Chapter 2:

About to Forget... the Human (Max Frisch, *Man in the Holocene*)

As soon as I was able to use that word, I said what I must always have thought of him: that he was the last man. In truth, almost nothing distinguished him from the others.¹

...so viel Zeit hat der Mensch nicht [Man does not have that much time].²

Die Literatur liefert (implizit) die Utopie, dass Menschsein anders sein könnte. [Literature (implicitly) produces the utopia that being human could be otherwise].³

We’re about to forget. Despite, or maybe because of, the ever-increasing amount of information (rather than knowledge) and the constant “processing” of information in which humans have to be increasingly “assisted” by machines, who as opposed to humans, have unfailing memories (in theory at least). Forgetting can be a blessing, mostly, however, it’s being experienced as a curse. But it certainly is one of those cultural technologies (even though we’re not in control of it) that seems to make “us” human. It’s when humans forget that they’re human, or what it means to be human (although nobody has ever managed to produce a satisfactory answer to this question), that – so the received knowledge goes – the worst can happen. Forgetting one’s humanity opens the door to the worst: a return to animality, becoming inhuman, the rule of the abject...

Since “we” all live longer (at least in some privileged parts of the world) the problem of forgetting one’s self, or forgetting who one “is”, i.e. the problem of dementia, is becoming a pressing social, cultural, philosophical reality for more and more people – people who experience their own forgetting, their own gradual erasure, as well as those close to them, who experience what looks like a disintegration or dissolution of some one’s self (there is thus an auto- and a hetero-forgetting, one could say). As old age, dementia, senility, Alzheimer etc. are gaining ground, more and more humans dream of becoming “posthuman” cyborgs, immortal and with total data “recall”. The temptation, ultimately, might be to replace the human memory function completely and to start dreaming of a Funes-like ability of absolute and indelible recording and endless storage capacity (just without the Borgesian paranoia, of course).⁴

² Max Frisch, *Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän – Eine Erzählung*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1979, p. 48; Frisch, *Man in the Holocene: A Story*, trans. Geffrey Skelton, Champaign: Dalkey Archive Press, 1980, p. 35. Further references will be given in the text as *Holocene*. Except for a few indicated exceptions we have used Skelton’s excellent translation. One of these exceptions concerns the epigraph above. In this specific case, we have altered Skelton’s translation from “no one has that much time” to “man does not have that much time”, for reasons that will hopefully become obvious in the course of our “geological” reading of Frisch’s story. It is also worth mentioning as well that the English title drops an important nuance of the original which literally translates as “Man appears in the Holocene”, which is wrong, geologically speaking, but already announces one of the major uncertainties about memory and “becoming human” that Frisch’s story thematises.
One could thus say that there are, in fact, two ways of forgetting to be human – one that points towards the self-deconstruction of human memory; and one that has more to do with repression. Both are interesting from a psychoanalytic point of view, especially at the time when human memory is being increasingly “exteriorised” by digital media. The effect is that humans increasingly find themselves in a situation vis-à-vis their own forgetting that illustrates the double-dimensionality of the preposition/adverb “before” – we are “before” memory. “We” “find” “ourselves” “before” “memory” (and its “loss”). Each word is here in scare quotes to emphasise that its precariousness signifies “trouble”. Without memory no identity (no “I”, and certainly no “we”). Finding hides the fact that in the process of “remembering” – of putting memory and thus identity back together again – often looks more like a “being found” by memories – a process that is beyond (cognition’s) control, barely manageable nor reliable but absolutely necessary, even while it remains one of the most fundamental (and supposedly most human) desires, just think of Hamlet. Memory – this mystery that no amount of neuro-cognitive science will ever be enough to explain; nor any philosophical sophistication, or anthropological description, for that matter – it erodes as we speak despite the most high-tech sophistication of our external memory apparatuses or pharmacological tweakings. And even so, nothing would be more deadly or dull than remembering everything, and even more so remembering everything exactly as it “really was”. Which leaves us with the “before” in the above statement: before memory, what was there? What does pre- or proto- or non-memory look like? In other words, Hhow did we get a memory in the first place? All these questions (also) have a paleo-ontological dimension alongside their evolutionary biological, neuro-cognitive or indeed speculative realist explanations. In fact, we are “before” memory, overlooking its vast expanse beyond comprehension while moving on towards its unknowable future – memory is a “project” in the sense that we have never been “memorious” (in Funes’s sense), yet.

The greatest risk of this moment, however, we would claim, is that we’re about to forget; forget the human and forget memory, ironically. Human (but also nonhuman) memory, as well as the memory of the human. While heading for the “posthuman” some of us are thrown back – not in an evolutionary or cognitively “regressive” way, however, but more in a psychoanalytic-deconstructive vein – to the question of before. Before as promise and as trace, even though both of which, however, must ultimately remain unreachable. This would be a “paleopoetics” in an entirely different sense. Remembering “before” humanity. Not only to explain how we became human – there will never be enough evidence or a satisfactory explanation to feed our desire for exceptionalism – or indeed whether we ever have been or going to be (fully) human (the significance of which necessarily will always remain deferred). But the attempt (the counter-desire, so to speak) to step outside, if only for a moment, and to ask: if things had gone differently, what would “we” be missing, if anything, if we hadn’t taken this trajectory? How to feed, or to ignore, this “yearning for the human” that constitutes the very human – the most fundamental humanist urge that prompts memorialisation in the first place, especially and precisely at the time when one is about to forget...

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6 In contrast with Christopher Collins’s notion of “paleopoetics” as an interest in the “prehistoric origines of literature” as an evolutionary psychological extension of cognitive poetics towards a “prehistoric poiesis [verbal creation] and the cognitive skills that must have made it possible” (Christopher Collins, Paleopoetics: The Evolution of the Preliterate Imagination, New York: Columbia UP, 2013, p. 2).
Being about to forget is thus “work in regress”, so to speak. What exactly do you remember when you remember that you’re (only) human? One might ask, as if this was something that you somehow forgot to forget. The cultural technology or even the anthropotechnics of forgetting, before high-tech, is one of the key features of literature (amongst other fictional discourses and practices), especially in literary texts that play with the specularity of the abyss (récits spéculaires, brises, mises-en-abyme)⁷ – the abyss that is human memory, affect and identity. Even if the posthuman as such does rarely figure in literature (except for science fiction of course), literature is in a sense always about a certain posthumansim, namely in the sense that it is always concerned with the tragedy of forgetting. The posthumanism of literature thus reminds “us” that we’re (always) about to forget. And, on some rare occasions, literature specifically thematises or foregrounds this precariousness of the human and his or her memory, humans who are about to forget who (and even what) they are. One such case is Max Frisch’s little-known novella Man in the Holocene...

Herr Geiser Is Losing His Humanity...

Herr Geiser, the seventy-four-year-old pensioner in Max Frisch’s novella Man in the Holocene, has gone to live on his own in a remote village in the Swiss Ticino mountains. Living at the edge of civilisation and isolation from other humans, Geiser appears in an almost ante-diluvian setting. In fact, the threat of a flood (and a climate cataclysm) is hanging over the village, since it has been an exceptionally wet summer with torrential rainfall. As a result, the village has been cut off and electricity disrupted by landslides. The breakdown of modern technology and the apocalyptic climatic situation is mirrored on a psychological level by Geiser’s own gradual disintegration. His memory is failing him – probably signs of dementia or Alzheimer. In order to regain some control over the environment and himself, he begins to develop a kind of mnemotechnics to counter the impression of both nature’s and his own looming demise, as Sharp explains:

Prone to confusion and loss of memory, he employs two basic strategies to counter this claim. However characteristically human, both are futile, even foolish attempts in Frisch’s eyes to exploit man’s accumulated knowledge, particularly in its technical and applied forms, in a struggle with the vastly superior forces of nature. For most of the first part of the narrative, Geiser spends his time copying data from an encyclopedia, which he then tacks to the walls, a ritual he later makes more efficient by cutting the scraps of information directly out of his source books. With the names, facts, figures, and historical information from diverse branches of learning surrounding him, he seeks to ward off the forgetfulness that signifies his aging and thus his mortality. At the midpoint in the narrative, Geiser makes an abortive attempt to flee through the mountains back to Basel, a symbolic return to a world cushioned against the ravages of nature by man’s inventions.⁸

Both strategies fail, however. The scraps pinned to the wall are blown off and scattered by the wind and at the end of the narrative, exhausted after his aborted trip across the mountains into the next valley, Geiser suffers a stroke which leaves his eyelid and one corner of his mouth paralysed. This is the way he is found in the end by his daughter who has come up from Basel to check on him.

While Frisch’s novella took some time to receive the attention it deserved in the German-speaking world, its English translation was immediately included in the New York Book Review’s list of Best Books of 1980. It was referred to as a “luminous parable of indeterminate purport” and as a “masterpiece” by the reviewer, George Stade (June 22, 1980), as well as a “chillingly beautiful portrait of a man who is surrounded by erosion, nature’s and his own, and who struggles for one last moment of clarity in which to make sense of himself and of civilization”. As the novelist Michael Magras claims: “Holocene reminds you of the extraordinary cruelty of human existence, and of its stubborn durability. Life may be as fragile and ridiculous as a pagoda made of crispbread, yet it’s also strong enough to withstand epochs of extinction. No matter how hard we try otherwise, we’re still here”.9 Today, this dogged optimism in the face of the apocalyptic nuclear threat of the late stages of the Cold War has given way to ever more threatening natural cataclysms, extinction threats and species angst in the light of global warming, rising sea levels, the greenhouse effect, the thinning of the ozone layer, the depletion of natural resources, etc. – to an extent where scientists are gradually reaching an agreement that, at least for the past two centuries, we might have been living in an entirely new geological period, the first in which climate change is mainly brought about by human activity: the Anthropocene. So while humans might have established themselves in the Holocene (while appearing in the Pleistocene),10 they might be in the process of bringing about their own disappearance in what will now have to be called the Post-Anthropocene.

One of the first interpretations of Man on the Holocene, by Michael Butler, in a special issue on Max Frisch in World Literature Today, in 1986, speaks of the “remarkable fusion of form and content through which gradual loss of coherence is expressed with an ironically brilliant articulacy”.11 In particular, Butler refers to “the peculiarly dual perspective of the erlebte Rede or ‘narrated monologue’ technique” and the “flexible narrative position, which could easily oscillate between detachment and empathy”,12 as Frisch’s major achievement in the novella. The shift between empathy and detachment produced in this way allows for a sharing of the progressive disorientation of Geiser while simultaneously making the reader observe this process “almost clinically”. Geiser is aware of the fundamental absurdity of his situation and his attempt at self-reassurance via epistemological, encyclopaedic certainty and a trust in “facts” extracted from Der Große Brockhaus encyclopedia, as well as some dictionaries and natural history books. This desperate attempt at retaining control through securing knowledge and, by returning to “Enlightenment” reflexes, thus to still feel “at home” in the world becomes progressively undermined by Geiser’s failing memory13 – a

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10 See note 3 above.
12 Butler, p. 575.

Science without moral reason and consequently science research whose consequences no-one is responsible for, this is more than a deficit, but indeed a perversion of Enlightenment, which was supposed to make us mature. Enlightenment today is revolt against the superstition of technology, which antiques man, as Günter Anders calls it, and which leads to powerlessness in the face of technology. All this would be alarming enough, but is not efficient as alarm in a society which insists on the idea that reasonable is what is profitable. Yes, much has gone awry! At the end of the Enlightenment is thus not mature man, as Kant and the Enlightenment
process that is anticipated in the first pages: “It is not so much the bad weather - ... What would be bad would be losing one’s memory - ... No knowledge without memory” (Man, 5-6). In the end, Geiser’s Zettelwand – a wall full of paper scraps – turns out to be an absolutely useless mnemotechnic device since it lacks a narrative structure that only (human) memory can provide. His situation is therefore not surprisingly likened by Butler to existentialist-humanist Camusian (post-enlightenment) absurdity:

There is a distinct echo of the Sisyphus myth in the image of Herr Geiser’s striving toward a goal, only to lose his grip at the last moment. However, the relatively robust humanism which caused Camus forty years ago to imagine his Sisyphus a happy man is shown as deeply questionable in Frisch’s hero. Whatever insights the journey has given Herr Geiser, they do not lead him to any form of permanent enlightenment. So, arguably, the existential humanism that inspired Camus’s ultimately optimistic (i.e. non-nihilistic) affirmation of human freedom in the face of absurdity, is taken back by Frisch in his “posthumanist” tale of failing human memory (both at an individual and at a species level). Interestingly, this apocalyptic vision of individual and species cataclysm urges Geiser to return to prehistory – the time before the human, the time of human emergence, and, more precisely, the (geologic, deep) time of stone. This almost feels, according to Butler, like a reverse form of evolution, in which Geiser starts seeing himself as a “lizard” (or as one of those extinct lizard-like dinosaurs):

The promise of the humanist thirst for knowledge proves a hollow one; the fate which he foresees and desperately tries to resist is the humiliating regression to the evolutionary stage of the lowly lizard. (Butler, 578)

As Gerhard Kaiser explains, Geiser is fascinated by the prehistoric extinct dinosaurs which he encounters in his encyclopaedia to the extent that he almost identifies with the newt that finds its way into his bath tub. In the end he more and more resembles an amphibious creature himself. By way of contextualisation, Walter Oelschlager reminds us of the motif character of amphibiousness within Frisch’s work:

With striking frequency, Frisch’s works evoke images of amphibians and reptiles in the context of age and human aging. There is a scene in Homo Faber in which Walter Faber looks at Hanna and notices that she is aging rather well, except for the skin beneath her chin, which reminds him of lizard skin.

Holocene – and its extremely pessimistic view of aging, a view that can also be seen in frequent comments about the threat of decrepitude in Frisch’s diaries – is seen by Franz Haberl as “a most significant expression of Max Frisch’s personal eschatology”. Like most principal characters in Frisch’s work, Geiser is in a situation and location from which he cannot really escape and is thus forced to take stock of his past, present and future

philosophers hoped, but the Golden Calf that we already knew from the Old Testament. (p. 126)

14 Butler, p. 578.
15 Ibid.
existence. However, Geiser is particular in seeing himself within a wider historical or even prehistorical context:

From the history of natural disasters and the determination of the people to rebuild and resettle, Herr Geiser goes back to the history of the earth, its geologic periods, its rock formations, the appearance and disappearance of oceans, mountains, forests, dinosaurs.\textsuperscript{19}

More specifically, Geiser remembers his visit to Iceland and its rough landscape shaped by glaciers and volcanoes. In fact, his very name, bears an affinity to the Icelandic geysirs, as some commentators have pointed out. Most importantly, this symbolic and epistemological “retreat” to prehistory, to a time before the human and a time of the emergence of the human (as mentioned in note 3: Man appears in the Holocene, is the literal translation of the German title), produces what must, in today’s terms, be called a “postanthropocentric” perspective. Postanthropocentric not in the sense of a time “after” the human – which, arguably, is the common sense understanding of the “posthuman” and “posthumanism” – but a time in which humanity is thrown back to its origins and the renewed challenge to the legitimation of a humanist anthropocentric world view. What Holocene shares with the contemporary moment – even though it was written during the final “apocalyptic” years of the Cold War with its looming environmental disaster produced by nuclear war – is thus an uncertainty about the place of the human within history (or time), nature and technology.

Geiser thus reflects on time and history “outside” the human, for example, and the fact that “Only human beings can recognize catastrophes, provided they survive them; Nature recognizes no catastrophes” (Holocene, 79). When his daughter appears at the end, when Geiser is already stunned by the stroke he suffered, he casts indeed a very harsh verdict on his attempt to secure human knowledge through memory:

The ants Geiser recently observed under a dripping fir tree are not concerned with what anyone might know about them; nor were the dinosaurs, which died out before a human being set eyes on them. All the papers, whether on the wall or on the carpet, can go. Who cares about the Holocene? Nature needs no names. Geiser knows that. The rocks do not need his memory. (Holocene, 107; our emphasis)

In passages like these, which allude to a return towards prehistoric time before the human, and which allow for a postanthropocentrism by hindsight so to speak, Frisch’s novella anticipates current texts that, according to Adam Trexler, might be classified as “Anthropocene fiction”.\textsuperscript{20}

\textit{Catastrophe, Ecocide and Extinction in Man in the Holocene}

\textit{Man in the Holocene} could thus be seen as an early example of the “novel in a time of climate change” and might thus contribute to activating the “imaginative processes that are

\textsuperscript{19} Wulf Koepke, “Retreat into Prehistory”, World Literature Today 60.4 (1986): 586.

\textsuperscript{20} Adam Trexler, \textit{Anthropocene Fictions: The Novel in a Time of Climate Change}, Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2015. This move is also shared by recent article on Holocene by Bernhard Malkmus, “‘Man in the Anthropocene’: Max Frisch’s Environmental History”, PMLA 132.1 (2017): 71-85: “Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän... can be read as a reflection on the Anthropocene avant la lettre” (p. 72). We will discuss Malkmus’s argument in more detail below in connection with Frisch’s narrative technique in \textit{Holocene}. 
fundamental to engaging with climate change”.²¹ As Trexler explains: “there is a considerable archive of climate change fiction. Human-altered climates were of grave concern to authors before greenhouse gas emissions attracted wide scientific interest”.²² But while “nearly all Anthropocene fiction addresses the historical tension between the existence of catastrophic global warming and the failed obligation to act”,²³ Holocene arguably already goes one step further creating an analogy between natural erosion and human aging, both at an individual and at a species level, in conjunction with a return to “deep time”, “prehistory” and the time “before humanity”.²⁴ The particular challenge that the scale of climate change poses for a genre like the novel (or in this case a novella)²⁵ and fiction more generally, namely the tension between formal experiment, realism and empathy (through identification with (human) characters, or the problem of “agency”, is met by Frisch through a sophisticated narrative ambiguity (of which more below). Above all, Holocene achieves the conjunction of individual and species consciousness in the face of, what Timothy Morton refers to as a “hyperobject”,²⁶ namely climate change, extinction and, in Frisch’s scenario, a new ice age.²⁷ by a radical deconstruction of both Geiser’s “humanism” and his “humanity”. In this sense, Frisch’s novella could also be seen as another example of what we called “posthumanism without technology”, or, more precisely, as a climate change novel without science fiction.²⁸

The influential apocalyptic imagination in the face of nuclear and ecological catastrophe in the late 1970s and 1980s was captured in Günter Grass’s Antonio-Feltrinelli Prize speech in Rome in 1982, entitled “Die Vernichtung der Menschheit hat begonnen (The annihilation of humanity has begun)”.²⁹ Frisch’s specific version of this apocalyptic imagination – or literature’s “cultivation of catastrophe”, as Peter Utz calls it³⁰ – is encapsulated in the quotation from Holocene referred to above: “only human beings can recognize catastrophes,”

²² Trexler, p. 8.
²³ Ibid., p. 9.
²⁴ The published version of Holocene that appeared in 1979 had in fact a long prehistory itself, with many revisions and stylistic changes, especially as far as narrative technique is concerned (see below). The story started out as a draft called “Regen” (rain) in 1974, which was renamed into “Klima” (climate), in which Geiser was introduced as a former specialist in climate control devices. The story gradually takes on a “geological” and “prehistorical” dimension or strata (cf. Walter Schmitz, Max Frisch: Das Spätwerk (1962-1982): Eine Einführung, Tübingen: Francke, 1984, 143-48).
²⁸ For the idea of a “posthumanism without technology” see our “Critical Posthumanism or, the inventio of a posthumanism without technology”, Subject Matters 3.274.1: 15-30.
³⁰ Peter Utz, Die Kultivierung der Katastrophe: Literarische Untergangsszenarien aus der Schweiz, München: Fink.
provided they survive them; Nature recognizes no catastrophes” (*Holocene*, 79), which Utz uses as the starting point for his investigation into the catastrophic. The central mirroring function on which the plot of this novella turns is the analogy between Geiser’s personal catastrophe (his loss of memory and thus control of his environment, and the realisation of his finality reinforced, in the end, by the stroke) with the signs of erosion around him (the rain, the landslides, the television news full of natural disasters). As Jürgen Barkhoff puts it: “In *Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän* Frisch is neither concerned with day-to-day environmental politics nor with a general criticism of our technological age as put forward in his *Homo faber*. Instead he uses an exemplary individual case to demonstrate the ephemeral status of the human species in the context of the overwhelming history of nature”. The individual catastrophe emblematic of the fate of the species, for Frisch, is aging and the hopelessness it brings with it. *Holocene*, in this respect, is Frisch’s most ruthless and resigned text, characterised by what Hans Blumenberg refers to as the narcissistic wound that arises from the non-coincidence of “*Lebenszeit* (life time)” and “*Weltzeit* (world time)”:

Consciousness of the fact that one is inserted as a kind of episode between natality and mortality within the course of the world – first as the moment of an individual and then also as that of the species – arises from the simple but not at all obvious perception that the world does neither end nor has it begun with our own life.

To be outlawed by a world that is visibly indifferent to individual or species extinction is maybe what Geiser intimates in one of his final thoughts: “Who cares about the Holocene? Nature needs no names. Geiser knows that. The rocks do not need his memory” (*Holocene*, 107). This finality (the time between natality and mortality) equally applies at a species level, even though the time span is much longer. This is, for example, one of the ways in which the title of Frisch’s novella – *Man appears in the Holocene* – may be understood, as Wolfgang Riedel remarks:

> Which man is meant here? It cannot be the species *homo*. Neither the kind that survives today, *homo sapiens*, because it already appeared two hundred thousand years ago, in the Pleistocene (the Ice age). The Holocene (post-Ice Age or our geological present) begins much later, around twelve thousand years ago. And at this point it is not a new species that appeared, but merely a new cultural variant

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31 “A catastrophe causes the rupture of culture’s skin” (Utz, p. 9; our translation). Axel Goodbody also refers to the phenomenon of “catastrophism” in his “Catastrophism in Post-war German Literature”, in Colin Riordan, ed., *Green Thought in German Culture: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1997, pp. 159-80:

> Literature and non-fiction on man’s degradation and destruction of the natural environment, the dangers facing mankind through over-population, the extinction of species, pollution, and the horrific consequences of a possible nuclear war painted an overwhelmingly negative picture of the history of mankind, culminating more often than not in a disaster wiping out modern civilization. (p. 159)

Goodbody’s final verdict nevertheless is that: “catastrophist literature has acted as a corrective in a predominantly anthropocentric and technocratic culture, disseminating and elaborating green ideas, and sketching out social alternatives” (p. 176). Although Goodbody does not refer to *Holocene* specifically, Frisch’s novella can certainly be seen as such a critique of anthropocentrism and technocracy, even though it does not provide “social alternatives”.


34 Cf. Claus Erhart, “’Herr Geiser ist kein Lurch.’ Apokalyptisches bei Max Frisch”, *Cahiers d’Etudes Germaniques* 51 (2006): 159-71. Erhart investigates Geiser’s strategies of narrowing the gap or even transcending the difference between “*Lebenszeit*” and “*Weltzeit*.”
characterised by sedentariness, agriculture, animal farming and pottery – the so-called “Neolithic revolution”. The kind of human who begins as homo faber to take over the world, the human of modern civilisation, in whose lineage engineers like Herr Geiser stands and who studies the relevant encyclopedia article – this human indeed only appears in the Holocene.\footnote{Wolfgang Riedel, “‘Der Prozess der Geschichte ist ein Verbrennen’. Erzählte Entropie bei Koeppen und Frisch”, in Friederike Felicitas Günther and Torsten Hoffmann, eds., Anthropologien der Endlichkeit, Göttingen: Wallstein, 2011, p. 258 (our translation).}

For Riedel, the postanthropocentric perspective that is here given rise to in what he refers to as “the crisis of humanism”,\footnote{Riedel, p. 258.} opens onto a literature “beyond” the human. For our current purposes, however, we prefer to read Frisch’s novella as an example of “climate change fiction” that, in stressing the mortality of the species through the example of a specific individual, throws us, not forward into a posthuman future, but, indeed, backwards to a time \textit{before} humanity.

\textit{Forgetting and Geiser’s Mnemotechnics}

Having read Frisch’s novella, one is tempted to “complete” its title, “Man appears in the Holocene”, for example by adding “and today is about to disappear”. Apart from its apocalyptic theme, however, what is most remarkable about Frisch’s story is the narrative technique it employs, and the restraint and the almost ruthless way in which Geiser’s “decomposition” is rendered for the reader. Karlheinz Rossbacher summarizes the specific narrative qualities of the story:

The radicality with which Frisch writes on aging and morbidity “from inside”; the peculiar narrative style which turns the reader into the co-producer of the relay of meanings; the process of a particular usage of negation that turns comforting phrases into uncomfortable ones; the interconnection of a world historical perspective with that of the downfall of one human being; the insistence on an Enlightenment position, despite everything that speaks against it, through a changed view of nature.\footnote{Karlheinz Rossbacher, “Lesevorgänge: Zu Max Frischs Erzählung Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän”, in Paul Michael Lützeiler, ed., Zeitgenossenschaft: Zur deutschsprachigen Literatur im 20. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt: Athenäum, 1978, pp. 252-53 (our translation).}

The psychological, “inside” perspective of Geiser’s dementia and his anxiety is generally hailed as Frisch’s major achievement in this story, which treats confusion with absolute and almost clinical clarity and honesty to avoid the danger of self-indulgence and (self-)pity. It is also the “power of negation” that plays an important part – Geiser’s thoughts are presented and immediately negated, which creates a constant change of perspective between a third person narrator who speaks from “inside” Geiser’s mind and a third person narrator who seems to reverse this perspective from “outside”. The reader thus has the impression of a schizophrenia-in-the-making: Geiser is describing himself as an other (i.e. in the third person) in the ghostly presence of another other, however, who provides a clinical comment of Geiser’s demise but without any judgement or pity. Take for example this passage in the middle of the story:

\begin{quote}
There is always something to do.
So one would imagine… – that is what Geiser is thinking.
\end{quote}
When Geiser goes back to the window to convince himself, by watching the slowly gliding raindrops, that time is not standing still – and in the whole of history it has never done that! – and when he cannot resist looking at his watch again, it reads seven minutes past six...

The other noise:

Footsteps in the house, his own – (Holocene, 66-67)

The passage shows Geiser’s puzzlement regarding the discontinuity between his personal life time and the cosmic dimension of time (and space), or “geological” (deep) time.

Another crucial feature of the story is the fact that it is in fact a “montage” – the encyclopaedia articles, handwritten notes and little drawings, graphs and illustrations are reproduced and inserted into the narrative at various stages, almost as illustrations of Geiser’s thoughts, pinned to the narrative like the scraps of paper that Geiser tacks to the walls of his house. These illustrate but also disrupt the narrative to stop any impression of a traditional narrative flow from developing – Geiser distrusts novels and instead favours the factual style of science: “(Novels are no use at all on days like these, they deal with people and their relationships, with themselves and others, fathers and mothers and daughters and sons, lovers, etc., with individual souls, usually unhappy ones, with society, etc., as if the place for these things were assured, the earth for all time earth, the sea level fixed for all time.)” (Holocene, 8). Apart from the “geological” effect this produces – the interconnection between the individual fate and deep time mentioned above (and which, to recall, is one of the most important endeavours of climate change fiction, with its particular challenge of bridging the vast differences in scale between individual human action and cosmic changes) – from a narrative point of view, the story keeps breaking down, repeating and watching its own de(con)struction, like the “pagoda of crispbread” Geiser is seen to be building at the beginning and which keeps collapsing as soon as the fourth layer is added:

It should be possible to build a pagoda of crispbread, to think of nothing, to hear no thunder, no rain, no splashing from the gutter, no gurgling around the house. Perhaps no pagoda will emerge, but the night will pass… It is always with the fourth floor that the wobbling begins; a trembling hand as the next piece of crispbread is put in place, a cough when the gable is already standing, and the whole thing lies in ruins – (Holocene, 3)

Just like the crispbread, nature slides (Geiser’s fear of actual, current and past, and imagined landslides), as well as memory slips and slides, constantly, until, in the end, Geiser has to realise: “There will never be a pagoda – Geiser knows that” (106).

Other stylistic elements signal the disjuncture between the generic conventions of the novel and other nonfictional texts. There is a bibliography at the end that covers the collage of scraps used by Geiser, pinned as well as pinned to the story. These scraps are not just cited but reproduced in their “original” form and type which foregrounds their material intrusion and iconicity as they are stuck to the narrative as mnemotechnic devices. Several commentators have seized on Frisch’s comparison between the absurdity of Geiser’s obsession with his collage, or cut and paste, technique and the famous ironic treatment of encyclopaedic obsession in Flaubert’s Bouvard et Pécuchet. 38 The fascinating thing is, however, as Robert Cohen points out that:

The texts on the paper scraps [Zetteltexte] are just as much calling for interpretation as their surrounding authorial text. They are of little use as far as determining the state of modern knowledge is concerned. Their selection depends on a figure whose mind is decaying. By contrast, their meaning – and the art of Frisch’s collage – resides in the fact that they communicate this decay. One reads them through Geiser’s eyes; one tries to understand, what in them he might be interested in; and one tries, to read his mental state through them.  

Frisch’s achievement becomes even more salient, if one compares Holocene with one of its earlier drafts, reproduced as “Fragment aus einer Erzählung” in the edition of Frisch’s collected works, in which an intrusive narrator keeps addressing Geiser directly and almost reproachfully: “Herr Geiser, what are you thinking?... It is night time, Herr Geiser, it is night. You forgot that it’s night time. No need to be anxious. It is dark, because it is the night”. Claudia Müller’s investigation into subjectivity and narration in Max Frisch’s (and Friedrich Dürrenmatt’s) late works follows the “genetic developments” of Holocene very closely. In Montauk, Frisch refers to a story started in 1972 (and having undergone many rewritings) by saying: “A literary story set in Ticino has failed for the fourth time; the narrator position is unconvincing”. It is only when Frisch abandons the first person narrator perspective and moves towards a split third person that the desired detachment is finally achieved. In a sense, the narrator has become one with his character and both turn increasingly unstable, which, according to Müller, makes the narrative “flicker towards the end like a dying candle”. The effect is that of a “destabilising of the reader” who can never be sure where to position him- or herself – i.e. inside or outside the main character. This, according to Müller, leads to a “dialogue” between the reader and the gaps and silences in the text: “Like Geiser, the reader is forced to reconstruct bits of reality out of the blanks between the words and sections”. Ironically, however, as this fusion progresses, the reader is forced to develop an autonomy and a freedom in order to create his or her own impression of the events and developments that have been affecting Geiser, all the while Geiser himself is gradually losing this autonomy. The effect is that of witnessing a psychological breakdown “from inside”, or of a “humanity” that is about to forget itself, as we would argue.

This “erosion” – which is without doubt the leitmotiv of the story – and which brings together Geiser’s individual fate and the fate of the species in the face of some planetary apocalypse – ultimately mirrors a cognitive breakdown between self and world which raises the question: how to speak with one’s self in the face of an inescapable process of (self)annihilation?

Verzettelung

39 Cohen, p. 553.
41 Frisch, “Fragment aus einer Erzählung”, p. 523 (our translation).
43 Quoted in Müller, p. 64 (our translation).
44 Müller, p. 81.
46 This German noun is only very inadequately translated by “dispersal”. The image, literally, evokes losing oneself in one’s notes, papers, scraps etc.
In his solitude, Geiser’s strategy is that of securing knowledge through memorisation — the ingrained Enlightenment instinct that tells him “No knowledge without memory” (Holocene, 6). His library contains a number of “factual books” (these he prefers to the novels his wife used to read):

*Brighter than a Thousand Suns*... the diary of Captain Scott... the Bible... the twelve-volume encyclopaedia [*Der Grosse Brockhaus]*... garden books, a book on snakes, a history of the canton of Ticino, the Swiss encyclopaedia... picture books for the grandchildren (*The World We Live in*), the *Duden* dictionary of foreign words, and a book about Iceland... as well as maps and rambling guides that provide information about the geology, climate, history, etc., of the district. (10)

Geiser starts by copying all kinds of bits of information onto scraps of paper until he realises that cutting and pasting is a more efficient technique:

> It is idiotic to write out in one’s own hand (in the evenings by candlelight) things already in print. Why not use scissors to cut out items that are worth remembering and deserve a place on the wall? (Holocene, 35)

In the end, however, there are cuttings and papers everywhere and Geiser’s attempt at recreating order in his brain to preserve his memory fails as his house and he himself is submerged with unstructured “information”. The scraps of paper (*Zettel* in German) on the wall, fall down, lie around awaiting their orderly pinning to the wall. German uses the reflexive verb *sich verzetteln* to describe a state of being gradually undone by a lack of a sense of direction, of losing one’s way.47 Claudia Müller, in a chapter entitled “Die Verzettelung des Herrn Geiser”, speaks of the way Geiser’s subjectivity is gradually undone by the materiality of the “medium” he has chosen to access (and safeguard his knowledge, memory and identity).48 One problem are the thumbtacks that do not stick to the wall but only to the wood panelling (which, however, only covers the living room). Elsewhere, the thumbtacks only damage the wall and the paper scraps just fall down. As Geiser’s exasperation with his material *Verzettelung* grows, so does his anxiety of losing control by losing his memory:

> The walls in the living room will provide nowhere near enough space, particularly since his paper slips must be affixed neither too high nor too low; otherwise, every time Geiser forgets what he so carefully cut out an hour ago, he will have to climb on a chair or crouch on his heels to read his pieces of paper. This is not only laborious, it also prevents an overall review, and once already the chair nearly capsized. Where, for example, is the information about the conjectural brain of Neanderthal man? Instead, one finds oneself back with the drawing of the golden section. Where is the information about mutations, chromosomes, etc.? It is all so exasperating... (Holocene, 38)

Further material obstacles lie in the fact that the cut out paper slips start to curl, that there is not enough glue in the house, and that there is the constant danger that “when one opens a window, creating a draft, the whole wall flutters and rustles” (39). In the end, Geiser realises: “It is no longer a living room” (39). Later on, the scissors break (60), the thumbtacks run out, and he has to use “Magic Tape” which sticks to the plaster (63). His glasses break

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48 Müller, pp. 82-87.
and he has to start reading with a magnifying glass (65). “Man”, as Geiser realises, “remains an amateur” (60). In the end, when his daughter Corinne opens the door to find her father, who has suffered a stroke, “the slips of paper are lying on the floor, a confused heap that makes no sense” (106).

There is also something intrinsically wrong with Geiser’s “method”, however: “Something Geiser has not taken onto account: that the text on the back of the page might perhaps be not less illuminating than the picture on the front that he has so carefully cut out; now this text has been cut to pieces, useless for his gallery” (89). The real “disconnect” however lies in the fact that Geiser forgets the motivation that lay behind the initial selection that memory (and knowledge) always imply:

Now and again Geiser finds himself wondering what he really wants to know, what he hopes to gain from all this knowledge. (90)

Standing before his gallery, Geiser cannot remember what gave him the idea of cutting out illustrations of dinosaurs and lizards and sticking them to the wall – There were never any dinosaurs in Ticino. (95)

It seems that in his attempt at archiving his knowledge – and maybe “human” knowledge, the knowledge of the species as such – the old man, Geiser, has succumbed to a serious strain of “archive fever”. In the construction of his archive, in the selection process of knowledge, Geiser has in fact contributed to the (further) destruction of knowledge. He has literally “scrapped” his library and “externalising” and compartmentalising his knowledge and memory onto his wall he may have in fact achieved the opposite of his intention, as Müller remarks:

his memory notes [Erinnerungszettel] are not able to constitute him as a person: his attempt to reconstruct the world that is slipping away from him through a memory of scraps [Zettelgedächtnis] on the wall fails. In searching for the origin of the subject, he does not document its presence, but its absence. Herr Geiser can only see himself in the history of the species – but the “tear” remains: between the encyclopaedia entries on the wall and Geiser himself, between the history of an individual that cannot be reconstituted, and the history of the species.

In fact, the cluttering of his wall with paper scraps in the end only increases the uncanniness, the (self-)alienation and the “unhomeliness” of Geiser’s personal space.

Geiser’s anxieties about losing his memory are in fact fears about “dehumanisation” and thus closely connected to the frequent recourse to the motif of the Flood, of the landslide and erosion more generally, as well as to extinction (of the dinosaurs) and prehistorical times, as Barbara Schmenk explains. The kind of knowledge Geiser is able to extract from the encyclopaedias and nature books actually hastens his “depersonalisation” and the “decontextualisation” of his individual subjectivity. As a form of resistance to the process of aging and dementia, the Zettelwand is the worst of media thinkable, since Geiser in fact tends to misinterpret (and thus wrongly identifies with) the “factual” content of the bribes of information he extracts. In the end he lives in constant fear of becoming (like) the newt he finds in his bathroom and which he places within an analogy of the extinct dinosaurs.


50 Müller, pp. 83-84.

Schmenk, in this context, speaks of the dynamic of “geologising” and “anthropologising” potentials in Geiser’s process of archi
visation. As Geiser gradually “geologises” knowledge through the selection of information about prehistoric life and climatic development, the reader has to take responsibility for the (re)anthropologisation and creates the kind of 
coherence the story itself no longer provides.52 As we would argue, however, it is not so much that Frisch’s story opens up the possibility of a reanthropologisation of Gieser’s 
situation by the reader – i.e. a neohumanist reading that sees the end of the story as a kind of 
reassurance, for example in the continuity of nature and the valley – but it also suggests a 
more permanent “deanthropocentring” (without return). This “posthumanist” reading of 
Holocene, would see Geiser’s turn towards geology and the time “before the human” not so 
much as a strategy of (failed) individual assurance through identification with a longterm 
view of the (survival of the) species, but as a concrete proposal by Frisch to see the 
“geologisation” of knowledge as a conscious strategy for “climate change fiction”.

**ANCESTRALITY 4: Geology and deep time [see separate file]: run as text box alongside next 
section.**

**Pre- and Posthistory, Geology and Ancestral**

Georg Braungart (following Stephen Jay Gould) refers to the discovery of geological “deep 
time” (sometime between 1750 and 1850) as the “fourth narcissistic wound” of human 
subjectivity. Alongside the cosmic, biological and psychological “decentring” of the human, 
geology adds a temporal marginalisation.53 As anthropology gradually becomes the central 
discipline, from the 18th century onwards, leading to an anthropocentric shift within 
 medicine, psychology, rhetoric, natural science and philosophy, Braungart argues, a parallel 
ascent of geology occurs as the “dark sister of anthropology... which contains a time bomb 
for the anthropocentrism of late Enlightenment and the philosophy of the subject of 
German idealism”.54 He sees Max Frisch’s Holocene as a late literary fallout from this gradual 
geologisation” of human history and what he refers to as a “transhuman perspective:

“[Max Frisch’s Man in the Holocene] lives off the tension between human egocentrism and a 
transhuman perspective that the history of the world suggests” 55

Braungart returns to Holocene in more detail in a later essay.56 While it is true that Geiser 
wonders “whether there would still be a God if there were no longer a human brain, which 
cannot accept the idea of a creation without creator” (Holocene, 9), his obsession with facts 
is actually driven by the question of a world “without” humans. Since this is an anxiety that 
works both “forward” and “backward” – a time “before” the human and a time “after” – we 
prefer to call this aspect of Frisch’s story (and the geological form it takes) a posthumanist, 
rather than a “transhuman perspective” (Baumgart). Geiser’s interest in prehistoric times is 
mainly a projection of his own annihilation onto the vast timescape “before” the emergence 
of the human species. As Geiser realises the impossibility of his own biography – due to his

52 Schmenk, p. 191.  
und ihre literarischen Nachbeben”, in Ulrich G. Leinsle and Jochen Mecke, eds., Zeit – Zeitenwechsel – 
Endzeit: Zeit im Wandel der Zeiten, Kulturen, Techniken und Disziplinen, Regensburg: 
54 Braungart, p. 112.  
55 Ibid., p. 120.  
56 Georg Braungart, “‘Katastrophen kennt allein der Mensch, sofern er sie überlebt’: Max Frisch, 
Peter Handke und die Geologie”, in Carsten Dutt and Roman Luckscheiter, eds., Figurationen der 
sinking deeper and deeper into dementia – his attention turns almost inevitably towards the biography of the planet.

The starting point of his interest in prehistory and geology thus lies in his “present” context: the physical and geographical isolation of his Ticino valley and the incessant rain in the rotten summer he is experiencing, which causes his fear of real and imaginary “landslides”.

The third paragraph of Holocene already introduces the theme:

“The news in the village is conflicting; some people say there has been no landslide at all, others that an old supporting wall has collapsed, and there is no way of diverting the highway at that spot... Nobody in the village thinks that the day, or perhaps the night, will come when the whole mountain could begin to slide, burying the village for all time.” (3-4)

The environment and the weather, and rain in particular, thus initiate Geiser’s obsession with factual, scientific and classificatory knowledge. He begins with a “typology of thunder” (5-6; continued on 24-5) and continues with a detailed record of rainy periods during one day (41) and observations on animals and signs of decay in nature throughout. Landslides, floods and erosion push Geiser into seeking reassurance in the “encyclopædic”, the listing of factual knowledge at the same time as he becomes aware of his sinking into dementia: “It is not so much the bad weather – ... What would be bad would be losing one’s memory” (5-6).

Landslides remain a recurrent theme: “A little wall in the lower garden (drystone) has collapsed” (7); and prompts the first facsimile reproduction from one of the books of history of Ticino: “Chapter 1 Ticino in Prehistoric Times, The First Inhabitants”, which contains this paragraph:

“Finally, mention must be made of the many rockfalls that have occurred since the retreat of the glaciers, for they played no little part in giving many districts in the canton of Ticino the appearance they have today. (Holocene, 11)"

The “little landslide in the garden” (12) “does not mean that the whole slope is beginning to slide. Presumably, there are rivulets here and there and lumps of clay, these are usual in persistent rain. Presumably...” (13) – what is half meant as (self-)reassurance, nevertheless continues to grow into a general feeling of apocalypse, deluge, climate cataclysm and catastrophes. Even though “Geiser does not believe in the Flood”, he nevertheless, in Noah-like fashion, does not cease “counting” and describing the animals of the valley, even the extinct ones (the encyclopædia entries on dinosaurs keep multiplying). He also implicitly compares himself to the explorer Robert Scott (the diary of Captain Scott is one of his books listed on p. 10). “Landslides like that have always occurred in this district” (29); “Nobody is reckoning on another Flood” (31); “More serious than the collapse of a dry-stone wall would be a crack across the ground, narrow at first, no broader than a hand, but a crack” (32); “A crack from gray prehistoric ages... at no time within human memory has a village in this valley been overwhelmed, and in a place where rocks once fell, burying some farm buildings, no new building was ever erected” (33); “Erosion is a slow process” (48); “There have been some landslides; not here, but farther up the valley” (54); “There have been some landslides” (57); “there have been some landslides” (95); “A crack in the plaster, fine as hair, which was not there yesterday” (95); “There have been some landslides” (105) – as the story and Geiser’s demise progress, cracks and landslides increasingly come to represent Geiser’s loss of memory and control. It fact, nonhuman “objects” and phenomena increasingly
develop an agency of their own and guide Geiser’s interest and selection of paper cuttings. Rossbacher speaks of “Frisch’s calculated geologisations of human life” in this context and lists the “petrifications” that befall Geiser:

“Geologisation” of man in Frisch’s analogical technique means: short term memory is that layer of the human that corresponds to the latest stratum of earth history. It is that layer which constitutes the surface and is thus most exposed to erosion. Deeper layers, longterm memory, are what remains because they are unexposed. Erosion in the brain is thus ablation and elution of the person. Paleontology corresponds to the archaeology of memory; Geiser’s work of knowledge, recalling and (re)storing of world historical knowledge on paper slips and walls is supposed to counter the biological process of personality erosion which cannot be influenced. The analogy is retained until the end: Geiser’s stroke is a ruptured brain artery which corresponds to the crack in the rock of the valley.

The narcissistic wound that geology’s deep time inflicts thus affects Geiser at a personal as well as at a species level (i.e. at the level of “humanity”). Immediately after the sentence “Geiser has no desire for sleep; a person does not have all that much time” follows an encyclopaedia entry on “geology”:

Geology is a science devoted to tracing the development of the earth through its various eras since the formation of the earth’s crust, and it covers a period of 2,000 million years – according to recent discoveries, 5,000 million years (see Geological Eras)... In this process [the evolution of higher forms of life] the changing pattern of the earth has played an important role, making it imperative for plants and animals to adapt to new living conditions, to migrate or to die out. (Holocene, 68-69)

Geology and rock formation in particular represent a form of nonhuman agency par excellence, which means that the analogy between the erosion of Geiser’s brain and the climatic erosion in Geiser’s valley suggests a link to the fate of Geiser, the individual human, but also to the fate of the human species. In creating an analogy between Geiser’s dementia and prehistoric times, “before” the human – i.e. the human that Geiser (and, arguably, humanity) is “about to forget” – the story opens up the possibility for the reader to perceive what Kathryn Yusoff has called the “geological life” of the human in the Anthropocene.

The encyclopaedia entry on erosion at the end of the story, when Geiser has suffered his stroke and is found dying by his daughter, is the first in a series of final paper cuttings on “Chestnut” and “Chestnut Canker” (also a recurrent theme in the story), “Eschatology” (“Theology of ‘last things’, i.e., the final fate of the individual human being and of the

58 Rossbacher, p. 258 (our translation).
“geologic life” – a mineralogical dimension of human composition that remains currently undertheorised in social thought and is directly relevant for the material, temporal, and corporeal conceptualisation of fossil fuels. Examining fossils as material and discursive knots in the narrative arc of human becoming, I argue for a ‘geological turn’ that takes seriously not just our biological (or biopolitical) life, but our geological (or geopolitical) life, as crucial to modes of subjectification in the Anthropocene. (p. 780).
For further comments on the idea of a “geologic turn” see Ancestrality 4 above.
world”), “Coherent” and “Apoplexy”: “Geological erosion, or abrasion, is, in its natural occurrence, a beneficial process, though human interference and mismanagement can lead to catastrophes, caused by disturbing the natural balance...” (Holocene, 107). Geiser lists the geological eras in a handwritten note on p. 19, immediately after a cutting from a typescript entry on dinosaurs and the Triassic, prompted by the reflection: “When did man first emerge, and why?” (18). At the end of the cutting is the central statement that leads to the central “confusion” in the title of the story: “According to present views, man first made his appearance in the Pleistocene (see Old Stone Age); the geological present is termed the Holocene...” (19). This “fact” is then reversed during Geiser’s mountain escape which brings on the stroke, when he says “man emerged in the Holocene” (79), which follows arguably the most memorable (because almost desperately anthropocentric?) phrase from Frisch’s story: “only human beings can recognize catastrophes, provided they survive them; Nature recognizes no catastrophes” (79). The confusion is ultimately dismissed in Geiser’s last thoughts: “Who cares about the Holocene? Nature needs no names. Geiser knows that. The rocks do not need his memory” (107). A number of interpretations are possible here: Geiser simply gets confused among the wealth of scientific knowledge and facts – a sign that his and, by analogy, the species’s (historical) memory is fading. Another possibility – already hinted at above – depends on what we might see as “man” (i.e. when does the human begin) – homo sapiens, or homo faber, or homo sapiens sapiens – in which case one stresses the continued evolution of the human within the last two (and today, arguably, three) geological strata, namely from the Pleistocene to the Holocene to the Anthropocene. But a third possible interpretation, closer to our argument about the ambivalence of the “after/post” and the “proto/before”, would run like this: prehistory – and the Pleistocene in particular – remains “with us” in many ways; or, in other words, the Stone Age retains a ghostly presence. As with any transition from one age to another, the arbitrariness of naming and drawing a line becomes apparent and demonstrates the “constructedness” of any teleology: just as a certain man “appears” only in the Holocene (namely that creature that records and tries to understand its own history in the context of (deep) time), a certain distinction between Pleistocene and Holocene (and, indeed, Anthropocene) only “appears” with the human – which secures the anthropocentrism of a discursive knowledge formation even as nonanthropocentric as geology.

It is therefore no coincidence that “man” should remain at the centre of Frisch’s story, literally. As Probst notes:

Under the heading “Mensch” (man or human being), the narrator reproduces verbatim from the Brockhaus encyclopaedia passages dealing with man’s ability to see himself as a subject in relation to an objective world (the conditio sine qua non for the text we are reading); man’s attempt better to understand himself through divine beings, totems, spirits, or other alter egos; the extreme materialist view of man as a machine; man as a historical being shaped through traditions in the crafts, sciences, arts, morals, laws, and values; the difference between man and animal as to man’s freer but at the same time problematic relation to his environment, characterized by his ability to project into the future (“man has a future”). The fact that this article on “Mensch” appears exactly in the middle of Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän [English edition: 53-54], especially with the quotation concerning the future of man, can hardly be accidental and must be interpreted as an ironical implicit reference to an
anthropocentric world view, to the title of the narrative, and to man’s questionable chances of survival...  

It thus seems that Frisch, by deliberately placing the received knowledge of anthropocentrism at the centre of his story and by almost clinically undoing every aspect of it through the symptomatic and symbolic demise of his main character, would create a proto-posthumanist fiction of a world “without” humans, both in the sense of “before” and “after” the human.

At least two further aspects of such a postanthropocentric or posthumanist reading of Holocene that stand in connection with “geologisation” should be mentioned here: the “language of stone” and the role of (post)animality in Frisch’s story. These are connected to geology through Geiser’s interest in the Ice Age, and the Flood, respectively.

Geiser’s handwritten note on page 24 starts with “At the end of the ice age the level of the sea was at least 100 meters lower than today”. The typescript cuttings on page 36 and 37 refer to “The glaciers of the Ice Age”, which “transformed these mountain ranges by acting on peaks and valleys according to new principles” and to the “Diluvian (see Ice Age)”, as well as to the “diluvian ice sheet”. Elsewhere he notes: “The glaciers, which once stretched as far as Milan, are now in retreat everywhere” (42), and in the “green valley” in which Geiser lives “one can see moraine, debris from the huge glaciers of the Ice Age... pebbles and gravel from the Ice Age” (43). “The glaciers have been retreating for centuries” (47), however, it is during his trip to Iceland some thirty years before that Geiser developed his interest in geology, the Ice Age, and one could argue, a certain “geophilia”. It is precisely the prehistoric aspect of the Icelandic landscape that captures him: “The wheel tracks left in the gravel or mud by one’s own vehicle provide the only sign that there are people on our planet” (51), “No farm, not even an abandoned one, nowhere the works of man... A world before the creation of man” (52; our italics). Geiser’s elemental “geophilia”, or the love of stone, as Jeffrey Cohen explains, “exists outside human experience. Yet to us nonlithics, its force will be most evident in the relations that enmesh us over long scales of time and in the ‘storied matter’ these confederations of the human and inhuman divulge”. As a “stumbling block to anthropocentrism”, stone is also a “spur to ceaseless story”, as Cohen writes. And it is Geiser’s fascination with the “memory of rocks” (Holocene, 107) and the knowledge that they preceded and will outlast him (and his species) – and the fact that the rocks “do not need his memory” – that shapes what appears to be his final resignation or acceptance of his individual fate. There seems to be something soothing (“transindividual” or even “inhuman”) in the repetition of the initial description of Geiser’s Ticino valley that closes the story. But, now, it is also an eerie scene (almost) “without humans”: “All in all, a green valley, wooded as in the Stone Age” (111). It is the continuity of stone, geology and deep time and its strange “inhuman” quality which now allows for the construction of a “witness”

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62 Cohen, p. 6. See also the link Cohen creates between the experience of an “alien duration” through the touching of stone (p. 80) and the potential for an “ecological project of thinking beyond anthropocentricity” this might provide (p. 9).
position outside the human (individual and species), or, as Jan Zalasiewicz writes, it allows to see “the planet in a pebble”.

The other aspect of “geologisation”, or one might even say, Geiser’s “fossilisation”, can be seen in his relations to animals, living but maybe even more so extinct ones. Throughout the story Geiser is a keen observer of animals, who (just like stone and plants – cf. the frequent reference to “chestnut canker”) are part of the “semiotics” of climate change, decay, deluge and catastrophe that is being invoked by the story. Geiser wonders “what bees do in a summer like this” (7), remembers a day of “biting flies, lizards, butterflies, summer as usual” (17); on his way to the rainy village he sees “three drenched sheep” (30), in one of his handwritten notes he put “Fish do not sleep” (a mirror of his own sleeplessness). He gives a first “Genesis-like” description of his valley (which is taken up again at the very end, pp. 110-11) by noting: “There are snakes, grass snakes, which are harmless, and various kinds of vipers, among them asps… The valley is swarming with lizards… Cows are few and far between; since the slopes are too steep, it is more a valley of sheep and goats and hens” (45). Geiser talks about woodpeckers (49), a little owl (50), and a stray dog (97-98). In the context of the frequent references to the Flood, the Ark and Genesis, Geiser as mentioned becomes a Noah-like figure, albeit a Noah-human whose dominion turns into disaster.

One of Geiser’s early cuttings are from Genesis (17-24), which announces the apocalypse of both posthumanity and postanimality: “21  And all flesh died that moved upon the earth, both of fowl, and of cattle, and of beast, and of every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth, and every man” (16). This theme is taken up again by Geiser when he remarks during his attempted escape through the mountains while he is “crawling on all fours”: “No cattle – No birds – Not a sound…” (74), which leads to the reversal of man’s dominion over the animals, one could argue – i.e. another form of postanimality – when Geiser concludes his description of “prehistoric” Iceland by saying: “Probably the fish will outlive us, and the birds” (53). Even more significantly, this “posthuman” statement comes just before the central encyclopaedia cutting of “Man” (see above). It is when Geiser/the narrator comments, almost in an aside, that he has “roasted the cat” (97), Kitty, that the idea of human dominion of the animal is undone; it is also the act that ultimately confirms Geiser’s pathology to the reader:

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65 We’re here referring to the interesting use of the term “postanimality” by the editors of a special Yale French Studies issue (127 (2015)) on “Animots” (with reference to Derrida’s coignage), in which they understand the condition of being “postanimal”, together with the question of “What does ‘to be after’” and “post animality” in particular.
Since yesterday, when he roasted the cat over the fire and then was unable to eat it, Geiser can no longer face even the soup, because there is bacon it... Kitty is buried near the roses. (97)

His most vivid interest, however, also in line with his geophilia, lies in “prehistoric” (esp. fossilised) animals and their descendants: dinosaurs, lizards and ants. These “monsters” trigger a peculiar kind of empathy and identification within Geiser during his gradual realisation that he himself is turning into a monstrous “other”. The first dinosaurs appear in a cutting on page 18 prompted by the question “When did man first emerge, and why?” (see above). The central analogy, however, is created on p. 61 when the spotted salamander he finds in his bath tub seen through the magnifying glass “looks like a monster: a dinosaur” with an “awful dullness in all limbs”. This prompts almost five pages of consecutive encyclopaedia cuttings on “Salamander”, “Newt”, “Salamdridae”, “Amphibia”, “The Era of the dinosaurs” and several dinosaur species. One of these also introduces the important theme of “metamorphosis” (62). Despite the factual negation – “Whether the spotted alpine salamanders of today can be regarded as the successors of dinosaurs or as an early form of them is not clear from the encyclopaedia” (62) – in Geiser’s mind, the salamander, the dinosaurs and himself from then on become eminently “confusable”. Looking at his “paper gallery” and prompted by another passage from Genesis, Geiser indulges into another knowledge frenzy on dinosaurs on pp. 86-92, with consecutive cut illustrations. The scene gives way to what looks like Geiser recovering from a fall: “He is just feeling dizzy, which is why he has to wait a while before venturing to rise to his feet like a human being” (92). This further confirms the idea of “postanimality”, one might argue: Geiser’s realisation of his slipping in and out of “animality” and “humanity” – a process that is anticipated by the metamorphosis theme, as early as page 24, in a handwritten note: “Changing of human beings into animals, trees, stone, etc., See: metamorphosis” (reproduced almost verbatim on page 56). When Geiser’s deterioration accelerates towards the final stroke and his thoughts become ever more confused and incoherent, he uses the comparison between him and the “newt” as an ultimate, if unsuccessful, attempt of reassuring himself of his “humanness”:

When Geiser looks in the mirror again to see his face, he knows the name of his daughter in Basel is Corinne, and that the firm in Basel that his son-in-law has been managing, and which has since trebled its output, bears his name, even if Geiser does look like a newt. (96)

And even though he has thrown the spotted salamander into the fire (96) it keeps haunting him in his final “anthropocentric” convulsions:

Geiser knows the year of his birth and the first names of his parents and the first names of his parents, also his mother’s maiden name, and the name of the street in Basel in which he was born, the number of the house – (The things a newt knows.)

Geiser is not a newt... Geiser knows what he looks like. (A newt doesn’t even know that.) (96-98)

Newt or non-newt, Geiser’s resistance to “dehumanisation” ends with the already cited realisation that neither the ants, nor the dinosaurs, nor the rocks “need his memory” (107). The question a posthumanist reading of Holocene might thus raise is whether to read Geiser’s metamorphosis merely as a process of regression, senility and dementia, or,

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66 An ironic premonition of this scene is given in the statement “The cats in this district are seldom eaten”, on p. 28. Early signs of Geiser’s turning against his cat can be seen on p. 59: “Cats always fall on their feet, but in spite of that she is now yowling outside the front door...”.


instead, maybe also as the opening towards a geo-ecological longterm memory that is both transindividual and transspecies in the Anthropocene.  

**Before Humanity: Dementia and Ecography**

How, then, to read and do justice to Geiser’s story given its multiple stakes: the personal tragedy, the extinction threat to the species, the future of knowledge, the effects of anthropogenic climate change, or the importance of “geological” memory? In any case, it seems entirely justified to include Frisch’s story within an emerging canon of (critical) proto-posthumanism. Geiser’s feeling of “cosmic solitude”, in fact, moves Frisch’s story within reach of “last man” narratives. In our view, however, it would be wrong to see *Holocene* as a fundamentally humanist in the sense of existentialist “drama”, even in a Camusian sense of absurdity, or merely a form of literary “gerontology” (i.e. a coping strategy with dementia).

To be sure, in phrases like “brain cells are ceasing to function” (*Holocene*, 32) and “One is becoming stupid…” (24) Geiser projects his own dying process onto that of humanity and “civilisation” as a whole. It is also true that the return of the almost humanless natural idyll of the valley which will outlive Geiser does inevitably (also) carry an elegiac tone that is so characteristic of a certain kind of humanist “yearning” for the human, its essence and its survival. However, focusing entirely on these aspects of humanist closure and a possible reaffirmation of the human in the face of the inhuman would be forgetting other important aspects. As a human, Geiser is about to forget (who or what he is). The human being about to forget also bears another meaning, however: the human is about forgetting—in order to be human one needs to be able to forget, especially to forget what or who one was before. Geiser’s stroke and his creeping aphasia (cf. the last encyclopaedia cutting on “Apoplexy” which refers to the “loss of speech” that often accompanies a stroke; p. 109) are thus not just a metaphorical testimony (to his gradual loss of memory, loss of life, loss of humanity, etc.) but must also be taken literally, in the sense of a writing or literature (or a world) *without* humans. Günter Grass captures this feeling of a literature “after the apocalypse” in his Feltrinelli-Prize speech (1982) speaking of his own postapocalyptic position:

> I know, however, that this book I am intending to write can no longer pretend as if it was certain to have a future. The farewell to the damaged things, to the stricken creature, of us and our heads, who have imagined everything and its end, would have to be written as well... Progress is a snail... The snail is too fast. It has already overtaken us. But we, fallen out of nature, we, the enemies of nature, still believe that we are ahead of the snail... But in my perplexity I know nevertheless that future will only be again possible when we find an answer and act in a way that we owe as guests to nature and this planet, by no longer propagating and instead taking away fear, by disarming down to the level of nakedness.

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67 This is basically the question of how to interpret the final scene of the “posthuman idyll”, namely either as a posthuman “renaturalisation” or, on the contrary, its refusal; cf. Bruce Clarke, *Posthuman Metamorphosis: Narrative and Systems*, New York: Fordham, 2008, p. 2.  
70 Grass, p. 832-33.
Of course, writing “before” just as much as writing “after” the human in a literary and in a literal sense remain mere conjecture. Nevertheless, one can say that Frisch’s story gives it a very good go in centring in on and questioning literary anthropocentrism. Geiser’s Iceland trip has opened up the idea of “A world before the creation of man” (Holocene, 52) for him and in his “cosmic” and almost “prehistoric” isolation he speculates that “probably there are whole Milky Ways without a trace of brain matter” (68). In moments like these, Holocene opens up a reading of the problem of “ancestrality”, and, from the point of view of contemporary ecological ethics, the possibility of new “ecographical” ways of writing, which, in Geiser’s case, would be a writing and a memory of “stones, ants and dinosaurs”. Geiser’s own “fossilisation” and its projection into a time after humans, as well as his retrojection into a time before them, from a “scientific” point of view, opens out to what Quentin Meillassoux refers to as the “arche-fossil” – or that which cannot be accepted by “correlationism”. What for Meillassoux constitutes “after finitude”, however, is also based on an unimaginable “before”, which is analogous to what we have been projecting onto the phrase “before humanity”. In fact, Meillassoux’s question is also Geiser’s, or Frisch’s: how to accept the fact that there is a reality “outside” any human subjectivity or experience that can, nevertheless, be scientifically proven, and which is older than any possibility of any “witnessing”; a pre-history in the literal and radically pre- or non-anthropocentric sense?

Meillassoux’s target is post-Kantian “correlationism” or “the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other”, which “consists in disqualifying the claim that it is possible to consider the realms of subjectivity and objectivity independently of one another”. Meillassoux’s struggle against the limits of correlationalism is indeed similar to Geiser’s (and posthumanism’s) attempt to think the world “without” (i.e. before and after) humans and without himself. Geiser tries to recover, both mentally, as well as literally and “geologically”, the “great outdoors” that “contemporary philosophers have lost”: “that outside which was not relative to us, and which was given as indifferent to its own givenness to be what it is, existing in itself regardless of whether we are thinking of it or not...". In fact, Meillassoux’s argument is also, strictly speaking, a “geological” one. The scientific example of ancestrality is concerned with the dates of the universe, the accretion of the earth, the origin of life and the origin of humankind on earth, which raises the (philosophical) question: “what is it exactly that astrophysicists, geologists, or palaeontologists are talking about when they discuss the age of the universe, the date of the accretion of the earth, the date of the appearance of pre-human species, or the date of the emergence of humanity itself?”

The challenge – for a correlationist, or maybe for any anthropocentric and humanist point of view – to interpret a statement like “Y occurred before the emergence of human beings” lies in addressing the tacit “codicil of modernity”, as Meillassoux calls it, which always feels compelled to add to this constructed “nonhuman” perspective a “dogged” “for humans” (and in the case of a scientific statement, “according to” or “for the human scientist”). The “before the human” thus always, necessarily, risks remaining a conjecture “of” or “by the

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71 Cf. Sophie Bunge, who reads Holocene through the lens of Kantian philosophical anthropology and (somewhat problematically) sees it as an example of a „liberation of the subject from the constraints of anthropocentric modernity, as an affirmation of life, which seeks refuge in the finality of the human and in the tears of its sovereignty”; Bunge, “‘Der Mensch bleibt ein Laie’ – (Post)Kantianische Auseinandersetzungen in Max Frischs Der Mensch erscheint im Holozän”, Text & Kritik 47/48 (2013): 162-71 (169).


73 Meillassoux, p. 7.

74 Ibid., p. 9.

75 Ibid., p. 13.
human”, which, however, ultimately constitutes a denial of “ancestrality” as such. Or, as Meillassoux continues, the before, in a correlationist sense, is always “a retrojection of the past on the basis of the present”, only ever a retrojection of an ancestral past (16). Thus, just like the narrative of *Holocene*, Meillassoux’s account of “after finitude” and “ancestrality”, in the end have to give way to some “posthuman idyll” in which a world without humans forces a (humanist) elegy:

The arche-fossil enjoins us to track thought inviting us to discover the “hidden passage” trodden by the latter in order to achieve what modern philosophy has been telling us for the past two centuries is impossibility itself: *to get out of ourselves*, to grasp the in-itself, to know what is whether we are or not.77

On the other side of the arche-fossil, still lies the catastrophe of forgetting. As the human is about to forget “himself”, by writing himself out of the picture, or by progressive dementia and aphasia, precisely at a time when anthropogenic climate change risks to bring about planetary destruction (never mind individuals, or human and nonhuman species), Frisch’s desperately humanist remainder maybe lies in a reminder of the fact that the task of humans – even, or maybe even more so, in a postanthropocentric world – is that of remembering, and of working through the initial human repression of the inhuman. This is what Frisch seems to allude to in an entry to his posthumously published *Entwürfe zu einem dritten Tagebuch*:

One might assume that someone who knows due to a medical diagnosis or old age that he will soon have to go might remain unaffected by the Holocaust-prognosis, APRES NOUS LE DELUGE – the opposite is the case; the idea that there won’t be any humans after us, annihilates retroactively our lived past.78

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76 Ibid., p. 16.
77 Ibid., p. 26 (original emphasis).