Ancestrality 3:

Animism without Humans and Belief without Belief

Perhaps there are lives not really worth living; but how could one simply not take seriously a life, any life?¹

Posthuman animism is interested in recovering mystery and enchantment, and proliferating relationships filled with meetings of otherness.²

Posthumanism, we might conclude, is not posthuman enough.³

There is something ancestral about animism. It seems like a prehistoric relic in our modern world to remind us of a world before humanity, a time before human exceptionalism, humanism and anthropology. Animism, however, was never far from modern rationalism. Its history is one of repression (and haunting returns) not supersession. It is part of the modern human unconscious and such it is making a return precisely at a time the human is “troubled” both by its significant others, against which it is used to define itself (the animal, the machine, the object etc.) and its “environment” (and its destruction). Animism, characterised by its “respect for life”, under posthuman(ist) circumstances, suddenly seems like a way forward rather than a step back...

In taking the “other” and their belief(s) “seriously” as Viveiros de Castro suggests above (see the first epigraph), anthropology “must construct a concept of seriousness (a way of taking things seriously) that is not tied to the notion of belief or of any other ‘propositional attitudes’ that have representations as their object”.⁴ This “belief without belief”, as one might call it, must allow for the fact “that ‘visions’ are not beliefs, not consensual views, but rather worlds seen objectively: not worldviews, but worlds of vision (and not vision only...)”. Apart from this move of suspension of (dis)belief, Viveiros de Castro claims a second principle for (contemporary or “new”) anthropology, namely the principle of “reciprocity” in the sense that “while we strive to take seriously things that are far from or outside of us, almost all of the things that we must not take seriously are near to or inside us”.⁵ What drives this programmatic double move – an impossible quest for “authenticity” that pushes the anthropologist towards taking the other life and the life of the other “seriously” – is the idea that “anthropology is over once the anthropologist believes that the fantasy has been realized and that he or she has ‘really’ found a life worth living”.⁶

However, taking another life seriously (as an entire “sensual world”) doesn’t mean taking it literally, as Viveiros de Castro adds:

The idea that “to take seriously” is synonymous with “to take literally” and, further, that to take literally means ‘to believe in’ strikes me as singularly naïve (or else the opposite – a case

³ Ian Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, or What It’s like to Be a Thing, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012, p. 8.
⁴ Viveiros de Castro, p. 133.
⁵ Ibid.
⁶ Ibid., p. 144.
of bad faith). Only by being too literal-minded could one fail to understand that to take anything literally is heavy work, requiring good provision of symbolic competence rather than infinite credulity.\(^7\)

Taking literally is “heavy work” indeed, particularly if applied to animism, which cannot just be seen as a set of “opinions” or “alien thoughts” of “other people”, especially, as we would add, when these people (or their peoples) are, literally, no longer around, as in the case of those humans before humanity we are concerned with here. It is not a question to believe the beliefs of Neanderthals (even if we could be sure to know what exactly they believed in), which would mean to give up our own, but it can also not be the aim to not take them seriously, as “minor” (primitive, prehistoric, prehuman...), which would mean to justify some kind of superiority on “our” side. Viveiros uses Deleuze’s notion of Autrui to clarify what for him is the arch-antropological procedure:

...the other, another – is an expression of a possible world, but this world has always to be actualized by the self, in the normal course of social interaction... When I develop the world expressed by the other to validate it as real and enter into it or to disavow it as unreal. Explication in this way introduces the element of belief.\(^8\)

The other (human, nonhuman, posthuman, prehuman) is thus to be understood as an “expression of a possible world”.\(^9\) And “alien thoughts” are sustained as possibility by “neither relinquishing them as fantasies of others, nor fantasizing about them as leading to the true reality”.\(^10\) In this vein, we are here proposing to take seriously, if not literally, the possibility of an “animism without humans”.

“Believing” in Animism

...anthropology is alterity that becomes alterity (and I mean “becomes” also in the sense of “that hat becomes you”).\(^11\)

We do not believe in fetishism, but yet we are fetishistic. We know this, but yet... we cannot leave it be. If this is the case, something has to change in our modern, confident, enlightened sense of self. More clarity is needed regarding our relationship to things, and they should be assigned a much stronger position in the psychological and cultural economy than we have previously been prepared to give them.\(^12\)

Animism (and its conceptual twin, “fetishism”) isn’t just any concept for anthropology. One could argue it is foundational to it\(^13\) – epitomized in the figure of Edward Burnett Tylor, first chair of anthropology and thus founding father of the modern discipline.\(^14\) Tylor’s Primitive Culture (1871) is without doubt the problematic “origin” with its repressed but enduring colonial legacy of “the

\(^{7}\) Ibid., p. 145.

\(^{8}\) Ibid., pp. 136-137.


\(^{10}\) Viveiros de Castro, p. 137.

\(^{11}\) Ibid., p. 145.


\(^{13}\) Cf. for example Nurit Bird-David: “The concept of animism, which E.B. Tylor developed in his 1871 masterwork Primitive Culture, is one of anthropology’s earliest concepts, if not the first”. A statement explained by a footnote which says: “Primitive Culture led Tylor to an appointment as reader in Anthropology in Oxford University, the first such position in the academic world” (Bird-David, “Animism’ Revisited Personhood, Environment, and Relational Epistemology”, Current Anthropology 40 S1 (1999): 67).

science of man”.15 In the first volume, The Origins of Culture, Tylor strategically brings animistic beliefs into the focus of “disinterested” and “rational” modern social science: “Far from its beliefs and practices being a rubbish-heap of miscellaneous folly, they [the general principles of savage religion] are consistent and logical in so high a degree as to begin, as soon as even roughly classified, to display the principles of their formation and development; and these principles prove to be essentially rational, though working in a mental condition of intense and inveterate ignorance”.16 What comes across as a bold move in defence of the “savage mind” in fact doubles up discursively as a self-legitimating gesture of the establishment of a new discipline and institution, which seeks to historically and rationally legitimate itself through comparison with its (“primitive”) precursors. Tyler can barely contain his (anti)religious zeal in announcing that “[i]t is with a sense of attempting an investigation which bears very closely on the current theology of our own day, that I have set myself to examine systematically, among the lower races, the development of Animism; that is to say, the doctrine of souls and other spiritual beings in general”.17 This is nothing but the promise of a step from irrational to rational belief which is so characteristic of late 19th century (secular) humanism – or believing without belief, as Viveiros de Castro above keeps defending it. There is thus rational and irrational belief, and the modern discipline of anthropology is called upon to investigate the difference:

Not merely as a matter of research, but as an important practical guide to the understanding of the present and the shaping of the future, the investigation into the origin and early development of civilization must be pushed on zealously. Every possible avenue of knowledge must be explored, every door tried to see if it is open. No kind of evidence need be left untouched on the score of remoteness or complexity, of minuteness or triviality.18

Nothing could be more frighteningly and promisingly “modern”, nothing could be less aware of its impact even to a contemporary research management standard (cf. “an important practical guide”, of “the present and the shaping of the future”). The “outlines of a philosophy of pramaeval history”, however, will be designed to elucidate the “early stages of our mental evolution [which] lie distant from us in time as the stars lie distant from us in space”, thankfully, is “not limited with the direct observation of our senses”;19 Tylor continues. From the start, Tylor’s was a struggle with religion (i.e. “belief” – the minimal definition of religion being “belief in spiritual beings”, according to Paul Radin),20 while animism (or “magic”) is nothing but “primitive” (or proto-) religion”. As such its value lies in being instrumental for demonstrating modern civilizational “progress” and pointing towards a post-religious, secular, scientific, enlightened and most importantly “ethical” future: “Are there, or have there been, tribes of men so low in culture as to have no religious conceptions whatever?”, Tylor begins his detailed study – which is another way of asking about the possibility of a “belief without belief”, one could argue – and which, however, is instantly dismissed:

The case is in some degree similar to that of the tribes asserted to exist without language or without the use of fire; nothing in the nature of things seems to forbid the possibility of such existence, but as a matter of fact the tribes are not found. Thus the assertion that rude non-religious tribes have been known in actual existence, though in theory possible, and perhaps in

16 Tylor, Primitive Culture 1, p. 23.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., p. 24.
19 Ibid., p. 25.
20 In his introduction to Tylor’s Primitive Culture 2, p. x.
fact true, does not at present rest on that sufficient proof which, for an exceptional state of things, we are entitled to demand.  

Where to start with a passage like this one? So, at some degree zero, everyone, every human, must have been (and continues to be) “at least” an animist. The absence of belief (in spiritual being) is as unbelievable as the absence of language (if not “technology”, here represented by “fire”). Belief is “originary”, co-constitutional of any (human) “tribe”, for Tylor, it seems. It is rational to believe, to assume belief (even if a “non-religious condition” cannot be excluded out of which “man” might have emerged, as Tylor admits). Nevertheless, Tylor’s Promethean gesture lays down the following (anthropological) law: “I propose here, under the name of Animism, to investigate the deep-lying doctrine of Spiritual Beings, which embodies the very essence of Spiritualistic as opposed to Materialistic philosophy”. Materialism – which thus becomes another synonym for “belief without belief”, or, indeed, a “philosophy” that believes in the existence of matter over mind, or spirit, or belief – is called upon to trace the spiritual development of the human race from animism to a modern philosophy of religion as a “measurement” of humanity’s hominization (or “civilization”):

Animism characterizes tribes very low in the scale of humanity, and thence ascends, deeply modified in its transmission, but from first to last preserving an unbroken continuity, into the midst of high modern culture... Animism is, in fact, the groundwork of the Philosophy of Religion, from that of savages up to that of civilized men. And although it may at first sight seem to afford but a bare and meagre definition of a minimum of religion, it will be found practically sufficient; for where the root is, the branches will generally be produced.

Tylor thus pays a very high price for legitimating an “anthropological” take on the history and philosophy of religion as an explanation of how we became human. Animism here is in fact used as “originary supplement” to modern “civilization”. It is (necessarily) characterized by both supersession and continuity, which provokes the question of what was missing from (primitive) animism in the first place? Tylor’s answer is this: “It is that the conjunction of ethics and Animistic philosophy, so intimate and powerful in the higher culture, seems scarcely yet to have begun in the lower”. What separates “lower” and “higher” humans in the history of animistic or (proto)religious thought and what motivates anthropology’s investigation into “the connexion between similar ideas and rites in the religion of the savage and the civilized world” is, in one word, “ethics”. Needless to say how hollow this must sound to “us”, at the back end of modernity’s progressivism, and at the tail end of liberal humanist universalism and a succession of modern humanitarian catastrophes (from colonial and racist genocide to anthropogenic climate change and biocapitalism). All the more strange, however, that Tylor, after all, actually proposes to “bracket” the ethical issue: “it seemed desirable to keep the discussion of animism, as far as might be, separate from that of ethics”, and with it the question of “how the introduction of the moral element separates the religions of the world, united as they are throughout by one animistic principle, into two great classes, those lower systems whose best result is to supply a crude childlike natural philosophy, and those higher faiths which implant on this the law of righteousness and of holiness, the inspiration of duty and love”. It is not that

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21 Tylor,Primitive Culture 2, p. 2.
22 Ibid., p. 9.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., p. 10.
25 Ibid., p. 11.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 446.
28 Ibid., p. 447. This, unfortunately, cannot be the place to trace the genealogy of Tylor’s ambivalent set-up of animism as a primitive (and mythological) system of belief that is both continuous and (to be) superseded. It certainly appears with similar foundational power in Freudian psychoanalysis and the educationalism of Piaget.
“morality is absent from the life of the lower races... without a code of morals, the very existence of the rudest tribe would be impossible; and indeed the moral standards of even savage races are to no small extent well-defined and praiseworthy”, as Tylor generously admits. So what is the difference, then, one might ask, which gives Tylor the assurance to claim that “[s]avage animism is almost devoid of that ethical element which to the educated modern mind is the very mainspring of practical religion”? If anthropology has moved on from the idea of Western humanist supremacy in any way at all, then it must be, surely, because it has lost belief in this belief? For example, the belief that “low” morality could be separated and distinguished from “higher” ethics, as Tylor uses it as justification” for the idea that the “ethical laws” of modern civilization “stand on their own ground of tradition and public opinion, comparatively independent of the animistic belief and rites which exist beside them”. Tylor’s fundamental ambivalence and his disingeniousness culminates in this “arch-anthropological” statement, one might say: “The lower animism is not immoral, it is unmoral”. We would indeed suggest to push Tylor a little and say: animism is (not outside, but) before morality. If animism is “unmoral” (for it knows no ethics), it is quite obviously, for a “post-moral” (and posthumanist) society, a way to go or return to. And return certainly is what animism has done; one could even say, with a vengeance...

For Freud, in “Animism, Magic and the Omnipotence of Thought” (chapter 3 of Totem and Taboo: Resemblances Between the Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics (1913), London: Routledge, 1999, pp. 75-99), compared to religion and science, animism “is perhaps the... most consistent and exhaustive and which gives a truly complete explanation of the nature of the universe” (p. 77). Where would psychoanalysis (or modernity, or the humanities) be without a certain “belief” in the animistic “magic” of the “omnipotence of thoughts” (p. 88), which is most clearly expressed in “obsessional neuroses” (p. 86) and provides proof of, what might be called [originary?] narcissism (p. 89). Tylor’s necessarily ambiguous framing of animism as a foundational object of study for anthropology is replicated in Freud’s appropriation of it for the purposes of the discursive institutionalisation of psychoanalysis. As a consequence, the “omnipotence of thought” as both originary and to be overcome (cf. Freud’s “motto”: Wo Es war soll ich werden), thus continues to perform its “magic” in the “system of thought” or “beliefs” that is psychoanalysis:

If we may regard the existence among primitive races of the omnipotence of thoughts as evidence in favour of narcissism, we are encouraged to attempt a comparison between the phases in the development of men’s view of the universe and the stages of an individual’s libidinal development. The anamistic phase would correspond to narcissism both chronologically and in its content; the religious phase would correspond to the stage of object-choice of which the characteristic is a child’s attachment to his parents; while the scientific phase would have an exact counterpart in the stage at which an individual has reached maturity, has renounced the pleasure principle, adjusted himself to reality and turned to the external world for the object of his desires. (p. 90)

Clearly, Freud takes over from Tylor when he says: “Thus the first picture which man formed of the world – animism – was a psychological one” (91); “Animism came to primitive man naturally and as a matter of course. He knew what things were like in the world, namely just as he felt himself to be. We are thus prepared to find that primitive man transposed the structural conditions of his own mind into the external world; and we may attempt to reverse the process and put back into the human mind what animism teaches as to the nature of things” (p. 91). However, Freud is eager to separate the origin of “the creation of spirits” from “the first moral restriction”, or “taboo” (p. 93) – a gesture to which we’ll return in the final section. For Piaget’s account of “child animism” see Part II of his The Child’s Conception of the World, London: Routledge, 1929, pp. 169-252.

29 Tylor, Primitive Culture 2, p. 446.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
Alter-Anthropological Animism (A-A-A)

The Animist is... all those who see an equivalence between all forms of life or who can see life where others would see the lack of life.32

If one strips the definition of animism of its sociological correlations, there remains one characteristic that everybody can accept and that the etymology of the term indicates, which is why I chose to preserve it despite the dubious uses made of it in the past. That characteristic is the attribution by humans to nonhumans of an interiority identical to their own.33

Philippe Descola is one among a number of anthropologists to defend the continued or renewed use of the term animism despite its history of primitivism and its colonial and cultural imperialist legacy. As Descola explains, the term is useful in that it can help “us” to overcome one of the most unhelpful “modern” binaries, as the title of his book makes clear, *Beyond Nature and Culture*. For Descola needs to be restored (as a concept, if not as a practice) because the assumed similarity and commonality of an “interiority” between humans and nonhumans authorises an extension of the “cultural” domain to include nonhumans and their “cultures” together with everything that this may imply (i.e. intersubjectivity, use of technology, rituals and conventions). This generalisation (or “humanisation”, as Descola calls it) allowing for new forms of “communication” between humans and nonhumans is not without restriction, however: “All the same, this humanization is not complete, since in animist systems these, as it were, humans in disguise (i.e., the plants and animals) are distinct from humans precisely by reason of their outward apparel of feathers, fur, scales, or bark—in other words, their physicality”.34 Here seems to lie the crux of the “new animism” as a counter- or alter-anthropological movement,35 namely in that it is based on a certain selective “belief” (a belief without belief, as we suggested above) to take animism “seriously” (if not “literally”) – i.e. with restrictions. The restriction that Descola produces, one has a feeling, somehow corresponds to the distinction between anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism.36 In fact, “the animist” while believing in a shared spirituality is perfectly aware of the differences in “materiality” (or, as Descola calls it, “embodiment”, or “physicality”). The feathers, hair, scales and bark are plain to see, after all, in the difference from (naked) human skin.

35 See Graham Harvey’s re-evaluation of animism as a “morally” superior ecological stance characterised by “respecting the living world” (subtitle to his comprehensive reader, *Animism: Respecting the Living World*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2006): “animism is more accurately understood as being concerned with learning how to be a good person in respectful relationships with other persons” (p. xi). While the “old usage” of animism “constructed animists as people who did not or could not distinguish correctly between objects and subjects, or between things and persons... [t]he new animism names worldviews and lifeways in which people seek to know how they might respectfully and properly engage with persons” (p. xiv). And “Animisms are theories, discourses and practices of relationship, of living well, of realising more fully what it means to be a person, and a human person, in the company of other persons, not all of whom are human but all of whom are worthy of respect” (p. xvii). See also Harvey’s “An Animist Manifesto”, *Philosophy, Activism, Nature* 9 (2012): 2-4.
36 We would agree with Timothy Morton (in his *Humankind: Solidarity with Nonhuman People*, London: Verso, 2017 – a text we will return to in more detail) that: “the actual enemy is not anthropomorphism, it is anthropocentrism, an entirely different beast that can express itself either by humanizing the nonhuman or indeed by totally dehumanizing it” (p. 174).
One of the major figures of the “animistic [re]turn”\(^{37}\) is Tim Ingold who, following Bruno Latour, with reference to a generalised (and “ecological”) concept of “livelihood”, extends sociality to many nonhuman forms of agency.\(^{38}\) This is in line with a general turn towards “new materialisms” and the idea of “relational ontologies” directed against “modern” subject-object-centred “Cartesianism”. Animism in this respect provides a welcome pre-cursor, a usable tradition, of “pre-modernity” to reopen the question of the animate-inanimate distinction. Ingold’s influential essay “Rethinking the Animate, Re-Animating Thought” begins by stating: “people do not always agree about what is alive and what is not, and that even when they do agree it might be for entirely different reasons... people do not universally discriminate between categories of living and non-living things”.\(^{39}\) Animism as a pre-modern (or un-modern) belief system may thus be used or returned to strategically to show, precisely, that belief systems are just that: systems of beliefs. This changes, however, once you’re “inside” a belief system, or as soon as it turns “ontological” so to speak, in which means that, in the case of animism, it becomes “animacy”:

> We are dealing here not with a way of believing about the world but with a condition of being in it. This could be described as a condition of being alive to the world, characterised by a heightened sensitivity and responsiveness, in perception and action, to an environment that is always in flux, never the same from one moment to the next. Animacy, then, is not a property of persons imaginatively projected onto the things with which they perceive themselves to be surrounded. Rather... it is the dynamic, transformative potential of the entire field of relations within which beings of all kinds, more or less person-like or thing-like, continually and reciprocally bring one another into existence. The animacy of the lifeworld, in short, is not the result of an infusion of spirit into substance, or of agency into materiality, but it is rather ontologically prior to their differentiation.\(^{40}\)

The implications of such a conceptual move – from restricted to generalised animism (or animacy), as one might call it – are immense, of course. They are aimed at overcoming the distinction that we still found in Descola above between anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism. They also coincide with a certain “posthumanism” in the sense that the idea of a general “animacy of the lifeworld” necessarily problematizes if not dissolves the idea of human exceptionalism. Most promising, however – and this is something that we’ll have to return to – is Ingold’s idea that “animacy” as a principle might be prior to the differentiation between spirituality and materiality on which all the previous anthropological investigations into animism used to rely. One could argue that Ingold thus replies to the anthropological principle of “belief without belief” with another principle, namely that of a “science without object” designed to create a new connection of “thought with life”, as he writes: “Knowing must be reconnected with being, epistemology with ontology, thought with life”.\(^{41}\)

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\(^{37}\) See Alejandro F. Haber’s explanation (in “Animism, Relatedness, Life: Post-Western Perspectives”, *Cambridge Archaeological Journal* 19.3 (2009), p. 418): “Within anthropology, animism was abandoned as an analytic category as the crudest forms of uni-linear evolutionism became démodé (and politically incorrect). It was not until a couple of decades ago that animism obtained a new lease of life, as anthropology began to focus on the diversity of theories and experiences of personhood as part of the contribution to the questioning of the modern individual and subjectivity... Such an ‘animistic turn’, part of the greater postmodern and anti-essentialist move away from rigid binary oppositions typical of modernity, is probably one of the most important contributions of anthropology to the criticism of (Western) social theory”.


\(^{40}\) Ingold, “Rethinking the Animate, Re-Animating Thought”, p. 10.

\(^{41}\) Ibid., p. 19.
This pushes the “implication” of the (Western) anthropologist within his or her observed environment to a new level of self-reflexivity.

In the same year as Ingold, Alf Hornberg writes that “animism raises more questions about ourselves than about the animists”, thus echoing Latour’s notion of “symmetric anthropology”, since “all of us are actually born ‘pre-modern’, have an ontogenetic familiarity with ‘relatedness’, and will generally tend to struggle to maintain some measure of community in our lives”. The reason why animism continues to “intrigue” us, according to Hornberg, lies in the fact that it is a primary example of relational (as opposed to “representational” or “constructional”) thinking that modern humans tend to (unsuccessfully) repress:

...we were all born ‘premodern’. ‘Relatedness’ is a condition that all of us continue to be capable of achieving in particular, experiential contexts of some minimal duration. Our ‘modernity’ – our inclination toward abstraction, detachment, and objectification – is the product of our disembedding biographies. It is in being involuntarily deprived of ‘relatedness’ that we become Cartesianists. The powerful historical trajectory of objectivism relies on a peculiar recursivity between social disembeddedness, Cartesian epistemology, and technology – ultimately, that is, between individual existence and socio-technical power structures.

Animism thus helps us “remember” our “originary” problem of how to distinguish between persons and things. It reminds us of the arbitrariness and impossibility of this distinction before humanity (and also after, one might add). Animism thus retains what Istvan Praet refers to as a “subversive quality”: “in an age of environmental crisis, animism is no longer seen as backward but as praiseworthy and sensible”. However, as Praet also points out, using animism as a “pawn” within global eco-politics does not remain without problems – an aspect to which we’ll return at the end.

Posthumanist Animism?

How do we account for the recent resurgence of interest in animism and animist thought? Once considered as some kind of cognitive error, evidence of cognitive underdevelopment and epistemological failure, animism has once again become an object of discursive attention and intellectual inquiry, in addition to serving as a platform for political action, particularly in relation to issues of ecology and the environment.

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44 Ibid., p. 28.
45 However, as Hornberg hastens to add, and as we’d hasten to agree, this cannot be a nostalgic return to some pre-modern, pre-human animism of pure ‘relatedness’, since “animism and ‘relatedness’ bring possibilities not only of harmony and community, but also of horror and rage” (Hornberg, 2006: 31). Thus belief here in the value of relatedness is still very much a vigilant “belief without belief”: “Only by keeping Society and Nature analytically [critically?] apart can we hope to progress in the demystification of that ‘hybrid’ web in which we all are suspended, and which more than anything else obstructs our pursuit of ‘relatedness’: the realm of animated objects we call ‘technology’. We more than ever need to retain our capacity to distinguish between those aspects of technology that derive from Nature and those aspects that derive from Society” (Hornberg, 2006: 29-30).
Western popular evolutionism... is thoroughly anthropocentric but not particularly anthropomorphic. On the other hand, animism may be characterized as anthropomorphic but definitely not as anthropocentric: if sundry other beings besides humans are “human”, then we humans are not a special lot (so much for “primitive narcissism”).

If we understand posthumanism as an emerging contemporary paradigm (or worldview, or “system of thought/belief”) with a view to taking postanthropocentrism with all its implications “seriously”, one starts seeing a few obvious parallels with what we’ve said about anthropology and animism above. Not only anthropology remembers and rewrites its anamistic origins, posthumanism is doing so, too. It rewrites what it means to be human including the entire catalogue of distinctions that have been used to establish human exceptionalism. It is a kind of “post-anthropology” that, from a conjectural space after the human, asks what it was like before humanity. In taking the resulting postanthropocentric scenarios “seriously” (“literally” in Viveiros de Castro sense above) it generalises and radicalises anthropology’s conceptual dispositif of “belief without belief”. Would an anthropology without humans still make sense? This is maybe one of the foundational questions that anthropology has been asking itself from its very beginning.

Animism as “the spectral Other that simultaneously constitutes and haunts the modern” must be – from a “postmodern” point of view – the bearer of some privileged knowledge about the “pre-modern” (or, indeed, “non-modern”, “un-modern”). The question is how to relate to this other without committing it, from the start, to the knowledge regime of the modern? How to let the “other” be “other” and still “relate” to him/her-it? If there is one anthropological concern that remains constant it would be this impossible relationality. How could this be different for posthumanism, then, which represents a conceptual move towards the radical opening of the future of humanity – and, as we have been suggesting, at the same time, a return to its origins. One could thus argue that what posthumanism (and post-anthropology) drives towards a “rediscovery” of animism – or one might even say its “desire for animation” – is something like “relation-envy” – a yearning for (a pure) state of relationality that comes before the fateful “modern” separation of object and subject, which gave rise to all the evils from which humanity has been suffering ever since, be it alienation, subjugation, or exploitation and consumption (in all of their forms). So while modernity and humanism ultimately produce inertia, postmodernity and posthumanism promise “re-animation” it seems. Hence the turn towards things and objects and their “ontologies”, environments and nonhuman forms of “agency”, as well as the search for new “politics of nature”. It seems quite obvious to us, however, how very “humanist” this conceptual framework with its more or less explicit desires for “reanimation” (still) remains.

In any case, “animism” has made it into the Posthuman Glossary (in the form of a fine entry by Anselm Franke). Franke, with a more than obvious nod towards Deleuzianism, explains that animism “describes a world in which all social and ontological boundaries are porous and can be crossed under specific circumstances, a world of becoming and metamorphoses, in which no entity precedes the sets of relations that bring it into being”. As outlined above, and as Franke also agrees, “[t]he continued challenge of the concept of animism lies in the imperative to rethink the border between

humans and their others, as the minimum demand put forth by the concept is that at least these borders and their underlying categories can potentially be re-thought.\textsuperscript{52} It is clear, however, that for Franke the “re-thinking” challenge posed by animism happens under a very specific media-technological “condition” which, one could say, squeezes modernity from both ends:

The otherness of animism is simultaneously a horizon that circumscribes and encircles modernity and its civilizational discourse, from both the past and the future. From the past, because the animism described by the ethnologists and psychologists of the late nineteenth century as primordial “religion”... is that which modern civilization must suppress and leave behind in order to become civilized and modern. But animism also appears at the other end of the vector of time – as a future condition in which alienation and the great divides of modernity are imagined as overcome.\textsuperscript{53}

If we agree with Franke here – and his, we believe, is nothing but another way of describing the ambiguity of the before in our phrase “before humanity” – it is, however, in the form of a shift of perspective: we are definitively more interested in the beginnings than in the projected futurity of the “posthuman”. In that sense, we would qualify Franke’s claim that “[t]he ‘return’ of animism to the centre of modernity essentially proves to be a result of computerization and the experience of medial environments and their feedback loops”.\textsuperscript{54} As important and exciting as the “field of expanded mediality” might be, and as relevant as the critique of a “neoliberal” (re)appropriation of animism under the conditions of globalised “new” media appears,\textsuperscript{55} our “genealogical” approach to the posthuman and our project of a “critical posthumanism” is based on the idea of “precedence” rather than “projection”. Nevertheless, the rise of contemporary scientific “re-enchantment” and “techno-animism” are important symptoms which cannot be ignored, of course.

**Techno-animism and the Re-enchantment of Science**

The old dream of progressive humanism is fading fast. There are still those who dream of the conquest of the biosphere by the technosphere, the human control of biological evolution through genetic engineering, and so on. But attitudes are changing around, and within, many of us: there is a shift from humanism to animism, from an intensely man-centred view to a view of a living world.\textsuperscript{56}

“voodoo” is perhaps precisely where science and technology are heading – animation everywhere.\textsuperscript{57}

Isabelle Stengers, in “Reclaiming Animism”, further problematizes the idea of “taking animism seriously” (this time from a “progressive” modern Western scientific point of view), when she asks: “How, then, to keep the question of animism, if taken seriously at all, from being framed in the terms that verify Science’s right to define it as an object of knowledge?”.\textsuperscript{58} For Stengers, animism is useful

\textsuperscript{52} Franke, p. 40.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{54} Franke, p. 51 (our emphasis).
\textsuperscript{55} Cf. Franke, p. 41: “The Animism of capital is a resource which grants the neoliberal subject access to (self)transformability and perhaps even more importantly, following the imperative of flexibility and ecological behaviour, with the means to adapt.”
\textsuperscript{58} Isabelle Stengers, “Reclaiming Animism”, e-Flux 36 (2012), p. 2; available online: https://www.e-flux.com/journal/36/61245/reclaiming-animism/.
as an epistemological stance that “pragmatically” provides a critique or an opening within Western scientific rationalism. The point is not to be an animist – “Nobody has ever been animist because one is never animist ‘in general’, only in terms of assemblages that generate metaphorical transformations in our capacity to affect and be affected – and also to feel, think, and imagine”59 – but to “reclaim” animism is a strategic counter-measure against science’s power which she sees at work in the “insistent poisoned passion of dismembering and demystifying [of assemblages]”.60 Animism would thus act as a shield against science’s appropriation through objectification, and as reminder of the idea “that we are not alone in the world”.61 In a similar vein, Cornelius Borck writes that “a reflexive and critical engagement with animism opens a discursive space for reworking the history of modern ways of knowing from a postcolonial perspective”.62 It is precisely this problematically “postcolonial” perspective that is often lost in both versions of (animist) “re-enchantment” – i.e. the bio-centred and the techno-centred version. Rupert Sheldrake’s advocacy of a Gaian biocentric return to animism seems to pass over the entire Tylorian baggage of “primitivism” of the term when he falls into what can only be called a (Nietzschean, vitalist...) “rhapsody” of promised rebirth:

As soon as we allow ourselves to think of the world as alive, we recognize that a part of us knew this all along. It is like emerging from winter into a new spring. We can begin to reconnect our mental life with our own direct, intuitive experiences of nature... And we can begin to develop a richer understanding of human nature, shaped by tradition and collective memory; linked to the Earth and the heavens, related to all forms of life; and consciously open to the creative power expressed in all evolution. We are reborn into a living world.63

It is difficult to see how this “deep ecology” could be really “biocentric rather than anthropocentric”64 as long as it is about understanding something like “human nature”.

Techno-animism, as we might call it, on the other hand, counters and maybe threatens precisely this “biocentrism” with its extension of animism’s “naturalizing agenda”, according to Borck: “Today’s technosciences constitute ever more entities with agency in relation to biological, individual, subjective, collective, or political levels of being”.65 It extends animism into the modern technosphere thus subverting the nature-culture/spiritual-material/animate-inanimate matrix of modernity out of which it nevertheless is born: “In this context, animism may demonstrate an unexpected potential as a conceptual tool for highlighting and describing precisely those deviations from modern epistemology that pass under its own guidance”.66 Techno-animism, or “technological animism”, as Erik Davis names it in his TechGnosis (2004), is provoked by the sense that “our digital technologies appear to be acquiring mind”:

Perhaps the phenomenon of techno-animism is nothing more than the latest upgrades from the society of the spectacle, infantilizing spells designed to crush whatever critical distance still allows some of us to question the technocapitalist domination of the world. On the other hand, a degree of animism can also be seen as a psychologically appropriate and imaginatively pragmatic response to the peculiar qualities of the information jungle. We associate

59 Stengers, p. 9.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Borck, “Animism in the Sciences Then and Now”, p. 3.
63 Sheldrake, pp. 188-189.
64 Ibid., p. 175.
65 Borck, p. 6.
66 Ibid.
intelligence with what reads and writes, and nowadays everything electronic reads and writes. For technopagans, the fallout from this is clear: The postmodern world of digital simulacra is ripe for the premodern skills of the witch and magician.68

Davis tracks this “technopagan” return of magic in the age of digital technology and computerization as a form of contemporary “gnostic” or pseudo-religious techno-spirituality by looking at the “archaic and occult metaphors that cluster around new technologies”69 that, for example, show a “scientific animism bound up with the computer’s ability to act as a replicating demiurge”.70

It was undoubtedly Donna Haraway’s remark that “our machines are disturbingly lively, and we ourselves frighteningly inert” in her “Cyborg Manifesto”71 – a foundational text for techno-animistic posthumanism – which opened up opportunities for the humanities to reclaim lost territory from the sciences in the war over “life” as an urgent object of the study. Processes of (re)animation have been pro-life-rating, so to speak, ever since in the lead-up to ubiquitous computing, artificial intelligence and the internet of things. (Techno)animism has, in fact, become an integral part of contemporary “design”, if one is to believe Brenda Laurel, for whom “pervasive computing” has given birth to “designed animism” as the basis for a “poetics for a new world”.72 As Betti Marenko further explains, “The idea that we are ‘turning animist’ to deal better with a world increasingly populated by smart objects and intelligent things is gaining approbation in interaction design... an animistic response emerges when technology connecting objects becomes simultaneously smarter, more pervasive, and more invisible”.73 Animism as an “affective post-cognitive framework” or life-strategy for “relating” to our digital environments, then, is the contemporary equivalent of “believing without belief” in the animatedness, or to use Jane Bennett’s term, “vibrancy” of techno-matter.74 In many ways, this must look, as Marenko readily admits, like a return to before humanity:

I want to argue that in a digitally connected world our apprehension of objects is more prone to deploy pre-modern (irrational? anti-modern? nevermodern?) affective faculties. Animism, magic, enchantment, and sensuousness are intertwined – and they are manifested in the ways that we experience this connected object-scape that is made of digital, post-PC devices, smart objects, pervasive computing, ambient intelligence, tangible interaction, and cloud services.75

Animism as a coping mechanism for the (re-)animation of 21st-century human environments – maybe this would be something for Lok, Golding’s Neanderthal hero, after all. However, it may also merely

68 Davis, p. 188.
69 Ibid., p. 195.
70 Ibid., p. 295. Compare this to Stef Aupers’s conclusion (in “The Revenge of the Machines: On Modernity, Digital Technology and Animism”, in Zaheer Baber, ed., CyberAsia: The Internet and Society in Asia, Leiden: Brill, 2005, p. 156) that “a paradoxical development is taking place; technoanimism... can be seen as a direct but unforeseen consequence of the accelerating process of rationalization. This process does not contribute to the disappearance of religion. On the contrary: it can be seen as the main driving force behind the emergence of this archaic form of religion”. We would claim that, in this sense, technoanimism is a near-synonym to “transhumanism” and the role of “technology” in that particular “system of beliefs”, indeed, corresponds to “magic” or “voodoo” (see above, Borck, p. 7).
75 Marenko, p. 223.
represent a way of preparing posthumanity for a kind of “neoprimitivsim”, as a reaction to a new kind of fetishism.

*Animism Under Erasure*

...accepting the otherness of things is the condition for accepting otherness as such.76

At some point in the past there was no mind, and today there is, therefore mind must have emerged from no-mind. This is the standard view. It is widely held, but rarely defended. And for good reason – it is deeply problematic... This is the *phylogenic* question: where should we draw the line between enminded and unminded beings?77

...if there is mind in process, that is, mind all the way down, just as there is process all the way down, that means we really have our work cut out for us in discussing this second new Transcendental Aesthetic, the non- or prebiotic one.78

If, as Bill Brown writes (epigraph 1 above), accepting the otherness of things is a precondition for accepting animism (or “panpsychism” – for which nothing as such is “alien”), from a psychoanalytic point of view, repressing animism might be a form of psychosis (or “an occlusion” of the otherness of the other). If, as the “emergentist” position with regard to the evolution of mind as David Skrbina describes it, is characterised by a “deeply problematic” idea of before and after mind (or, before and after humanity, one might add), and if, instead, as John Protevi (and a host of other speculative realists and object-oriented-ontologists) claims it’s “mind all the way down”, then we are dealing either with an annihilation or a proliferation of otherness. In other words, either nothing is truly other, or, the opposite, everything suddenly becomes radically “alien”, as in Ian Bogost’s “alien phenomenology”.79 If animism or panpsychism take over the new theoretical paradigm, as the precursors of new “deep” ecologies and new “nonhuman” ontologies and agencies, these might be seen as “fatal strategies”80 to recover some mythical “great outdoors” (in Meillassoux’s sense) and to “get at the strangeness of things”.81 Thus, in a repetition of the arch-anthropological move of “getting at” while “not believing” or “resisting” the essentially ambiguous “strangeness of things”, speculative realism and object-oriented-ontology are returning to animism with a clear strategic aim, namely to recover “realism” through something as unlikely as “speculation”. “Confronted with the real, we are compelled to speculate”, as Shaviro writes.82 But what exactly “compels” us to do so?

The answer is: the world-without-us scenario:

We learn about the world-for-us through introspection and the world-in-itself through scientific experimentation. But we can only encounter the world-without-us obliquely, through the paradoxical movement of speculation.83

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79 Bogost takes as his cue Thomas Nagel’s seminal essay “What is it like to be a bat?”, *Moral Questions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 165-180. See also Nagel’s “Panpsychism” in the same volume pp. 181-195.
81 Shaviro, *The Universe of Things*, p. 66.
82 Ibid, p. 67.
83 Ibid.
In order to escape the “deception” of “correlationism”, then, the anthropologist of deep time and the world-without-us must believe in the impossible (or “believe without belief”, again) in the epistemological thesis “that it is in some way possible for us to point to, and to speak about, this organized world-without-us without thereby reducing it yet again to our own conceptual schemes”.\(^84\)

This is pure magic, maybe even voodoo, as we noted above, and it is done all in the name of the “poor thing” (i.e. it is openly fetishist). Animism as a fatal strategy of humans arguing themselves out of the picture, however, might be taking it a little too seriously (or literally, not in Viveiros de Castro’s sense). Addressing “human exceptionalism” and the problem of “anthropocentrism” are valuable and noble ethical imperatives but the idea that the world or things might be able to do the “caring” business seems a little too hopeful:

It is only an anthropocentric prejudice to assume that things cannot be lively and active and mindful on their own, without us. Why should we suppose that these are qualities that only we possess. Why should we suppose that these are qualities that only we possess and that we merely project them on the “universe of things” outside us?\(^85\)

Is the attribution of mindfulness to things really going to create more justice? There is a big difference between panpsychism as a new cosmology and Jane Bennett’s “strategic vitalism” seeking to acknowledge the “vibrancy of matter” and “thing-power”. Bennett proposes a form of strategic “naiveté” (or, belief without belief) to promote the awareness of “connectivity” and “entanglement” between humans and nonhumans: “One tactic might be to revisit and become temporarily infected by discredited philosophies of nature, risking ‘the taint of superstition, animism, vitalism, anthropomorphism, and other premodern attitudes’”.\(^86\) Strategic or “tactical” animism is what anthropologists like Viveiros de Castro and many others have been advocating all along, always in the hope that the contamination would be somehow rewarding or “enchanting”.

Timothy Morton is one of the few neoanimists to be more circumspect in this regard. Although animism is not mentioned as such in his latest book, *Humankind*,\(^87\) it certainly plays a crucial part in (already suggested by the title) *Realist Magic*, which in fact takes its cue from Jane Bennett’s “strategic animism” referred to above and acknowledges that: “it would be better if we had some term that suited neither vitalism nor mechanism”.\(^88\) Morton’s use of “animism” thus includes some deconstructive caution from the beginning. What obviously intrigues but also bothers Morton about animism is precisely that it may be too easily associated with the neo-spiritual and neo-primitive naturism of “conservative” ecocriticism, as he explains in *Ecology without Nature*:

[Ecocriticism] needs to be able to argue for a progressive view of ecology that does not submit to the atavistic authority of feudalism or ‘prehistoric’ primitivism (New Age animism). It requires instead that we be nostalgic for the future, helping people figure out that the ecological ‘paradise’ has not occurred yet”.\(^89\)

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\(^84\) Ibid., p. 68.
\(^85\) Ibid., p. 77.
\(^86\) Bennett, *Vibrant Matter*, p. 18.
\(^87\) This is particularly surprising since *Humankind*’s programmatic subtitle is *Solidarity with Nonhuman People*, London: Verso, 2017. As a programmatic statement for Morton’s postanthropocentric political programme the following might serve as representative: “we’ve been looking for empathy in the wrong place. An anthropocentric place” (p. 32). Empathy (or solidarity) is of course the main motif in *Humankind* and (human) kindness, however it is a “haunted” (p. 85) or “paranoid” (p. 161; or psychotic, cf. above) solidarity (p. 85).
A progressive use of ecology (without the, too Romantic, notion of nature) according to Morton, quite paradoxically, is “nostalgic” for a future. Progressive ecological politics is a politics that focuses on the “paradise-to-come”, not the “paradise-lost”. We would argue that nostalgia for the future, understood as an alternative or other future, also speaks to the ambiguity of the before: a remembering or “rewriting” of the repressed origin to open up alternative futures. Ecology without nature, ecology without ecology, nature without nature; these are the markers of (animist) “reenchantment” in Morton’s “realist magic”. Animism is attractive, because it “is decidedly not nature worship”, and this “turns out to have a lot in common with an ecology to come”. However, from an “aesthetic” point of view, Morton feels obliged to put animism “under erasure”, or to “cross it out” in order to produce an “upgraded version of animism”:

Ancient animisms treat beings as people, without a concept of Nature. I’m going to cross out this word to prevent people from thinking of it as another belief system, in particular as system that implies something about living rather than non-living things: animism. Is there any art that points this way?

Once again, we have an instance of “belief without belief” in this passage, analogous to the alter-animisms outlined above. Not believing in “nature”, but only in “corals”, for example, in a vaguely religious “shimmering” or a “rocking” of generalised “animation” (the idea of “life” attributed to all entities) is what one might call “ultra-animism”. The problem, according to Morton, is that in the “age of asymmetry” human reason already “knows too much about nonhumans”.

...the Age of Asymmetry is not a return to animism as such, but rather animism sous nature (under erasure). It’s called the Age of Asymmetry because within human understanding humans and nonhumans face one another equally matched. But this equality is not like the Classical phase. There is no Goldilocks feeling in the Great Acceleration era of the

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90 In an interview with Hans Ulrich Obrist, Morton explains: “I don’t really believe in nature, I believe in ecology; I think nature is actually a human construct, I think that’s what’s wrong with it. It’s not like I don’t believe in coral, I do believe in coral which is why I don’t believe in nature. And I think that not only is nature a human philosophical construct, an aesthetic construct, it’s also a social construct that is one of the reasons for this violence, is this concept of nature actually. And so I think that ecology must necessarily be without nature”. See Timothy Morton and Hans Ulrich Obrist, “Interview”, dismagazine.com (2014); available online: http://dismagazine.com/blog/68280/hans-ulrich-obrist-timothy-morton/.


92 Ibid.

93 Morton, The Ecological Thought, p. 110.


95 Morton, Humankind, p. 175-189.

96 The “Age of Asymmetry”, for Morton, is characterized by “[t]he overall aesthetic ‘feel’ of the time of hyperobjects”, which is a “sense of asymmetry between the infinite powers of cognition and the infinite being of things” (Humankind, p 22), or, as one might put it, a specific “disconnect” between ontology and epistemology based on a mismatch in “scale”, or, indeed, as a kind of “disruption” that requires new (aesthetic) answers based on “beliefs without belief”.

97 Morton, Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013, p. 172. Which leads one to believe that a (posthumanist) pedagogy might have to be based on “unlearning” – especially “unlearning to be human” (cf. Stefan Herbrechter, “Posthumanist Education”, ed. Paul Smeyers et al., International Handbook of Philosophy of Education, volume 1, Dordrecht: Springer, 2018, pp. 727-745], since “the young adult is precisely an anthropocentrist in training” (Morton, Humankind, p. 15).
Anthropocene. The feeling is rather of the nonhuman out of control, withdrawn from total human access.  

What Morton is trying to make us believe is that this asymmetry – based on an originary “severance” – can be overcome by “solidarity”, or by “humankindness”: “‘solidarity’ cuts against a dominant ontological trend, default since the basic social, psychic and philosophical foreclosure of the human-nonhuman symbiotic real that we call the Neolithic”. What Morton refers to is the originary conceptual separation between humans and nonhumans (the “fissure between reality and the real”, in Lacanian terms) that constituted “modern” agrarianism with its subsequent unfolding of “humanity”. It seems then, that Golding’s fictional scenario of the Neolithic Urszene – our primitive-primal scene – is reinscribed here by Morton as precisely the moment, the occasion, the chance of the before – i.e. before all went pear-shaped – and animism (under erasure, of course) is a kind of conduit to re-memberance. Re-membering in the Osiric sense, but without actually remembering the origin, which (necessarily) remains repressed, in other words, a “weak holism that isn’t theistic” – all this sounds very much like “religion without religion” or “belief without belief”, or, precisely, like “a critical ‘gnosticism’”, in Morton’s words. But who would be the demiurge responsible for our post-agrarian “fallen state” if not the “human” itself, creator of the Anthropocene? In which case, however, why still insist on “belief” and the “critical” as a qualifier of (animistic) gnosticism? If the challenge is, amongst other things, aesthetic, as Morton argues, then where else could we find an animism before humanity than in (prehistoric) art?

The Animism To Come

Despite the prodigious ink spilled on “nonhuman agency” in recent years... much posthuman thought retains an ambiguous relationship to inhuman agencies that are magical or religious in character.

Marxism only works if it weirdly embraces animism.

Paleolithic humans are only different in degree from contemporary ones insofar as Paleolithic ones are less aware of the indirect consequences of their actions.

According to Evan Firestone, animism and shamanism appealed to the avant-garde of Twentieth-Century art because of its “authenticity” and “naturalism”. From an ecocritical point of view, the same appeal applies to the contemporary “return of the real” as well, as we have seen in Morton’s work (whether animism might be sous rature or not, from aesthetic point of view, the aesthetic “effect” of animism should be some “darkness” (cf. Morton’s notion of “dark ecology”) or some kind

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98 Morton, Hyperobjects, p. 173.
99 Morton, Humankind, p. 13. See also: “Hiding in very plain sight, everywhere in post-agricultural psychic, social and philosophical space, is evidence of a traumatic Severing of human-nonhuman relations” (Morton, Humankind, p. 16).
100 Ibid., p. 13.
101 Ibid., p. 103.
102 Ibid., p. 109.
103 See Intermezzo 3 below.
105 Morton, Humankind, p. 97.
106 Ibid., 174.
of “dirty” or “nitty-gritty”). Re-enchantment of the world is what specular, magical and other animist “realisms” are yearning for – even though this yearning will probably forever remain the domain of humans and their spiritualities. That’s precisely what the purpose of “savages” or “ancestors” (and ancestrality more generally) has always been, as Christopher Bracken explains in his Magical Criticism, namely to serve as the “raw” source of “reanimation” of the lost real, or to regain “liveliness”. So how is one to feel more “alive” with all this contemporary correlationist hyperreality and biopolitical catastrophism around? Maybe the return to animism is precisely that: a desire to just be or become life (organic, inorganic, or somehow post-organic) itself.

Unsurprisingly, maybe, we have thus arrived back at Freud’s idea of the “omnipotence of thought” in animism. But maybe we can introduce a difference into this “belief system” and slightly unhinge it, before drawing this round-up of contemporary animisms to a close. To recall, Freud appropriates animism as “the first complete theory of the universe” and as a “system of thought” from anthropology to provide psychoanalysis with an evolutionary underpinning. If Freud is prepared to take animism “seriously” (and not just as a “primitive superstition”) it is because there are significant parallels and investments between animism and the idea of the unconscious (esp. as manifested in dreams):

Let us now return to the animistic system with which we are dealing. The insight we have gained into other psychological systems enables us to conclude that with primitive man, too, ‘superstition’ need not be the only or the real reason for some particular custom or observance and does not excuse us from the duty of searching for its hidden motives. (...) ‘Superstition’ – like ‘anxiety’, ‘dreams’ and ‘demons’ – is one of those provisional psychological

108 See for example Ian Bogost’s “aesthetic” understanding of the speculative realist philosopher’s task:

Speculative realism really does require speculation: benighted meandering in an exotic world of utterly incomprehensible objects. As philosophers, our job is to amplify the black noise of objects to make the resonant frequencies of the stuffs inside them hum in credibly satisfying ways. Our job is to write the speculative fictions of their processes, of their unit operations. Our job is to get our hands dirty with grease, juice, gunpowder, and gypsum. Our job is to go where everyone has gone before, but where few have bothered to linger. (Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, p. 34)

CF. also Bogost’s following call for a neorealism after humanism, if not the human:

The posture one takes before the alien is that of curiosity, of wonder. For too long, humanists have relinquished wonder to the natural sciences, and then swooped in ostentatiously to blame its awe on false consciousness. The return to realism [or the real?] in metaphysics is also a return to wonder, wonder unburdened by pretense or deception. Let’s leave rigor to the dead. Let’s trade furrow for gasps. Let’s rub our temples at one another no longer. Let’s go outside and dig in the dirt. (p. 133)


110 Don DeLillo’s character Richard Elster in Point Omega expresses the contemporary posthumanist desire when he says: “Do we have to be human forever? Consciousness is exhausted. Back now to inorganic matter. This is what we want. We want to be stones in a field” (DeLillo, Point Omega, London: Picador, 2010, p. 67); see also Mario Perniola’s (Benjaminian) notion of the “sex appeal of the inorganic”, and esp. his opening statement: “To give oneself as a thing that feels and to take a thing that feels is the new experience that asserts itself on contemporary feeling, a radical and extreme experience that has its cornerstone in the encounter between philosophy and sexuality, and constitutes the key to understanding so many disparate manifestations of present-day culture and art” (The Sex Appeal of the Inorganic, London: Continuum, 2004, p. 1.).

111 Freud, Totem and Taboo, p. 94.

112 Cf. His statement: “I shall now go on to draw certain conclusions from the psycho-analytic view of such systems” (ibid.).
concepts which have crumbled under the impact of psychoanalytic research. Once we have penetrated behind these constructions, which are like screens erected as defences against correct understanding, we begin to realize that the mental life and cultural level of savages have not hitherto had all the recognition they deserve. If we take instinctual repression as a measure of the level of civilization that has been reached, we shall have to admit that even under the animistic system advances and developments took place which are unjustly despised on account of their superstitious basis.\textsuperscript{113}

What Freud is doing here is, on the one hand, cautioning his “contemporaries” not to underestimate animism as a system of thought and belief with regard to its own “cultural achievements”, and, on the other hand, he claims that a psychological dimension of human development – the overcoming not only of individual but also social “narcissism” – must be the true measure of humanity’s evolutionary progress – i.e. a perfect example of modern humanism at work.\textsuperscript{114} The particular kind of “obsessional neurosis” that is animism, understood as a “primitive” philosophy of nature – “the principle governing magic, the technique of the animistic mode of thinking”\textsuperscript{115} – is governed by the principle of “Omnipotence of Thought”, as Freud explains. What is already becoming clear here is the proximity and the entanglement as well as the compromise (in both senses of the term) of a certain (let’s call it Hegelian) understanding of “reason” as a force (or even “life force”) that is neither “material” nor “spiritual”, as well as a certain idea of animism largely projected onto the “primitive” as the “emergent”. From an evolutionary standpoint the primitive originality of thought, or belief systems (which are forever imbricated within each other), is at once the precondition for (Western) modernity to arrive, as well as that which absolutely needs to be left “behind” (where leaving behind is nothing but the reverse side of the before x we have been exploring here). Even more importantly maybe, it is also what allows every single member of humanity (every “individual”) to undergo and to repeat this evolutionary (paleoanthropological) process, as well as for each “culture” (or society) to locate itself on the “map” of human advancement (i.e. modernity).\textsuperscript{116} Let us refer back to Freud’s statement on primitive “narcissism” in this context:

If we may regard the existence among primitive races of the omnipotence of thoughts as evidence in favour of narcissism, we are encouraged to attempt a comparison between the phases in the development of men’s view of the universe and the stages of an individual’s libidinal development. The animistic phase would correspond to narcissism both chronologically and in its content; the religious phase would correspond to the stage of object-choice of which the characteristic is a child’s attachment to his parents; while the scientific phase would have an exact counterpart in the stage at which an individual has reached maturity, has renounced the pleasure principle, adjusted himself to reality and turned to the external world for the object of his desires.\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., p. 97.

\textsuperscript{114} Freud tries to pre-empt attacks from his contemporary imperialist-colonial critics (and thus prepares the terrain for Piaget) by explaining that he is “under no illusion that in putting forward these attempted explanations [he is] laying [himself] open to the charge of endowing modern savages with a subtlety in their mental activities which exceeds all probability. It seems to [him] quite possible, however, that the same may be true of our attitude towards the psychology of those races that have remained at the animistic level as is true of our attitude towards the mental life of children, which we adults no longer understand and whose fullness and delicacy of feeling we have in consequence so greatly underestimated” (p. 99).

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., p. 85.

\textsuperscript{116} Clive Gamble is spelling out this critique in great detail in his Origins and Revolutions: Human Identity in Earliest Prehistory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007; see, in particular, his explanation of what he calls paleoanthropology’s “Originsland” (i.e. chapter 3: “Metaphors of Origins”, pp. 59-86).

\textsuperscript{117} Freud, Totem and Taboo, p. 90.
In other words, in as much as primary narcissism is both the source of individual as well as transindividual drives, animism cannot really be overcome or fully superseded by “religion” and/or “science”, because it is more like a “life force” that is more originary. One might thus indeed say that animism always remains before modernity, if not before humanity.118

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118 This is how one could read Derrida’s reading of Cixous’s animism in H.C. for Life... That is to Say (trans. Laurent Milesi & Stefan Herbrechter, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006). In this curious account of an extraordinary intellectual friendship, Derrida writes of an impossibility to choose between Cixous’s “side of life” and “the other side”, the side of death, “which is no side”, since it is impossible to be on the side of death, literally (for a longer commentary see Stefan Herbrechter, “Theory...for Life”, Style in Theory: Between Literature and Philosophy, eds. Ivan Callus, James Corby and Gioria Lauri-Lucente, London: Bloomsbury, 2013, pp. 303-322). In order to explain Cixous’s (and his own) “narcissism” and the “animistic moments” (esp. with regard to “telepathy”) in Cixous’s work – see esp. his evaluation of Cixous’s “performative” dimension of “phantasm” at work in her writings (pp. 76-77) where he refers to Cixous’s “new logic of phantasm and of the event that, inseparable from a poetics of the event, may take into account an unheard-of, performative might, a mighty power of making-say as making-happen or arrive…”; see also his reference to Cixous’s “zoo-anthropomorphic-animism” in connection with her “speaking to the telephone” (p. 105) – Derrida provides an interesting sketch of a reading of Freud’s chapter on animism. He discovers, what he calls, three “snags” in the “system of beliefs” about the “omnipotence of thought” outlined in Totem and Taboo – “three problematic snags and three opaque areas in the Freudian analysis of the ‘omnipotence of thoughts’” (p. 110; the repetition of the word “three” is an obvious echo of Freud’s “three caskets” motif). The “snags” concern Freud’s exception granted to art in relation to animism; Freud’s compulsion to introduce what he calls “pre-animism” (or “animism”); and Freud’s gesture of “denegation” towards the “necessity” of death (pp. 108-120).

Freud claims that “[i]n only a single field of our civilization has the omnipotence of thoughts been retained, and that is in the field of art” (Freud, Totem and Taboo, p. 90). Derrida quite bluntly questions the consequentiality of this claim, referring to the “evolutionist scientism” in Freud’s three-phase model of outgrowing animism and labels it as “coarse”, but also as “full of indisputable common sense”:

...one may wonder what this exception of art as magic means. Why did art not disappear, if it still survives? And why must Freud hesitate to turn art’s magic into a mere animist remnant, the residue of “narcissism”? (p. 111)

Derrida counters Freud’s claim by referring to art’s “performative” dimension in producing “effects and affects” of “enchantment” (p. 112) – or “performative power acts” that are at once “rational, technical, and magical” (p. 112).

Similarly, Derrida focuses on Freud’s curious move which, on the one hand, acknowledges the logical necessity of a “pre-animistic” phase, “more ancient than the doctrine of spirits... which form the kernel of animism” (p. 112) and which Freud calls “animism”, but of which, on the other hand, Freud remains completely silent. Animatism – if it exists – Derrida concludes “[i]s something like a theory of living, of being-alive, of livingness [vivance], of universal being-for-life (Lehre von der allgemeinen Belebtheit [a notion that Derrida places within the proximity of Jankelévitch’s “universal hylozoism”, and which of course would be the ultimate philosophical consequence of a “biological” animism]),” which would thus be a kind of “originary” and most importantly, a “pre-religious” and “non-spiritual” form of life-affirmation that must be prior to any known and even the most “primitive”) culture: “a quasi-originary Belebtheit that must, if not present itself, at least announce itself to some pre-empirical or pre-positive experience” (p. 114).

Derrida’s third snag – which we cannot pursue in detail here – concerns the following Freudian statement:

Thus man’s first theoretical achievement—the creation of spirits seems to have arisen from the same source as the first moral restrictions to which he was subjected—the observances of taboo. The fact that they had the same origin need not imply, however, that they arose simultaneously. If the survivors’ position in relation to the dead was really what first caused primitive man to reflect, and compelled him to hand over some of his omnipotence to the spirits and to sacrifice some of his freedom of action, then these cultural products would constitute a first acknowledgment of Ananké [Necessity], which opposes human narcissism. Primitive man would thus be submitting to the supremacy of death with the same gesture with which he seemed to be denying it. (Totem and Taboo, p. 93)

While Derrida uses this passage to return to his argument relating to Cixous’s “oppositionless narcissism of Belebtheit” (p. 119) whose power he finds at work in her writings, Freud’s own argument develops into another, more general statement about human psychic development, with which he attempts to pull the animist firmly onto the (proto-)modern, dualist or Cartesian plane (which was the starting point of our critique...
Conclusion: Seriously, But Perhaps Not Too Seriously?

...humanisme et animisme sont mutuellement incompatibles.\textsuperscript{119}

If there is indeed a survival of animistic beliefs in technologically advanced civilizations, it is not animism that persists, but rather the abstract condition of animatism – the belief in a perpetually circulating energy located outside of individual bodies.\textsuperscript{120}

So, weirdly, our round-up of the impossibility and inevitability of animism has taken us to a place where we can venture two propositions: 1) it might be good to take animism seriously, without taking it too seriously; 2) one might have to acknowledge, while taking into account all the intrinsic restrictions and contradictions of the very notion of animism (with its reliance on the whole Greco-Latin-Christian philosophical tradition of “anima”, for a start), that the idea of “animation”, which provides the main (sex)appeal for a contemporary “return” to animism and its development into a generalized principle of \textit{Belebtheit}, might be best understood as an animism without (or indeed before) humans.

As Rane Willerslev in his appropriately entitled “Taking Animism Seriously, but Perhaps Not Too Seriously” explains,\textsuperscript{121} referring, once again to Viveiros de Castro’s work, in the context of a “decolonization of thought” (which, today, might be extended towards a generalized critique of all forms of anthropocentrism, as argued above): “Anthropologists need to take seriously what indigenous peoples take seriously, not as a means of exoticizing them as being somehow more knowledgeable or wiser than Western philosophers. Nor is it about ethics, in terms of respecting other cultures. Rather, we need to take indigenous animism seriously, so as to alternate our own ways of thinking”.\textsuperscript{122} Willerslev admits that despite all the seriousness of anthropology’s claims about “taking the other and his or her beliefs seriously” we may have overlooked something quite elementary, namely the question whether animists take themselves that seriously:

I have started to question if seriousness at all lies at the heart of animism. Perhaps quite the opposite is the case: it may be discovered that underlying animistic cosmologies is a force of laughter, an ironic distance, a making fun of the spirits, which suggests that indigenous

\begin{itemize}
  \item and the main motivation behind the call for a (post-)anthropological return to animism in posthumanist times, in the first place):
  \begin{itemize}
    \item It might be said that in the last analysis the ‘spirit’ of persons or things comes down to their capacity to be remembered and imagined after perception of them has ceased. (\textit{Totem and Taboo}, p. 94)
  \end{itemize}
  \item The only difference between animism and modern science, according to Freud, lies thus in a clearer demarcation (of the “soul” from other parts) and thus between conscious and unconscious psychic activity, while “immutability and indestructibility are qualities which we no longer attribute to conscious but rather to unconscious processes, and we regard the latter as the true vehicle of mental activity” (\textit{Totem and Taboo}, p. 94). In summary, what is sketched here in these few very dense pages of Derrida’s reading of primary narcissism via Cixous and via a return to Freud is nothing short of what may be called the beginning of a “deconstruction of animism”. Or, in other words, a way of insisting on the inevitability and necessity of animism as an explanation for life in our and in any time, as well as a demonstration that, at the same time, one cannot, one must not take it “literally”, or not too “seriously”, as a system of belief.
  \end{itemize}
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{122} Willerslev, “Taking Animism Seriously, but Perhaps Not Too Seriously”, p. 42.
animism is not to be taken very seriously at all. I think that we are facing a fundamental yet quite neglected problem here...

It is quite true that the ecological catastrophism – and this is not a way of denying climate change, of course – that has undoubtedly been motivating the contemporary “return to the real” in theory, is somewhat lacking in ironic distance, maybe also quite simply in (“dark”) humour. Maybe what “we” are projecting onto animism and its desirability in the time of the Anthropocene – beginning from the idea of a “false epistemology” or “consciousness” to a “new relationality” beyond the dreaded “correlationism” – was meant, after all, as nothing but a bad joke? In seeing the animist as “joker”, or the shaman as “trickster”, one enters an entirely different epistemological regime, or “system of beliefs”, one that is much closer to the troubled and troubling tradition of “Gnosticism” with its more than dubious relationship to “materiality” and human existence. Willerslev uses his anthropological fieldwork on “animistic types of humor in Mongolia and Siberia” to ask: “to what extent does it make sense for the anthropologist to take animism seriously if indeed it turns out that indigenous peoples themselves do not take it seriously?”

What if animists “see through their own pretentious animist ideology” and the “authority of the spirits”?

This is not, in our view, an invitation to stop taking animism seriously. However, it questions the motives and also the extent and manner in which animism can or should be returned to. The intrinsic and problematic privileging of spiritualism of some anima (the animate, but also the animal) in the idea of animalism should make us wary and maybe prompt a search for a Belebtheit that lies even before something that may still be as compromised by anthropocentrism as animism.

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123 Ibid.
124 Ibid., p. 50.
125 Ibid., p. 54.