds of thousands of years”. This, according to Foley, is a necessary claim to counter the reverse teleology used to explain the sole survival of one hominid species mentioned above: “They did not exist because they were ‘evolving into humans’ but because they had adaptations that enhanced their survival” (and by implication their extinction subsequently shows their lack of adaptation).  

Around the same time as Foley, the zoologist Jared Diamond conjectures in a similar vein that: “A zoologist from outer space would immediately classify us as just a third species of chimpanzee, along with the pygmy chimp of Zaire and the common chimp of the rest of tropical Africa”. As opposed to Foley, however, there is no doubt in Diamond’s mind that the encounter between Neanderthal and Cro-Magnon led to the former’s extinction and to the latter’s “Great Leap Forward” – an event that was the first in a series of “progress by genocide”:

My guess is that events in Europe at the time of the Great Leap Forward were similar to events that have occurred repeatedly in the modern world, whenever a numerous people with more advanced technology invades the lands of a much less numerous people with less advanced technology... By analogy, I guess that Cro-Magnon diseases, murders, and displacements did in the Neanderthals. If so, then the Cro-Magnon/Neanderthal transition was a harbinger of what was to come, when the victors’ descendants began squabbling among themselves.

The encounter would thus be the primal scene of colonialism and would constitute the trauma that forces the compulsive repetition of the cruelty of humans warring amongst themselves (with technology in all its forms, arguably, as driving force). One can still see the proximity with Golding’s view and his portrayal of Neanderthals in the aftermath of post WWII.

The evolutionary psychologist Robin Dunbar, in The Human Story (2004), also subscribes to the view that: “Were the Neanderthals or the later Homo erectus still alive – as the former were until around 28,000 years ago – the gap between humans and the other great apes might be less glaring.” He describes the Neanderthal’s extinction as “the final mystery”: “suddenly within a short space of time, about 30,000 years ago, [the Neanderthals] simply faded out. The fact that this seems to have coincided with the arrival of anatomically modern humans (a group of people known as the Cro-Magnons) in Europe from Africa some 40,000 years ago has always seemed... well, suspicious”. The suspicion of “the hoary spectre of racial extermination” and fratricide of our “older brother” (as Dunbar states, “[t]he current view is that Neanderthals represent the descendants of an early migration out of Africa into Europe by archaic H. sapiens”) haunts human consciousness as much as it underpins the idea of human exceptionalism:

thousands of years. What it nevertheless articulates is the fundamental ambiguity of “descent” that the temporal dimension of “before” expresses. The fascinating idea that a “planet without apes” would enhance the impression of discontinuity, human exceptionalism and diminish the explanatory power of evolution is something we will take up again below.

75 Ibid., p. 29.
77 Diamond, pp. 44-45.
79 Dunbar, p. 35.
80 Ibid., p. 37.
It is sobering to remember just how strange these times we live in actually are: the 28,000-year period since the Neanderthals died out is unique in the five-million year history of the human lineage in that there has only been one living species of hominid during it. Hitherto, there has probably been no time period when there have not been at least two (and sometimes as many as five) species of hominid wandering the byways of the world at the same time – bumping warily into each other from time to time. This fact has tended to exaggerate our apparent uniqueness and has perhaps been responsible for giving us a false sense of our own importance. Like all single children born late in their parents’ lives, we humans have proved more than just a handful to our ageing relatives. We invariably assume that we deserve special attention.81

One could argue that this misperception is an even more strange and dangerous one at the moment we, on the one hand, increasingly (in the face of intensifying ecological extinction threats) under the banner of new, posthumanist and postanthropocentric, world views write ourselves out of the picture, and, on the other hand, engage in transhumanist “science factional” fantasies82 of slipping out of our animal bodies, handing over to our “successor” species, the robot, and bowing out to “artificial intelligence”. The idea of technological determinism within human evolution would thus come full circle with our technologically induced (self-)extinction. “Before humanity” all too easily (and hastily) gives rise to “after humanity” at a time when all the injunctions and implications of the “before” (and the “after, for that matter) are in danger of being violently repressed.

Even though, as Richard Dawkins suggests in The Ancestor’s Tale, published in the same year as Dunbar’s The Human Story, due to new genetic evidence extracted from Neanderthal bones “successful interbreeding between Neanderthals and Moderns was rare”, the ambient haunting of the Neanderthal continues. As Dawkins explains, “if only one Neanderthal male, say, bred into a sapiens population, that gave him a reasonable chance of being a common ancestor to all Europeans alive today. This can be true even if Europeans contain no Neanderthal genes at all. A striking thought.”83 More recently, due to new DNA analytical technology – referred to as “the molecular clock” – the genetic relationship between Neanderthals and humans has become even more complex, as The New Scientist explained featuring an article on “Our Distant Origin – humans have been human for a lot longer than we thought”.84 A 2013 special edition of Scientific American even credits “our inner Neanderthal” with up to four percent of our contemporary DNA – some of which might contain “disease-fighting genes”.85 The other “forerunner” function of the Neanderthals from a contemporary point of view includes their fatal experience with earlier forms of “climate change” and living (or dying) in a “world in flux”: “So rapid were these oscillations [due to an increasingly unstable climate] that over the course of an individual’s lifetime, all the plants and animals that a person had grown up with could vanish and be replaced with unfamiliar flora and fauna.86 And then, just as quickly, the environment could change back again”. As Kate Wong concludes:

The Stone Age whodunit is far from solved. But researchers are converging on one conclusion: regardless of whether climate or competition with moderns, or some combination thereof, was the prime mover in the decline of the Neanderthals, the precise factors governing the

81 Ibid., p. 40.
86 Wong, p. 79.
extinction of individual populations of these archaic hominids almost certainly varied from group to group. Some may have perished from disease, others from inbreeding. “Each valley may tell its own story...”

It thus seems that Golding’s *The Inheritors* might still be awaiting its serialization. The emerging contemporary consensus on the importance, proximity and “likeness” of the Neanderthals stands in stark contrast to one of the most influential but also most sceptical voices regarding the role Neanderthals might have played in the last phase of our hominization is that of Ian Tattersall, former anthropology curator at the American Museum of Natural History in New York. We will therefore conclude our short survey with some comments on a number of his interventions in the debate.

In 1995, Tattersall published a popular science book entitled *The Last Neanderthal*, in which he writes – in what could almost be a comment on Golding’s project in *The Inheritors* – that “envisioning exactly how beings who differed enormously in their cognitive capacities would have communicated and interacted is difficult. Perhaps it’s not too far-fetched to imagine that only the cleverest Neanderthals could have managed such contacts successfully and passed their newfound knowledge on to others.”

The fact that “We were not alone”, as Tattersall’s introduction to the volume *The Last Human* states, should not distract us from the qualitative leap that must have happened for Cro-Magnon to depose Neanderthal: “we find nothing in the technological record of the Neanderthals to suggest that they were symbolic thinkers. Skilful, yes; complex, certainly. But not in the way that we are.”

Again, the view that Neanderthals were “lacking” in symbolic thought – though highly contested – here forms the ultimate source of self-legitimation and human exceptionalism. In our view, it is this contested claim that constitutes the real battleground of Golding’s *The Inheritors* and explains the contradictory interpretations it has received. We will thus have to turn to the question of the Neanderthals’ cognitive and linguistic “abilities”.

**ANCESTRALITY 2: Languages and Evolutions [see separate file]: run as text box alongside section 4**

4. *Language, Cognition and “Becoming Human”*

Quite without warning, all the people shared a picture inside their heads.

Modern humans have a range of abilities in cognition, symbolic representation, speech and language, manipulative skills, and social complexity that might be summed up as “humanness”. In this sense, were the Neanderthals human, non-human, or in the process of becoming human?

Technology is the means by which the human world is created.

---

87 Ibid., p. 81.
94 Foley, *Humans Before Humanity*, p. 43.
Ian Tattersall provides us with a perfect example of the role language, cognition and “symbolic cognitive processes” play in the distinction between “us” humans and “them” (everybody else, including Neanderthals):

This new capacity [of symbolic thought]... stands in the starkest possible contrast to the more modest achievements of the Neandertals whom the Cro-Magnons so rapidly displaced from their homeland in Europe and Western Asia. Indeed, Cro-Magnon behaviors – just like our own – evidently differed totally from those of any other kind of human that had ever previously existed. It is no denigration at all of the Neandertals and other now extinct human species – whose attainments were entirely admirable in their own ways – to say that with the arrival on Earth of symbol-centred, behaviourally modern Homo sapiens, an entirely new order of being had materialized on the scene. And explaining just how this extraordinary new phenomenon came about is at the same time both the most intriguing question and the most baffling one in all of biology... And it was almost certainly the adoption of symbolic cognitive processes that gave our kind the final – and, for the Neandertals, fatal – edge.95

The deadly capacity of symbolic thought which cost the Neanderthals dearly (and might ultimately bring about our own downfall, in turn, of course) thus serves at the same time as the ultimate legitimation of the (evolutionary-biological-paleoanthropological) scientific discourse that seizes upon this ultimate human “mystery”. Tattersall proposes to see the emergence of symbolic thought as an “exaptation” – “characteristics that arise in one context before being exploited in another, or... the process by which such novelties are adopted in populations”).96 While the feature of symbolic thought might have been dormant so to speak in other or even all hominids, it is only with Cro-Magnon that it was “co-opted into some new function”:

Unfortunately, exactly what it was that exapted the brain for modern cognitive purposes remains obscure. This is largely because, while we know a lot about brain structure and about which brain components are active during the performance of particular functions, we have no idea at all about how the brain concerts a mass of electrical and chemical signals into what we are individually familiar with as consciousness and thought patterns. And it is this which it will be crucial to understand if we are ever to make the leap to comprehending exactly what it is that enables us to be (and I use the term advisedly) human.97

Which means, it is probably safe to say, that the exaptation hypothesis is entirely conjectural or speculative. What Tattersall and many other seem to be very clear and adamant about, on the other hand, is that there is a fundamental difference or chasm between modern humans and Neanderthal (and other hominids) as far as their cognitive processes and language capacities are concerned – despite the absence of conclusive fossil or DNA evidence for these “soft” (or, as one could also say, largely “cultural”) features. Instead, as Tattersall claims, the theory goes that “at some point, say around 70 or 60 kyr ago, a cultural innovation occurred in one human population or another that activated a potential for symbolic cognitive processes that had resided in the human brain all along, we can readily explain the rapid spread of symbolic behaviors by a simple mechanism of cultural diffusion”, which leaves a lot of room for speculation as to “what the new cultural stimulus might have been”.98 It also implies that it is even more “unfortunate” for the Neanderthals that it had not been them to which this stimulus had applied itself – and which, in turn, makes Golding’s scenario in

---

95 Ian Tattersall, “How We Came to Be Human – The acquisition of language and the capacity for symbolic art may lie at the very heart of the extraordinary cognitive abilities that set us apart from the rest of creation”, Scientific American, special edition “Becoming Human – Evolution and the Rise of Intelligence”, p. 68.
96 Tattersall, “How We Came to Be Human”, p. 67.
97 Ibid., p. 69.
98 Ibid., p. 70.
which both species clearly have access to cognitive symbolic processes, albeit very different ones, even more radically speculative and innovative. The crux lies not in the mere ability to engage in symbolic cognitive processes but in the recombination, availability and externalisation of mental symbols, or symbolic creativity like art, writing, technological innovation and “science”99—the absence of which ultimately only disqualifies the Neanderthals due to lack of evidence. So while Neanderthals spoke “in some general sense… what they almost certainly did not possess, however, is language as we are familiar with”, Tattersall concludes.100 And since language is the “ultimate symbolic mental function… it is virtually impossible to conceive of thought as we know it in its absence”,101 which means that the stimulus that changed everything in leading to the “emergence” of symbolic thought, for Tattersall, must have been “the invention of language”.102 The fact that Neanderthals had a more “ape-like”, higher-positioned larynx which would not have allowed them to pronounce the full range of modern human sounds is usually taken as evidence that though Neanderthals might have had some form of language their phonetic use and range of linguistic signs (i.e. speech)103 would have been “anatomically” restricted.104 Complex mental processes relying on language obviously have an influence on cognitive ability including higher consciousness and consciousness of self. They include some form of “theory of mind” or “mind-reading” capacity (double-guessing and anticipating the thoughts and intentions of others—human and nonhuman), which, in turn, is required for the development of complex social relationships.105

One of the most original attempts to arrive at an explanation of the origin-of-human-language mystery through a combination of scientific, “poetic” or rhetorical and “imaginary” or speculative approaches is Christopher Collins’s *Paleopoetics*.106 Since there are some similarities between the notion of “paleopoetics” and what we have been putting forward under the idea of “before

---

100 Tattersall, “How We Came to Be Human”, p. 71.
101 Ibid., p. 71.
102 Ibid., p. 72.
103 This is for example the conclusion that Marizio Gentilucci and Michael Corballis draw in their essay, “The Hominid That Talked”, in *What Makes Us Human?* Ed. Charles Pasternak, Oxford: Oneworld, 2007, p. 63.
104 Cf. the debate triggered mainly by the cognitive linguist Philip Lieberman in the 1970s. See a more recent “reprise” by Lieberman in “Current views on Neanderthal speech capabilities: A reply to Boe et al. (2002)”, *Journal of Phonetics* 35: 2007): 552-63, and the reply by Boe et al. in the same issue, pp. 564-81. The question of the Neanderthals’ speech capacity (or lack thereof) is highly contested both based on fossil finds (see Donald Johanson and Blake Edgar, *From Lucy to Language*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006, p. 106), and genetic evidence (the presence of the FOXP2 “speech gene” in Neanderthal DNA). The “Great Leap Forward” model as such is equally contested, see for example John V. Canfield, *Becoming Human: The Development of Language, Self, and Self-Consciousness*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007; esp. chapter 5 (“How the Human Got Its Words”), pp. 58-77. In sum, Steven Pinker’s early quib at Lieberman, largely to underscore his own “language instinct” theory, is quite a good heuristic device to explain the remaining uncertainty over the issue: “In any case, e lengeege weth e smell nember of vewels cen reemeen quete expresseve, so we cannot conclude that a hominid with a restricted vowel space had little language”. Steven Pinker, *The Language Instinct*, New York: William Morrow and Company, 1994, p. 354. Gary Tomlinson makes a similar argument regarding “musicking” by Neanderthals: “Neandertals did not sing as modern humans do, and they did not speak a modern language; but their fashioning of the material world preserves traces of powerful cognitive patterns at once protomusical and protolinguistic” (Tomlinson, *A Million Years of Music: The Emergence of Human Modernity*, New York: Zone Books, 2015, p. 172).
humanity” we will discuss Collins’s model in some more detail. This will also allow us to return to Golding – who, however, has never been very far our round-up of recent paleoanthropological positions. In many ways, Collins’s approach complements the idea of “prehistoric fiction” of which Golding’s The Inheritors is a primary example. Collins, however, is not concerned with representations of prehistoric humans per se but seeks to combine paleo-science with rhetoric to investigate “the prehistoric origins of literature”. It extends cognitive psychology and cognitive poetics into the speculative realm of the paleontological, with a special focus on theories about the origins of language and pre- or proto-literate “poetry”. As Collins cautions: “if the object of our search is prehistoric poiesis and the cognitive skills that must have made it possible, we must at the outset lay aside our literate conception of poetry as lines of words printed on white paper rectangles”. In fact, one could say – and this is the interesting parallel between Collins and our approach here – paleopoetics is the “science” equivalent to Golding’s speculative (or imaginary, fictional) attempt to provide his readers with an inside view of Neanderthal “symbolic processes of cognition”. Important premises for Collins are the idea that “the brain is an embodiment of its own evolutionary narrative”, and that “poetry is the brain’s use of language to recover knowledge that is at once deeply past and deeply present”. This presence of the evolutionary past is contained in rhetoric – which, according to Collins, has a pre- and nonhuman dimension – an aspect which resonates with the specific idea of ancestrality pursued by us here:

Communicating social and object information in ways that convinced others of one’s knowledge and trustworthiness became the valuable skill we understand as rhetoric. Rhetoric… serves purposes that predate language and, in fact predate the emergence of our human genus, purposes that include territorial dominance, sexual selection, alliance building, and all those other social negotiations practiced by our primate ancestors. This rhetoric would have been one of postural, gestural, and vocal signs.

Collins thus describes the development of what he refers to as “the presymbolic mind”, or the “cognitive skills essential to verbal art and trace[s] their gradual emergence over the long prehistory of our species”. It speaks for the power of literature, understood as “imaginative writing”, that it is able to thematise, to explore and, in a sense, to produce, as in Golding’s main character, Lok, and the other fictional Neanderthals, the kind of “presymbolic mind” that stands outside and prior to its own existence (in this sense, it certainly shares some of the intuitions of “ancestrality”). One could thus argue that The Inheritors is literature in the meta-literary sense: it fictionalises and depicts its own “paleopoetic” origins. Golding’s project is to allow modern humans to “inhabit” a Neanderthal Umwelt based on empathy and “mind-sharing” in the form of the recognition that “others share with us a common [but also different] set of needs and desires” based on visual perception. What distinguishes Collins’s evolutionary account from Golding’s scheme is that the former focuses on the developmental rather than the conflictual aspect of symbolic world-formation and cognition, i.e. the fictional and real encounter between Neanderthal and Cro-Magnon. Collins, in fact, still subscribes to the “classic” view that “[e]ven if an older species, such as the Neanderthals, had vocal language, they could never have communicated among themselves at the speed, not to mention the semantic and syntactical precision, of Homo sapiens sapiens”. Collins, in fact, differentiates between “pre-language” (which includes manual gestures and sounds used by apes) and “proto-language” (“the

107 Collins, Paleopoetics, p. ix.
108 Ibid., p. 2.
109 Ibid., p. 9.
110 Ibid., p. 11.
111 Ibid., p. 19.
112 Ibid., p. 97.
113 Ibid., p. 116.
symbolic code of syntax-less speech composed of clearly articulated phonemes that many assume had to have been a transitional phase between pre-language and full language.\textsuperscript{114} The special power of literature (and, even more specifically, poetry) lies in what Collins refers to as “paralanguage” (“retained features of the prelinguistic system, deploying that older repertoire of voice and gesture... to convey a broad range of affective states and semantic nuances”).\textsuperscript{115} Imaginative writing like Golding’s – which applies its own “deep-time” powers to an imaginary (i.e. speculative) explanation of how these powers first developed – is thus “a living link to our phylogenetic past... [and] derives its special properties from its power to actualize those older, deeper cognitive levels that still remain within us”.\textsuperscript{116} Fiction, if one follows Collins’s argument to its logical conclusion, is thus always in a sense “prehistoric fiction”, just that in Golding’s case: it is prehistoric fiction that thematises its own prehistorical roots; in short, it is “metaprehistoric fiction”.

We will now have a closer look at Golding’s text and the specific “symbolic cognitive processes” and language used by the Neanderthal characters in his novel. There are a number of features pointed out by both literary critical as well as more specifically linguistic interpretations of \textit{The Inheritors}. In fact, the novel even plays an interesting role within the history of linguistics as a discipline itself, namely in the discussion about the importance of “stylistics”. In 1971, Michael Halliday used \textit{The Inheritors} to promote stylistics as a new approach to reading literature through linguistics.\textsuperscript{117} His main claim is that the novel “provides a remarkable illustration of how grammar can convey levels of meaning in literature”.\textsuperscript{118} According to Halliday, “Golding is offering a ‘particular way of looking at experience’, a vision of things which he ascribes to Neanderthal man; and he conveys this by syntactic prominence, by the frequency with which he selects certain key syntactic options”.\textsuperscript{119} These syntactic patterns Halliday goes on to analyse constitute what he refers to as “syntactic imagery”, and which in the language use attributed by Golding to the Neanderthal group is marked by a “lack of transitive clauses of action with human subjects”.\textsuperscript{120} Stanley Fish in \textit{Is There a Text in This Class?} takes issue with the assumption that “syntactic preferences correlate with habits of meaning”. Instead of stylistics and grammar he wishes to emphasise the role of the reader in interpretation. He criticizes Halliday for what he calls his “Darwinian reading” of Golding in which – like most interpreters focusing on the novel from a linguistic point of view – he follows the paleoanthropological dynamic of “deficiency”. The result is, as Fish claims, that:

\[n\]ot only does Halliday go directly from formal categories to interpretation, but he goes to an interpretation which proclaims the superiority of his formal categories. The survival of the fittest tribe is coincidental with the emergence of the fittest grammar.\textsuperscript{121}

Instead, Fish wishes to promote his own brand of reader-response criticism as a better way of reading literature, since it departs from the assumption that the central meaning-making instance is

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Ibid., p. 107.}
\footnote{Ibid., p. 107.}
\footnote{Ibid., p. 140.}
\footnote{Halliday, p. 347.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Ibid., p. 349.}
\footnote{Stanley Fish, “What Is Stylistics and Why Are They Saying Such terrible Things About It?”, \textit{Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities}, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980, p. 83. As a consequence, the “lack of transitivity is read as a lack of agency because it appears in a book whose central characters are primitive humans”, as David Hoover explains (cf. David L. Hoover, \textit{Language and Style in The Inheritors}, Lanham: University Press of America, 1999, 22). Hoover goes on to provide some important qualifications to both Halliday’s and Fish’s claims as far as the “transitivity” or the apparent “lack” thereof in Lok’s and Fa’s language is concerned in the novel.}
\end{footnotes}
not grammatical or syntactical functions (“as if meanings arose independently of human transaction”) but readers and their “interpretive communities”. Consequently, Fish can frame his attack on Halliday and stylistics in general as a defence of “humanism” against “the desire to be relieved of the burden of interpretation by handing it over to an algorithm, and the fear of being left alone with the self-renewing and unquantifiable power of human signifying”. Curiously, Fish does not object to Halliday’s attempt to characterize the stylistic features used by Golding to create a Neanderthal language as such, but wants to divert the focus on the importance of “affect” (and hence the role of the reader) in stylistics: “when Halliday demonstrates that in the language of the ‘people’ in Golding’s The Inheritors, agency is given not to human but to inanimate subjects (‘the stick grew shorter at both ends’), we can extrapolate from his evidence to the interpretive effort demanded of the reader who must negotiate it”. The fundamental difference, according to Fish, lies in “regarding human beings as passive and disinterested comprehenders of a knowledge external to them (that is, of an objective knowledge)” and “regarding human beings as at every moment creating the experiential spaces into which a personal knowledge flows”. Fish’s claim is important for our context in that it allows us to by-pass the evaluative approach towards Neanderthal language based on an anthropocentric model of “deficiency”. We also believe that a non-normative approach, in this sense, which does not see a Neanderthal “pre-symbolic” mind and “language” as necessarily inferior, is closer to what Golding wanted to achieve in The Inheritors – namely a revision of Wells’s “ogre” image of prehistoric humans and a less triumphalist evaluation of human achievements, and language and culture in particular.

The debate between Halliday and Fish has received a number of commentaries with a view to refining Golding’s “Neanderthal style”. Apart from “misattributing” agency to nonhuman subjects (what we will treat below under the term of “animism”), another “deficiency” at work in the Neanderthal language, at least as described and used by Golding’s narrator, is “underlexicalisation [Roger Fowler’s term]: the use of a restricted vocabulary and the avoidance of terms outside the experience and linguistic resources of the people” (e.g. “stick” for “bow”, “twig” for “arrow”, “log” for “fallen tree” etc.). A good and recent summary of the linguistic argument surrounding The Inheritors is given by Billy Clark, who, from his own “pragmatist” standpoint, focuses on “the inferential processes of readers” that Golding’s fictive linguistic representation of Neanderthal minds plays with or “manipulates”.

122 Fish, p. 84.
123 Ibid., p. 86. It is striking to what extent this exchange from the 1970s and 1980s prefigures the current debate around the use and methodology of the emerging “digital humanities” and the role of empiricism and linguistics within an arguably still predominantly hermeneutic paradigm of literary (and cultural) criticism.
124 Ibid., p. 92.
125 Ibid., p. 94.
126 This does not mean, however, that we should follow Fish in his celebration of the “impossible enterprise of understanding understanding” and the humanist-exceptionalist conclusion that “meaning is human” (Ibid., p. 96). On the contrary, what an analysis of the language of Golding’s Neanderthals will hopefully show is that (human and nonhuman) meaning is produced through an interaction with a human-nonhuman environment which does not allow for a straightforward attribution of agency (transitivity of intransitivity) and circumvents the usual “ablism” that is prevalent in paleoanthropological explanations of hominization. Fish hints at the possibility of such a more ecological and maybe even posthumanist reading when he points out that “[g]iven the evidence... the way seems equally open to an Edenic rather than a Darwinian reading of the novel, a reading in which the language of the ‘people’ reflects (or embodies or enshrines) a lost harmony between man and an animate nature. The triumph of the ‘new people’ would then be a disaster, the beginning of the end, of a decline into the taxonomic aridity of a mechanistic universe” (Ibid., p. 82).
understanding of the story is based on the different kinds of inferential processes we go through when reading different parts of the book.”

It is the contrast between what Halliday designated as “Language A” (the language of the narrator’s account of the first ten chapters of the novel) and “Language B” (used in the final part told from Tuami’s Cro-Magnon or “modern” human perspective) that produces the “inferential challenge” to the reader. The linguistic alienation effects used by Golding in Language A are listed by Clark as the following:

- short, simple sentences, mainly in simple past tense
- body parts and inanimate objects as agents, and as subjects of mental process and perception verbs, and intransitive verbs of motion
- body parts and inanimate objects with attributes normally associated with animate beings
- a small, concentrated, peculiarly distributed vocabulary of short words
- a high proportion of very frequent concrete, physical nouns and verbs
- natural object words used to refer to artifacts, buildings, and boats
- words referring to modern cultural phenomena and activities and names of known places and people are absent.

As such, these characteristics do not necessarily display any “deficiency” until they are mapped onto “cognitive” patterns. De Paola’s reading of The Inheritors is an example of this strategy:

Directly correlating neuroanatomy to intelligence, Golding imagines a brain dysfunction for his Neanderthal population…Golding emphasizes the perceptual experience of Lok (textually mediated through a third-person narrator) from the inside out… The most characteristic aspect of Lok’s consciousness, and one incommensurate with the cultural and technological achievements of the Neanderthal, is… an interruption of nerve-impulse transduction to the brain. Lok, it seems, is unable to process what he senses… But beyond the perceptual level, Lok’s thinking cannot progress: what the early modern humans are doing and how it affects the lost children is incomprehensible to him. Because his interpretative skills are stunted…

De Paola’s aim is to show Golding’s flawed “unscientific” and “conservative” misrepresentation of the Neanderthal having a “fragmented mind” by denying the accuracy of the “brain dysfunction” Golding apparently “inflicted” on his characters. However, it is also possible to just see De Paola’s reaction as a case of over-interpretation. In a sense, just like Halliday’s functional stylistic analysis of the novel, de Paola’s over-reliance on scientific accuracy downplays the “human” interpretive aspect. The fact that Lok’s thoughts “cannot be trusted” does not necessarily have to be mapped onto any kind of (cognitive or cultural) deficiency, “sensory overload” or “cognitive deprivation”. It merely points to the possibility of an “other thinking”, or a “thinking of the other”, and has more to do with the cognitive conundrum that “we” humans usually experience when we are confronted with the possibility and the inscrutability of other minds. It reveals thus just as much about our own cognitive deficiencies as those apparent in any “deviant” theories of mind, whether human, nonhuman or prehuman. Most interpretations of The Inheritors, however, feel somehow compelled to see Lok’s confrontation and fascination with the “new people” as a process of cognitive adaptation or some pedagogical assimilation with all its ambivalent outcomes (although the ambivalence is usually projected from a specific human and quite romantic perspective onto the Neanderthals as having lost their “innocence” in that encounter). Two examples may suffice here: Elizabeth Beck ends

---

129 Clark, p. 187.
130 Clark, “Salient Inferences”, p. 190.
131 De Paola, Human Prehistory in Fiction, p. 75
132 Ibid., p. 76.
133 This is another reminder that the problem of “other minds”, as for example outlined in Thomas Nagel’s influential essay “What is it like to be bat?”.
her investigation of the use of simile, metaphor and underlexicalisation in the novel, as well as Lok’s “acquisition of like as a tool”, by seeing the “enhancement” of the Neanderthals’ “capacity of thinking” as a double-edged sword:

With the acquisition of like as a tool, the people’s capacity for thinking is enhanced. But this brings with it the potential for change, allowing them to become agents instead of passively relying on [the goddess] Oa. So the potential for evil is introduced into their world. It is not meeting the new people which destroys the people: they carry the seeds of change within themselves. Change is essential for survival, though the price is loss of innocence... This language and action together reflect the theme of the novel: the price of the highest achievements of mankind is his potential for evil.\(^{134}\)

Again, it could be argued that Beck’s well-intentioned post-Darwinian reading of the encounter between Neanderthals and Cro-Magnons elides the fact that it is a (modern) human reader who is likely to project his or her own ambiguous feelings of good and evil, innocence and guilt onto Lok as a proto-human, on the one hand, and as “the other human”, on the other hand, to explain his own status as “survivor” after the effect in the form of a reverse teleology. Similarly, Ruddick claims that “[i]n William Golding’s *The Inheritors* the encounter between transitional speech and articulate language is raised into a major tragic theme”,\(^{135}\) the “tragedy” being that humanity’s “marvellous linguistic capacity has turned us into a species capable of liquidating even our closest relatives or neighbors as though they were deadly enemies”.\(^{136}\)

Instead, we would like to align our rereading of Golding’s *The Inheritors* with more recent and also more non-normative approaches to the question of “the other human” and “before humanity”, like for example Thomas Wynn and Frederick Coolidge’s *How to Think Like a Neanderthal*.\(^{137}\) Wynn and Coolidge gather insights from all available scientific data and approaches to deduce and reconstruct a cognitive portrait of likely Neanderthal personality traits, like for example “tenacity; or dogged persistence, wariness especially with regard to strangers; strong emotional attachment” – characteristics that “attest to our common humanity”.\(^{138}\) They present evidence for Neanderthal semantic and procedural memory, theory of mind, symbolic culture (e.g. burial rituals) and speech. What is “missing” in Neanderthal culture (at least there is no or little evidence for it) is technological innovation, representational or symbolic art and complex knowledge of social interaction (e.g. “cheater detection”\(^{139}\)) which leads to the following typical Neanderthal “personality profile”:

- “pragmatic, including callous when necessary; stoic; tolerant of risk; sympathetic and empathetic; neophobic; unimaginative; dogmatic and inflexible; xenophobic; direct but laconic”\(^{140}\). Regardless of the intrinsic value of such an exercise, it is probably fair to say that each and every one has encountered modern *humans* for whom this personality profile is a close fit. Wynn and Coolidge conclude that “a Neanderthal baby raised in a modern human household would grow into a fully functional human adult. His genetic cognitive endowment would be rather different from average, and this would tend to channel him in particular developmental directions, but he could acquire all of the necessary abilities for modern life”.\(^{141}\) We can thus presume that Fa’s and Lok’s child – the only survivor from the encounter with the “new people” and, in fact, adopted by them – has a good

\(^{134}\) Beck, “Metaphor, simile and cognition...”, p. 47.


\(^{136}\) Ibid., p. 179.


\(^{138}\) Wynn and Coolidge, p. 20.

\(^{139}\) Ibid., pp. 96-98.

\(^{140}\) Ibid., p. 169.

\(^{141}\) Ibid., pp. 181-182.
chance to grow into his new community and maybe even pass on his genetic material to us.\footnote{And may thus be, following Golding’s “visionary” insight, responsible for the Neanderthal genetic information found in modern humans.} Most interesting, however, because of its similarity with Golding’s fictionalisation (although there is no evidence of any influence), is Wynn and Coolidge’s speculative version the encounter of Neanderthal and Cro-Magnon leading to the former’s demise:

This story of modern humans is often presented as a tale of evolutionary success, of the triumph of brains over brawn. Here we would like to present it as a sad tale of cultural incompatibility and evolutionary doom.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 184-185.}

The “cultural encounter” is thus not that different from more recent fateful “encounters” between “incompatible” cultures, or indeed from contemporary theories about “clashes of civilisation” in the age of globalisation and cultural imperialism. The description of the encounter with the “fearsome others” from the perspective of the Neanderthals provided by Wynn and Coolidge very much resemble Lok’s experience as portrayed in The Inheritors:

The foreigners, whom we will dub Cro-Magnons, had a very strange appearance. They were tall, several inches taller than the tallest Neanderthal man. They had dark skin and dark hair, very unlike the light hair and eyes of Neanderthals. They covered themselves head to toe in tight-fitting, tailored clothes. When they removed their clothes their bodies were thin and poorly muscled... But their heads were oddest of all. They had bulbous heads with very small, child-like faces, small noses, and ugly protruding chins.\footnote{Ibid., p. 185.} (185)

Wynn and Coolidge ultimately come to the same conclusion as the reader of Golding’s The Inheritors might do, namely that the “ultimate fate of the Neanderthals”, in their speculative existence within imagination or fact, science and/or fiction, is “to live on as inexact mirrors of ourselves”.\footnote{The mirror function of the Neanderthals is also stressed by the Musée de l’homme in Paris with its recent exhibition focus on the Neanderthal, as the daily Le Monde describes: “Hier décrit comme une brute épaisse, aujourd’hui comme un pacifiste écolo, Neandertal nous tend un miroir: parler de lui, c’est parler de nous” (Pierre Barthélémy, “Ce que Neandertal dit de nous Neandertal, une autre humanité ?”, Le Monde, Cahiers du « Monde » 22770 (28 March 2018), p. 3).}

\textbf{ANCESTRALITY 3: Animism without Humans [see separate file] run as text box alongside section 5}

\section{Animism and Empathy}

Virtually all species that have ever lived have gone extinct.\footnote{Donald Johanson and Blake Edgar, From Lucy to Language, p. 107.}

Panpsychism seems especially relevant today, in the light of the “nonhuman turn” in critical discourse and the growth of speculative realism.\footnote{Steven Shaviro, The Universe of Things: On Speculative Realism, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014, p. 86.}

I want to know what it is like for a bat to be bat... The fact that we cannot expect ever to accommodate in our language a detailed description of Martian or bat phenomenology should
not lead us to dismiss as meaningless the claim that bats and Martians have experiences fully comparable in richness of detail to our own.  

A key role in linking Golding, Neanderthal thinking and the kind of proto-posthumanism contained in the phrase “before humanity” goes through the questions of animism and empathy. Animism or animistic beliefs are probably the linguistic and cultural markers that are most closely correlated with marking the Neanderthal perspective as more “primitive” as that of the Cro-Magnons. David Hoover begins his analysis, _Language and Style in The Inheritors_, accordingly:

When we learn that “The log has gone away”, the animism that this sentence suggests reinforces the sentience of Lok’s feet. More hints of animism quickly follow it:

The water was not awake like the river or the fall but asleep, spreading there to the river and waking-up... Fa! The log has gone away. I did not move the log to make people laugh. It has gone.

Perhaps in other contexts these would be simple personifications, but in a novel about primitive man they seem more or other than that: they suggest a world in which everything is alive.

Other features in Neanderthal cognitive behaviour like the “telepathic” sharing of “pictures” further reinforce the impression of “magic” and create what Hoover calls an “animistic mind style” the reader of Golding’s novel is presented with in the first ten chapters, narrated by a third-person narrator who slips in and out of Lok’s perspective. The effect is that “we see events and objects of the fictional world through a primitive consciousness in a way that simultaneously allows us to understand them as normal and see that the Neanderthal understanding is quite different”.

Hoover goes on to dedicate an entire chapter to the question of “Transitivity, Agency, and Animism”, in which he supplements Halliday’s findings about “the frequent use of body parts and inanimate objects as subjects of transitive verbs” with a less normative view that says that “these unusual subjects are more reasonably interpreted as an aspect of the animism of the world of the Neanderthals than as a sign of their inferiority or inadequacy”. In fact, it is the new people who might be said to have lost the important ability to communicate “telepathically”, which suggests, according

---

148 Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, in _Mortal Questions_, pp. 169, 170. Dorothy L. Cheney and Robert M. Seyfarth extend Nagel’s argument about “other minds” to monkeys in _How Monkeys See the World: Inside the Mind of Another Species_, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. Their conclusion as to whether monkeys have a “theory of mind” could be taken word-for-word as an intervention within the question of the encounter between Neanderthals and Cro-Magnons in Golding and also more generally:

In sum, many fundamental differences in social behaviour between human and nonhuman primates depend on the presence, or lack, of a _theory of mind_: whether individuals can recognize their own knowledge and attribute mental states to others. Apparently, monkeys see the world as composed of things that act, not things that think and feel. Although they are acutely sensitive to other animals’ behaviour, they know little about the knowledge or motives that causes animals to do what they do. In a monkey’s world, the knowledge possessed by an individual exists in a kind of vacuum: the individual does not know what he knows and cannot recognize knowledge (or lack of it) in others. (p. 308)

The parallels with Lok’s apparent “limitations” and his “animism” could not be more evident. We will discuss the implications of the ape-human analogy in more detail in Intermezzo 1 below.

149 Golding, _The Inheritors_, p. 12.
150 Ibid.
151 Hoover, _Language and Style in The Inheritors_, p. 3.
152 Hoover, p. 9.
153 Ibid., p. 7.
to Hoover, that “the animism of the body parts of the Neanderthals should not be seen as demonstrating inferiority”. Hoover’s explanation is that:

Golding makes effective use of agentive body parts, body parts as subjects of verbs of mental process or perception, and body parts as subjects of intransitive verbs in creating his anistmistic, alien, and primitive fictional world. Although such body parts sometimes suggest that no conscious control is being exerted where we might expect it, they also suggest extraordinary abilities for the Neanderthals and a kind of distributed sentience in which body parts have their own kinds of knowledge and will.

If “animistic” and “alien worlds”, “extraordinary abilities” and “distributed sentience” sound a little like science fiction – which returns us to the ambivalent generic classification of prehistoric fiction we started with – they also resonate with current ecological and posthumanist or postanthropocentric thinking. Graham Harvey, for example, explains what he refers to as the “new animism” in the following terms:

Animists are people who recognise that the world is full of persons, only some of whom are human, and that life is always lived in relationship with others. Animism is lived out in various ways that are all about learning to act respectfully (carefully and constructively) towards and among other persons.

The reverse, positive, side of “primitiveness” is usually some form of “authenticity” and, as is the case in Golding’s Neanderthals, is likely to involve attributions of innocence and closeness to nature, as opposed to the “alienating” effects of “modern life” (a view that, in turn, is normally based on an instrumental notion of technology). Ironically, then, in the context of the renewed current interest in the “nonhuman”, “object ontology”, “new vitalism”, a rethinking of “materialism” and a revision of the nature/culture divide, it might be Golding’s Neanderthals who are closer to present-day “moderns” (in Latour’s sense). Jane Bennett’s work, which is often associated with a (re)turn to materialism, for example, speaks of a renewed “enchantment as a weak ontology” and of “vibrant matter”. What this approach shares with animism is the focus on the “active role of nonhuman materials in public life” and the insight that “we are also nonhuman and that things, too, are vital players in the world”, which might “generate a more subtle awareness of the complicated web of dissonant connections between bodies, and will enable wiser interventions into that ecology”. Consequently, Bennett also reclaims of a form of “new primitivism” when she discusses the conceptual framework that might be necessary to achieve the “vibrant materialism” she advocates and which requires developing a renewed capacity for “naiveté”. “One tactic”, she writes, “might be to revisit and become temporarily infected by discredited philosophies of nature, risking ‘the taint of superstition, animism, vitalism, anthropomorphism, and other premodern attitudes’”. As strategic, projected, speculative (or, indeed, all of these) as Bennett’s list may be, there is no better way to characterise the beliefs of Golding’s Neanderthals, who stand “before humanity”.

---

154 Ibid., pp. 53-54.
155 Ibid., p. 69.
159 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, pp. 3-4.
A good indication of a contemporary return to animism and its associated belief in “panpsychism” can be found in David Skrbina’s collection *The Mind Abides.* 161 Particularly interesting in this respect and for our purposes are also Ian Bogost’s *Alien Phenomenology* and Steven Shaviro’s *The Universe of Things.* 162 Both volumes are informed by Meillassoux’s notion of “ancestralty” and take a “speculative realist” and “anti-correlationist” stance. 163 Bogost specifically relates his proposal of a speculative phenomenology from the point of view of an “alien” to the “abandonment of anthropocentric narrative coherence in favour of worldly detail”. 164 He approvingly cites Graham Harman who writes: “For we ourselves, just like Neanderthals, sparrows, mushrooms, and dirt, have never done anything else than act amidst the bustle of other actants”. 165 Like Bennett’s “enchantment”, Bogost’s alien phenomenology banks on the alienation effects that arise from a repositioning of the apparently familiar – in his word: “wonder”: “The posture one takes before the alien is that of curiosity, of wonder”. 166 And, as we would argue, this posture is also one that presupposes at least some minimal form of “empathy”. 167 However that does not mean that this empathy necessarily needs to be “human-centred” or, indeed, that it needs to be understood as in any way morally “redeeming” in a humanist sense. 168

161 David Skrbina, ed., *The Mind Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium*, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2009. The volume contains, among many others, interventions by Graham Harman and Iain Hamilton Grant, both associated with “speculative realism” or “object-oriented-ontology”. See also Thomas Nagel’s excellent essay on panpsychism in *Mortal Questions*, Cambridge: CUP, 1979, pp. 181-95; and John Protevi, *Life, War, Earth: Deleuze and the Sciences*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013. Protevi discusses panpsychism in relation to Deleuze’s “larval subjects” and “spatiotemporal dynamisms” to illuminate one of the main problems that both speculative realists and critical posthumanists have tried to address, namely the question of the “before”, or how to explain “emergence” (e.g. of the human). As Protevi writes: “Is there a point of emergence we can locate? That’s what panpsychists deny. For them, it is mind all the way down” (p. 195). “Mind all the way down” may be an excellent phrase to capture a non-normative and non-ablist conceptual framework for a different kind of paleoanthropology without any anthropocentric reverse teleology to legitimate it.


163 For a more detailed discussion of speculative realism, posthumanism and *before humanity* see the “Preamble” above, which also comments on Quentin Meillassoux’s notion of “ancestralty”.

164 Bogost, *Alien Phenomenology*, p. 41-42. This is realised by the alien phenomenologist in a practice that Bogost, following Bruno Latour, calls “ontography”. The parallels between these ideas and Golding’s selected “alien mind style” for his Neanderthals in our view is obvious.


166 Bogost, p. 133.

167 This only seemingly goes against Thomas Nagel’s take on “Martian” or “bat phenomenology” cited as epigraph to the current section. Nagel would like us to work towards an “objective phenomenology not dependent on empathy or the imagination” and to “approach the gap between subjective and objective from another direction” by a “more objective understanding of the mental in its own right” (Nagel, p. 449). The kind of “speculation” that speculative realism proposes has very little to do with what Nagel refers to as “imagination”, while the kind of minimal empathy we suggest as necessary and always already at work in even the most panpsychic or animistic perspective, even including object-oriented-ontology, is not necessarily clearly attributable to either a subject or an object, nor to human or nonhuman forms of agency. In that sense, this primary form of empathy is “posthumanist” or “postanthropocentric”. It “happens” *before* (and outside of) the human.

168 Empathy also plays an important role in the study of nonhuman primates, see Kirstin Andrews and Lori Gruen, “Empathy in Other Apes”, Heidi L. in Maibom, ed., *Empathy and Morality*, Oxford: OUP, 2014, pp. 193-209. As Andrews and Gruen explain in their conclusion:
Golding’s *The Inheritors* certainly is a novel that foregrounds this kind of empathy on various levels. And the entire paleoanthropological question that is raised by the encounter scenario between the Neanderthals and the Cro-Magnons – whether fictive or factual – could be reframed as a *crisis* of empathy, or as the question: what is (or was) empathy before humanity? Golding’s strategy of shifting perspectives between Neanderthals and modern human ancestors only really makes sense if one also foregrounds the aspect of reader empathy (as a minimal form of reader response). In the case of our reading of *The Inheritors* in the light of the “nonhuman turn” referred to by Steven Shaviro in the second epigraph to this section169 most certainly corresponds to what Suzanne Keen, in her *Empathy and the Novel*, describes as empathy’s context specificity:

> Readers’ empathy for situations depicted in fiction may be enhanced by chance relevance to particular historical, economic, cultural, or social circumstances, either in the moment of the first publication or in later times, fortuitously anticipated or prophetically foreseen by the novelist.170

How “fortuitous” or “prophetic” Golding’s empathic representation of Neanderthal animism in the novel may be, as already shown, has been the subject of much of the literary criticism and the highly emotionally charged responses it has received.171 It is only through the reader’s ability to empathise with the Neanderthals and their “alien mind style” that the novel might create the kind of repositioning between “self” and “other” that would lift the Neanderthals out of their “subhumanity”. This is thus what constitutes “Golding’s pity”, as Barbara Everett writes:

> The most tenderly “pitiful” of Golding’s novels in practice is *The Inheritors*... The story itself explains our double ancestry in terms of two children of the People, one eaten by the New Men and the other likely when full grown to interbreed with them. But the whole book explains it too in the way that it involves the affection, the complicity, and then the shame of the reader. As a result of this double inheritance *The Inheritors* is “pitiful”; but it betrays at the same time that moral ambiguity of pity which by its conflicts generates much of the charge of Golding’s writing.172

The moral ambiguity Everett refers to lies in the fact that “pity” and “shame” experienced at the suffering of the “ape-man like” Lok and his “sadness” may ultimately serve as a reconfirmation of human (moral) superiority. In this sense, empathy (and even less pity) are always in danger of being compromised by humanist anthropocentrism. However, it is also a prerequisite to get humans interested in the nonhuman (or in this case, the otherwise human) in first place, because it is

---

The nature of particular entanglements and how and whether empathic responsiveness emerges (or doesn’t) within them is an important area of study, and exploring empathy among other apes with this framework in mind may lead to insights not just about what apes can and can’t do, but also how humans might rethink empathy and ethics. (p. 209)

For further comment please see Intermezzo 1 below. The eminent primatologist Frans de Waal also claims that empathy is by no means an exclusively human characteristic. Indeed, in his work de Waal insists that humans should learn from nature’s “lessons for a kinder society” (cf. Frans de Waal, *The Age of Empathy: Nature’s Lessons for a Kinder Society*, New York: Three Rivers Press, 2009; see also his *Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved*, Princeton: PUP, 2006).


171 Golding’s case for the Neanderthals would probably fall under the categories of both “ambassadorial” and “broadcast strategic empathy”; cf. Keen, pp. 170-71. For further elaboration on the topic see Meghan Marie Hammond and Sue J. Kim, eds., *Rethinking Empathy through Literature*, New York: Routledge, 2014.

fundamental to any “theory of mind”, as an “ability to attribute mental states to self and others and to interpret, predict, and explain behaviour in terms of mental states such as intentions, beliefs, and desires”. The kind of empathy necessary to recognize the Neanderthals as fellow humans thus involves a projection, an anticipation of a reciprocity and some form of “emotional contagion” – a theory of mind projected towards the human other or the other human. In The Inheritors this reciprocity is foregrounded: the (human) reader empathises with the (prehuman) other as this pre-or nonhuman mind itself empathically engages with the human mind that will prove to be its successor and thus its greatest threat. Empathy in this context could be seen not so much as a moral or “humanizing” device but as a “phatic” pre-condition for any “encounter” to occur in the first place. Much like Emmanuel Levinas’s primacy of ethics over ontology, empathy would thus function as pre-condition or “imperative” for an encounter with any other (human, nonhuman, object…). While Levinas gives this imperative a human “face”, nonhuman or indeed posthuman and posthumanist forms of address are eminently thinkable and have always been part of everyday experience. Once the specificity of the kind of encounter that is fictionalised in Golding’s novel can be seen against the background of the general, postanthropocentric and posthumanist, idea of and the factual possibilities of nonhuman-human, nonhuman-nonhuman forms of encounter, the notion of “before humanity” takes on its full meaning: it is the encounter with the human as well as the nonhuman which produces “humanity”. The crux lies in the challenge to resist turning this “fact” into some form of “legitimation post factum”, or, in other words, the challenge lies in alternative accounts of “becoming human.”

6. **Becoming Human?**

We should not let the uniqueness of our species dupe us into believing that we are the product of special forces.

The central questions of [The Inheritors] concern the nature and future of man and society. By placing us in the minds of our extinct cousins and then shifting us to the mind of Tuami, our

---


174 Zahavi traces the origins of the philosophical notion of empathy (Einfühlung) to the late 19th century German philosopher and psychologist Theodor Lipps, who specifically uses what could be called a fundamentally animistic thrust within empathy:

> If I experience trees or mountains as animated or besouled, if I hear the wind and experience it as having a melancholy sound, or see a cloud and experience it as threatening, the source of such psychological content is in fact myself... What is really happening is that I am projecting part of myself into these external objects... and this is for Lipps what empathy more or less is about. To feel empathy is to experience a part of one’s own psychological life as belonging to or in an external object; it is to penetrate and suffuse that object with one’s own life. (p. 104)

This is precisely the kind of subjectivism and solipsism that Nagel has in mind when he wishes to turn away from empathy as a regulative mechanism for any objective “alien phenomenology” (see above). However, more recent neurological findings on so-called “mirror neurons” show that there are forms of empathy that are “hard-wired” into human cognitive behaviour. See for example Heidi L. Maibom’s very good “Introduction: (Almost) Everything You Ever Wanted to Know about Empathy”, *Empathy and Morality*, ed. Heidi L. Maibom, Oxford: OUP, 2014, pp. 1-40, and Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie, eds., *Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives*, Oxford: OUP, 2011. In fact, this evolutionarily beneficial genetic and biological form of “empathy” is seen by the primatologist Frans de Waal as our “greatest hope”; see his *The Age of Empathy: Nature’s Lessons for a Kinder Society*, New York: Three Rivers Press, 2009; and our comments in Intermezzo 1 below.

spiritual and biological ancestor, Golding shows us imaginatively what was, what could have been and what we are. What he cannot show us is what we may become.  

The very term “humanitarianism” has long been suspect precisely because sentiments for humanity generally did not translate easily into care for humanity at hand...  

As far as Golding’s account of “becoming human” in The Inheritors is concerned, it has to be placed historically within the humanist reaction to the inhuman atrocities committed in the first half of the 20th century. Paul Crawford refers to Lord of the Flies and The Inheritors as “literature of atrocity” in which Golding “interrogates English ‘immunity’ from totalitarian violence”. 178 Crawford (also following Stephen Boyd) 179 thus sees Golding’s Neanderthals in typically post-Holocaust anti-racist and humanitarian terms:  

In The Inheritors, the “shock tactic” of breaking fantastic hesitation brings a startling recognition that “civilized” human beings commit genocide against those they project as monstrous “ogres” or devils. The Cro-Magnon people, progenitors of Homo sapiens, exterminate a race that, Boyd argues, resemble the Jews. The fantastic tension between the real and unreal in all these novels is strongly evocative of the Holocaust experience and the kind of writing it provoked. 180  

However, at the beginning of the 21st century the context in which The Inheritors will be read is somewhat different. Not that genocide has been eradicated, maybe on the contrary, but the very notion of “humanity” on which 20th-century humanitarian humanism was built may be about to implode due to a combination of ecological, technological and cultural changes. The humanist idea of a human nature has come under serious attack both in its evolutionary biological and its religious-philosophical-metaphysical version. The result is that human exceptionalism both from a scientific as well as from a philosophical point of view has become increasingly untenable and has been giving way to what we have already referred to as a posthumanist or postanthropocentric view. Recent discussions about the “Anthropocene” as a new geological period (beginning with 19th century industrialization, or indeed, as early as the “agricultural revolution” in the Paleolithic, so just after the fateful encounter between Neanderthal and Cro-Magnon or even as a result of that encounter) 181 in which humans become the single most influential factor of climate change has also contributed to an ecological rethinking of “humanity” within the context of dramatically diminishing “biodiversity” and human-induced environmental deterioration like global warming. On the one hand, humans are today called upon to reverse their exploitative and supremacist, speciesist behaviour to avoid various extinction scenarios, while, on the other hand, human exceptionalism is relativized by stressing the “entanglement” between humans and nonhumans and their environments and the need for new materialist thinking (like the approaches we have seen in Jane Bennett, the speculative realists, or new feminist materialist thinkers like Karen Barad, Vicki Kirby or Rosi Braidotti). One of the side-
effects of this development is also the outlined “retroactive” change (or “reverse teleology”) of the relationship with our “ancestors”. The erosion of the species “human” and of the (moral) category “humanity” is also related to the crisis in paleoanthropology that we have been tracing through our reading of Golding’s *The Inheritors*. If, as a result, we find ourselves “before humanity” (again), the aporia we face is that neither exceptionalism nor inclusivity seems an adequate tactic in the time of “global climate change” and the “posthuman”.

However, “why would one believe that mere species being is the foundation for treating someone else morally?” In asking this question, Thomas Laqueur articulates the main philosophical anti-speciesist argument against humanism. But it is also from a paleo-eco-anthropological point of view that the relationship to prehumanity complicates human speciesism and exceptionalism, as Johanson and Edgar explain, in their reply to the question “Will Humans Become Extinct?”:

> Extinction is as natural a process as speciation and evolution. Just as every individual life has its end, so every species, if we look back through the fossil record, ultimately comes to pass... So, if strictly we consider the odds from the past, then yes, we are likely to go extinct. We are the sole survivors of a relatively small and unusual family of primates, which are a peculiar group of mammals. We have reached a position of unparalleled dominance in the natural world in terms of our use of diverse resources and ability to alter environments, often to detrimental effect... As for us, the conditions for significant evolutionary change in our species have been greatly diminished, perhaps eliminated... Culture is our key survival strategy, as long as we can keep the planet intact and alive.

The combination of “extinction angst” in the face of “climate change” require both a new humility as well as an increased responsibility for humans. Both extend “forward” (to our “posthuman” future) as well as “backward” (into our “prehuman” past):

> To be good custodians of Earth, a responsibility our brains and adaptive capabilities impose on us, we must have the foresight to consider the extended future as well as the hindsight to take lessons from our ancient ancestors.

These, then, are the challenges within the intellectual climate. Re-read in this context, *The Inheritors*, as Anat Pick explains, mainly remains relevant because of its “creaturely (eco)poetics” and its implied “possibility of transcending the distinctions of species”. For Pick, Golding’s importance lies in the fact that he “rejects anthropocentric history and opens up the historical to a nonhuman dimension, which, in his own historical reflections, Benjamin called the creaturely”.

Reminding humans of their (shared) “creatureliness” is a strategic move that brings together the anti-imperialism of postcolonial studies and the anti-speciesism of animal studies. However, this still does not do justice to the rather special case of the Neanderthals and that of the “other human” in general – which is neither explicable on the basis of human exceptionalism nor of creaturely inclusivity. Prehumanity complicates the question of “subhumanity”, racism and speciesism. The challenge contained in the phrase “before humanity” lies in the Neanderthal’s (the prehuman’s or the other human’s) “demythification”. It speaks to the question, posed by Felipe Fernandez-

---

182 Laqueur, p. 31.
183 Johanson and Edgar, *From Lucy to Language*, pp. 107, 111.
184 Johanson and Edgar, p. 112.
186 Pick, p. 54.
187 Ibid., p. 71.
Armesto as “the evolutionary predicament”: “How should our common ancestors be classed: as human, or as non-human animals? (...) is humankind a coherent concept? At what point in the history of evolution might it make sense to distinguish humans from non-humans?”189 The implications, as we have seen, lead to the impossible decision at the current crossroads, namely the one between “becoming human”190 and “ceasing to be human”.191 Neither form of this ultimate anthropogenic desire can be trusted, since both imperatives would have to be obeyed at the same time.192

“The Neanderthal’ is the body who, following Roland Barthes, lies at the bottom of history; history is against this body and is nourished by it; the body nurtures history, but it remains indifferent to it.”


Were they still extant today, would we consider them human? Would that decision be affected of they were significantly less developed cognitively than modern humans? Would we grant them the same rights and privileges that are granted to all people, whatever their disabilities, in a modern civilized society? ... If Neanderthals are considered as human, when in hominid evolution was the threshold to humanity crossed?”

As Steven Connor explains in his “Foreword” to Becoming Human: New Perspectives on the Inhuman Condition (ed. Paul Sheehan, Westport: Praeger, 2003, p. xi): “To become human is always to become more, or less, than human”.

Cf. Gerald L. Bruns, On Ceasing to Be Human, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011. Bruns’s conceptual point of departure for his journey around contemporary notions of the “vanishing human” are the two questions Jean-François Lyotard poses in The Inhuman with regard to humanism: “What if human beings, in humanism’s sense, were in the process of becoming inhuman? And what if what is ‘proper’ to humankind were to be inhabited by the inhuman?” (Lyotard, The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991, p. 2; Bruns’s quote is on p. 13).

This is also why an “anti-humanist” stance à la Foucault ultimately cannot be trusted, as Connor makes clear: “If the face of the human is being effaced by the sand it may yet be possible to say of the human that nothing becomes it so well as the manner of its taking leave of itself” (Connor, “Foreword”, p. xvi). The consequence, as we have been arguing, is to embrace the compromise of a critical posthumanism.