Conclusion – Ancestrality 5:

Becoming *In*human

> [W]hat if human beings, in humanism's sense, were in the process of, constrained into, becoming inhuman…? And…, what if what is "proper" to humankind were to be inhabited by the inhuman?[1]
>
> How might the human otherwise come to *unknow* itself, permanently and without the comforts of naming and identity, as neither human nor posthuman, as altogether different and unidentifiable from what "we" imagine we are or continue to become?[2]

Julian Murphet regrets that today's "inhumanism" has lost the sense of "satire" he sees at work in Lyotard's "genre or mode" and instead prefers an "ardency of tone".[3] What the contemporary inhuman or posthuman thus lacks is a good measure of "wit, laughter and engaged militancy", since without it, even the most critical critique of humanism, assumedly, would still remain too humanist in its earnestness, too universal in its seriousness and claim for justice, responsibility, equality and humanity (all indivisible and one) vis-à-vis the irreducible (comic?) plurality and singularity of "real people". It is true, a certain tragic "existentialism", which is still subtended by a deep desire or "yearning for the human" in humans, might also be found in this work on *before humanity* (despite what we hope might be seen as its occasional "critically satirical" mode). But we believe that satire cannot ultimately escape responsibility either unless it wishes to dwell in radical nihilism or frivolousness. It is difficult not to read a certain despair into Lyotard's (yes, provocative) proposal to see the human as (always already) "inhabited by the inhuman", and humanism as a process constrained by (always) "becoming inhuman". The serious (and perhaps "sobering") question, nevertheless remains, would it have been possible (is it possible still) to be human "otherwise"?

So You Think You're Becoming Human?

> It is sobering to think that there have been alternative ways of being human, and that some of the options vanished despite good design, and that such a fate might have easily awaited us round some unexpected corner of our short history. Indeed, it may await us still.[4]
>
> Humanity is in peril: not from the familiar menace of "mass destruction" and ecological overkill – but from a conceptual threat.[5]

The historian Felipe Fernández-Armesto in his "Brief History of Humankind" singles out conceptuality as the greatest threat to humanity. Primatology, the animal rights movement, the paleoanthropological and evolutionary uncertainty about "when we became human", the explosion of the biological category of "species", artificial intelligence and biotechnology – all produce an

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[1] Jean-François Lyotard, *The Inhuman: Reflections on Time*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991, p. 2.
[2] Christopher Peterson, "The Posthumanism to Come", *Angelaki* 16.2 (2011), p. 139.
[3] Julian Murphet, "A modest proposal for the inhuman", *Modernism/Modernity* 23.3 (2016), p. 656.
[4] Clive Finlayson, *The Humans Who Went Extinct: Why Neanderthals Died Out and We Survived*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 2-3.
[5] Felipe Fernández-Armesto, *So You Think You're Human? A Brief History of Humankind*, Oxford: OUP, 2004, p. 1.

erosion of the idea of "humanity" and undermine confidence in the historically quite recent category of the "human". Fernández-Armesto is rightly worried about the conceptual integrity of what it is and what it means to be human. However, somehow he also displays a deep trust in what he calls the human "spirit" (or, more precisely, "the imaginative discovery that life is animated by spirit" which elevated our ancestors out of "primitive" materialism).[6] In doing so, he joins the long list of those who, in the face of some "posthuman" future, choose to trust some mysterious form of "human nature" to guarantee some kind of (human) continuity, in short, a trust in the continued re-articulation of humanism. This, ultimately, the trusting is based on a form of sophistry: namely, the impossibility of establishing a "before" and "after". Since we do not know how and when we became human, we also do not (and thus cannot) know how and when we will cease to be human:

> How much our nature has changed before our descendants cease to be human is a question we are not yet ready to answer. In this respect it resembles a question about when, in the course of evolution, our ancestors became human – which is also unanswerable at the present stage of our thinking and knowledge.[7]

Fernández-Armesto clearly thinks this is a temporary stage (a question of "choice") – which means that, in the end, he is not too worried about the conceptual threat to "humanity", after all – since "For now, if we want to go on believing we are human, and justify the special status we accord ourselves – if, indeed we want to stay human through the changes we face – we had better not discard the myth, but start trying to live up to it".[8] But how is one to live up to a myth of which one ignores both the beginning and the end, or its true "nature", for that matter? Or, to put it differently, what exactly is Fernández-Armesto trusting, if not some diffuse conceptuality without concept that says that somehow "we will know", somehow we will (have) become human (because we just have to)? Given the irreducible plurality at the beginning (and also during and at the end) of this process of "hominization", nothing seems less certain. Nothing is guaranteed by the irreducible ambiguity of *before* and *after*.

Post/Anthropology – Before and After Humans

> It might be thought as morality is essentially anthropocentric, our extinction would have to be a bad thing. That just begs the question. Our morality, perhaps all morality, is *anthropogenic*, but it need not be anthropocentric.[9]

> When you see "before", remember that it really means after! When you see before, it really means before. And the same for "after" and after, *mutatis mutandis*.[10]

Richard Dawkins's valiant effort to distinguish between "before" and "'before'" and between "after" and "'after'", unfortunately, does little else but highlight the constitutional ambiguity at the heart of any *before* (and *after*, regardless of the number of inverted commas around them). One could go as far and add to the endless anthropological attempts to distinguish the human from other animals

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[6] Fernández-Armesto, *So You Think You're Human?* p. 165.
[7] Fernández-Armesto, *So You Think You're Human?* pp. 169-70. A similar kind of intellectual disengagement can be seen in Alan Weisman's post-apocalyptic "trust" in posthuman times when he says: "The only real prediction you can make is that life will go on. And that it will be interesting" *(The World Without Us, p. 232).*
[8] Fernández-Armesto, *So You Think You're Human?* p. 170.
[9] David Wood, "Homo sapiens", in Lynn Turner et al., eds., *The Edinburgh Companion to Animal Studies*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018, p. 302.
[10] Richard Dawkins, "The Conceit of Hindsight", *The Ancestor's Tale: A Pilgrimage to the Dawn of Life*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004, p. 14.

another exceptional meme which says: the human is that animal which constitutively (i.e. necessarily, but also strategically) confuses *before* and *after*. This is so because humans see themselves as subject *of* and subject *to* "becoming" – they are always humans in-the-making. Humans thus "project" themselves, literally, by seeing themselves as projects. Humanism is, first of all, "projectural".

The number of titles containing the phrase "becoming human" as a result is not surprising. In one of these books carrying the title, Chad Wellmon provides a critique of Immanuel Kant's foundational gesture that formulates a philosophical anthropology by asking "*Was ist der Mensch* [What is man]?"[11] Wellmon argues that modern anthropology is founded on an impossible double imperative, namely that of defining "human nature" (i.e. the empirical question of what the human *is*) and of establishing a moral trajectory (i.e. the transcendental, normative or moral question of what the human should *become*). It is this foundational crisis (of the ambiguity between being and becoming) that, strictly speaking, constitutes the eighteenth-century emergence of (Enlightenment) modernity, which "sees itself as condemned to draw its norms and very self-understanding from itself".[12] Modernity and its self-reflexivity is thus from its beginning based on an anthropological mode of thought: "Anthropology's crisis of self-recognition epitomizes the critical project of modernity that since its self-proclaimed inception has been obsessed with its own operations".[13] Its double claim on empiricism and transcendentalism means that anthropological modernity is, according to Wellmon, "the epoch in which the human being is condemned to justify itself".[14] Kantian anthropology is thus from its inception *pedagogical* (i.e. normative and teleological) in the sense that "it was meant to orient and guide the individual towards becoming human. Anthropology was pedagogy for the human race".[15] However, due to the erosion of the boundaries drawn between the human – as both subject and object of its own self-reflexivity – and its others outlined by Fernández-Armesto above, anthropology, and in particular its (humanist) pedagogical thrust, have run into trouble and are no longer self-legitimating.

A variety of stances in such a post-anthropological environment are emerging. We can only provide some hopefully symptomatic and representative positions which all reconnect with the temporal confusion of *becoming* human – both in the sense of "how did we become human?" (i.e. the mystery of a time before *humanity*) and "what is becoming of the human?" (i.e. what lies *before* humanity now?). There is, first of all, following Günther Anders, the sense of human "obsolescence"[16] and a return of the Nietzschean question of the "overman" in the contemporary guise of the (technologically enhanced) "posthuman". Following this trajectory the question of philosophical anthropology, "what is man?", becomes "to what extent is the human (still) enhanceable?" and "up to what level of enhancement is a human still 'human' (to be defined)?" What lies before *humanity* is thus the uncertain future of technology and the teleology of (technological) becoming, which means nothing else than that the human is essentially something that needs to be overcome. Another way of putting this would be asking: "who (or what) comes after the human" (bearing in mind the

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[11] Cad Wellmon, *Becoming Human: Romantic Anthropology and the Embodiment of Form*, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010.
[12] Wellmon, *Becoming Human*, p. 2.
[13] Ibid., p. 3.
[14] Ibid., p. 6.
[15] Ibid., p. 8.
[16] See Günther Anders, *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen*, volume 1: *Über die Seele im Zeitalter der zweiten industriellen Revolution*, München: Beck, 1956; volume 2: *Über die Zerstörung des Lebens im Zeitalter der dritten industriellen Revolution*, München: Beck, 1980). See also Christopher Müller's translation and commentary in *Prometheanism: Technology, Digital Culture and Human Obsolescence*, London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.

ambiguity of the *after*, in the sense of (evolutionary) succession but also who or what is chasing (going *after*) – the human and thus, really, comes *before*)?[17] Essentially, what remains more or less intact on this trajectory, however, is the idea of human exceptionalism and some form of anthropocentric projection into the future (even, paradoxically, if that future were to turn out to be a "world without us").

Animal studies has different ideas regarding anthropocentrism: it is only posthumanist in the sense of "postanthropocentric". The question "what is man?" within this conceptual shift remains a normative one, but from an exclusively "ethico-ecological" perspective. The ethologist Domique Lestel, for example, in one of his latest interventions on the critique of the modern relationship between humans and animals asks: "A quoi sert l'homme? [what's the point/use of the human]?"[18] In a strangely vitriolic (ironic, satirical?) style, Lestel attacks "le papy de Königsberg [the grand-dad from Königsberg]" (i.e. Kant) who committed the original anthropological "sin" of determining that "unlike other animals, man is useless, every man is an end himself, etc.", which leads to Lestel's ironic "definition" of (Western) "man" as "a means that takes itself for an end".[19] The self-legitimatory anthropocentric view established by "European humanism" is not only bad news for nonhuman animals but also for humans themselves, according to Lestel:

> By giving extraterritorial status to the human, and by making it the end of everything, European humanism has placed man in danger of death. The human exists as such through a life shared with other living beings... The posthumanist currents, contemporary or older, say nothing else, after all. The future of man is a machine. If man is useless, he can at least serve to eliminate himself.[20]

The (technological) "posthumanist" (or rather transhumanist) vision of a post*anthropos* scenario is of course unacceptable to animal studies since transhumanism strives to eliminate what remains of human *animality* through technological enhancement and this might cut the chord with "the living" [*les vivants*]. In trying to overcome the human, "post-humans" (or transhumanists) nevertheless act in some perverted interest of "preservation": "Whatever they claim, post-humans still try to save , not the human for sure, but *whatever may be human in the human*. Well, good luck, guys!"[21] What the human is "good for" then – Lestel's postanthropo*centric* question – basically lies in unlearning to be human or retraining – i.e. in a diversion of the original anthropological pedagogical project – namely, to be part of "nature".

In a similar vein, Matthew Calarco (following Giorgio Agamben) proposes to "jam" the Anthropological Machine.[22] Agamben's notion of the anthropogenic "machine" is based on a reliance "on the human-animal distinction that serves as the foundation for Western political and metaphysical thought".[23] What lies before *humanity* following this logic or trajectory is some form of

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[17] See the analogy with the question asked by Eduardo Cadava, ed., *Who Comes After The Subject?* New York: Routledge, 1991. See also Norbert Bolz's thoughts on "Was kommt nach dem Menschen", in *Was ist der Mensch?* Eds. Norbert Bolz and Andreas Münkel, Munich: Fink, 2003, pp. 201-12 and Bolz's introduction, pp. 11-20.

[18] Dominique Lestel, *A quoi sert l'homme?* Paris : Fayard, 2015.

[19] Lestel, p. 8 (our translations).

[20] Lestel, *A quoi sert l'homme?* p. 10.

[21] Lestel, p. 103.

[22] Matthew Calarco, *Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2008, pp. 79-103.

[23] Calarco, *Zoographies*, p. 79. See also p. 92:

> This machine can best be understood as the symbolic and material mechanisms at work in various scientific and philosophical discourses that classify and distinguish humans and animals through a dual process of inclusion and exclusion.

"rehumanisation", however, outside anthropocentrism: this human is "called for" to take on its ethico-ecological responsibility. What does it mean to be human, in this context, is to, first of all, show humility, solidarity and "care" (for the nonhuman). There is, in this rationale, not so much a "posthuman" future that is announced by posthumanism but, as the sociologist Edgar Morin would argue, a "new" prehistory.[24] In 1973, in *Le Paradigme perdu: La nature humaine*, Morin already set out the task for what he calls "*fundamental* anthropology":

> L'anthropologie fondamentale doit rejeter toute définition qui fasse de l'homme une entité, soit supra-animale (la Vulgate anthropologique), soit strictement animale (la nouvelle Vulgate pop-biologique) ; elle doit reconnaître l'homme comme être vivant pour le distinguer des autres vivants, elle doit dépasser l'alternative ontologique nature/culture. Ni pan-biologisme, ni pan-culturalisme, mais une vérité plus riche, qui donne à la biologie humaine et à la culture humaine un rôle plus grand, *puisque c'est un rôle réciproque de l'une sur l'autre*.[25]

This early intervention by Morin already attempted a resolution of the postanthropological dilemma of "what is to become of the human" *after* or outside anthropocentrism (due to both the biological and cultural relativisations that were to occur in the following decades and, arguably, continue to shape the current discussion). However, Morin's call for a fundamental (or deep?) anthropology certainly does not avoid, but rather exacerbates the problem of human exceptionalism. A postanthropology, however, if one were to take its drift literally, understood in its most radical sense, would inevitably turn into an anthropology *without* humans – a human "devoid" of all its humanistic characteristics, or a human that merely understands itself as "inhuman".

Inhumanism, or, Becoming Inhuman

> Silence d'une humanité sans phrase (mais non sans parole), que rien ne rapporte à ses fins, que rien ne vient faire passer pour autre chose que ce qu'elle est: la simple étrangeté de la presentation. (Une humanité sans humanisme).[26]

In *L'Homme sans*, Martin Crowley tackles the semantic "stripping process" that anthropology has always been engaged in: "l'homme sans [man without]… everything that one has to subtract from

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[24] There is a similar view in Marc Augé's most recent book, *L'Avenir des Terriens; Fin de la préhistoire de l'humanité comme société planétaire*, Paris: Albin Michel, 2017. It is quite clear that the injunction to contemporary (i.e. "planetary") humanity to finally step out of its "prehistory" is precisely what *Before Humanity* has been arguing against. It is precisely because "l'anthropologie est un humanisme" (p. 133) that, today, one has to by (critically) posthumanist, postanthropocentric and postanthrpological, since, as Kathryn Yusoff puts it, "the human" has to recognize, that it "is riven by the torques of non/inhuman forces in the establishment and maintenance of identity. In a time of extinction, such recognition might constitute an understanding of ecological survival as dependent on these inhuman forces" (Yusoff, "Geologic subjects", p. 389).

[25] Edgar Morin, *Le Paradigme perdu: La Nature humaine*, Paris : Seuil, 1973, p. 313 [Fundamental anthropology must reject any definition that makes man an entity, either supra-animal (the anthropological Vulgate) or strictly animal (the new pop-biological Vulgate); it must recognize man as a living being in order to distinguish him from other living beings ; it must go beyond the ontological alternative nature / culture. Neither pan-biologism, nor pan-culturalism, but a richer truth, which gives human biology and human culture a greater role, *since it is a reciprocal role of one [biology] over the other [culture].* Our translation].

[26] Jean-Luc Nancy, *Les Muses*, Paris: Galilée, 2001, p. 126 [Silence of a humanity without sentence (but not without words), which nothing relates to its ends, that nothing comes to pass for anything other than what it is: the simple strangeness of the presentation. (A humanity without humanism)]. Our translation.

man so that he can be what he is".[27] This "man without qualities"[28] might constitute the true subject of a negative anthropology (or "negentropology", as Morin called it)[29] – the only one that remains after all those characteristics are subtracted that used to make man "exceptional" (language, culture, bipedalism, tool-use, laughter, music, etc.) – so that "le propre de l'homme" would consist of its exposure to the subtraction of everything that he was supposed to have as "propre".[30] Crawley goes on to use this absence or lack (of qualities), which is not a lack of "any/thing" but a constitutional lack that cannot be filled or remedied, as the starting point of what he calls a new "politics of finitude" based on the solidarity (between human and nonhuman animals) of this experience of "divestment". The specifically human task, following Crawley (who, in large parts, follows Jean-Luc Nancy), would be to become "human" by embracing not "animality" (which would be a self-condemnation towards victimisation and passivity) but "inhumanity" (by which he obviously does not mean "inhumane" behaviour but rather a kind of "unthinking" – a deconstruction of anthropocentrism and humanism).

This would be close to the "inhuman" and "inhumanism" that Jean-François Lyotard proposed. Lyotard, notably, differentiates between two forms of "inhumanity": "The inhumanity of the system which is currently being consolidated under the name of development (among others) must not be confused with the infinitely secret one of which the soul is hostage".[31] Lyotard goes on to inscribe this inhumanity of the (individual human) soul within human "neoteny":

> What shall we call human in humans, the initial misery of their childhood, or their capacity to acquire a "second" nature which, thanks to language, makes them fit to share in communal life, adult consciousness and reason? That the second depends on the first is agreed by everyone. The question is only that of knowing whether this dialectic, whatever name we grace it with, leaves no remainder.[32]

Lyotard here clearly already articulates an important aspect we have been tracking through the phrase *before humanity* – namely the fact that hominization is a process that every individual has to go through, a cultural evolution every single specimen of the species has to re-enact in order to become "fully" human despite having been biologically "born" human. *Before* humanity is the state of the human child, while, as Lyotard writes, the child is also the *most* human due to its "misery" (its neotenous exposedness, defenselessness, helplessness) but also to its "potentiality" (in many ways, the child is the ultimate "*homme sans*"): "Shorn of speech, incapable of standing upright, hesitating over the objects of interest, not able to calculate its advantages, not sensitive to common reason, the child is eminently the human because its distress heralds and promises things possible".[33] The cruel irony, for Lyotard, is that the "human system" that humans create to "educate" the child into becoming (fully) human (let's call this "humanism") depends on and has to eradicate the (first) "humanity" of the child (this is what the "inhumanity of the system" seems to require) for its "development". Humanism thus also has two sides, following this logic: it is that ideology that demands "child development", on the one hand. While the other humanism, the one which takes the first humanity of the child seriously, so to speak, would in fact be an "inhumanism" for which the development of "becoming human" is too high a price to pay. This irresolvable double imperative of

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[27] Martin Crowley, *L'Homme sans – Politiques de la finitude*, Paris : Lignes, 2009, p. 15 (our translations).
[28] Cf. Robert Musil's novel, *The Man Without Qualities*, trans. Sophie Wilkins, London: Picador, 1995; and our reading in Ivan Callus and Stefan Herbrechter, "Humanity Without Itself: Robert Musil, Giorgio Agamben and Posthumanism, in Andy Mousley, ed., *Towards a New Literary Humanism*, Houndmills: Palgrave, 2011, pp. 143-160.
[29] Morin, *Le Paradigme perdu*, p. 213.
[30] Crawley, *L'homme sans*, p. 16.
[31] Lyotard, *The Inhuman*, p. 2.
[32] Ibid., p. 3.
[33] Ibid., pp. 3-4.

anthropology, being *and* becoming human, and which also feeds the anthropological machine still echoing in the phrase *before humanity*, is ultimately what prompts the deconstruction of humanism – the "remainder of the dialectic", as Lyotard remarks.[34]

If this sounds very similar to the (ironic?) injunction Nietzsche launches by inviting "us" to "become who we are", it is certainly no coincidence. As Steven Connor put it in his foreword to *Becoming Human*:

> For no human being can simply be, and leave it at that. The nature of human beings, it is often said, is not to be but to subsist in a state of *becoming*, by which is meant coming about, coming-to-be, being in transit, being on the way to what one will have been.[35]

The impossible demand, as Connor puts it, is that "to become human is always to become more, or less, than human", and Nietzsche's imperative does not help, of course, since "to be what you are becoming is to attempt to will and be in advance what it is you will end up having been".[36] No wonder that the temptation would be to either "subtract" ourselves from the tiresome task of "becoming" (human), or, indeed, to press ahead and become "transhuman". Both escape routes do not come with unwanted side-effects, however, as Connor insinuates (with a strong echo of Michel Foucault's famous statement about man's disappearance, at the end of *Order of Things*): "If the face of the human is being effaced in the sand, it may be possible to say of the human that nothing becomes it so well as the manner of its taking leave of itself".[37]

Before Humanity certainly does not want to shirk "our" responsibilities, but it deliberately resists the temptation to cut through the aporia of the *before* – that the human is always "becoming" and at the same time too late for the event. However, we hope to have shown that "business as usual" in the face of "technology, ecology… taking over" cannot be an option. Instead, to quote Paul Sheehan (quoting Emmanuel Levinas): "If rather than being human we are, more modestly, *becoming* human, then we do better to speak not of 'man's inhumanity to man' but, in Emmanuel Levinas's phrase, of 'what occasionally is human in man'".[38] And although we do not directly address the other "inhumanity" here – Lyotard's "inhumanity of the system", which, today, if one is to believe Bernard Stiegler, lies in keeping open the "history of technological possibilities of anticipation – which is the history of the different mirror stages in which humanity reflects itself"[39] – what we derive from our reconceptualization of human prehistory in the face of the posthuman is not unrelated to Stiegler's vast project of rewriting the history of anthropology from the point of view of technics, namely the hope of establishing a "noopolitics of becoming non-inhuman", as Ben Turner puts it.[40]

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[34] In very different ways the following could be seen as related: Keith Tester's *The Inhuman Condition*, London: Routledge, 1995; Iain Chambers's *Culture After Humanism: History, Culture, Subjectivity*, London: Routledge, 2001; and Gerald L. Bruns's *On Ceasing to Be Human*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011.
[35] Steven Connor, "Foreword", in *Becoming Human: New Perspectives on the Inhuman Condition*, ed. Paul Sheehan, Westport: Praeger, 2003, p. ix.
[36] Connor, "Foreword", p. xi.
[37] Connor, "Foreword", p. xvi.
[38] Paul Sheehan, "Introduction", *Becoming Human*, 11.
[39] Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time 1: The Fault of Epimetheus*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, p. 159. See also Ben Turner's illuminating comments in "Life and the Technical Transformation of Différance: Stiegler and the Noopolitics of Becoming Human", *Derrida Today* 9.2 (2016): 177-198. Stiegler, incidentally, also refers to his project as a "néguanthropologie" – a contraction of negentropy and anthropology (which echoes Morin's choice of word above), in Bernard Stiegler and Ariel Kyrou, *L'emploi est mort, vive le travail, entretien avec Ariel Kyrou*, Paris: Mille et une nuits, 2015, p. 116.
[40] Turner, "Life and the Technical Transformation of Différance", p. 194.

In a way, we even share Edgar Morin's sense that we might be in the middle of a "seconde préhistoire [second prehistory]"[41] – this time, however, without the "tragic humanism" that this seems to involve, when Morin speaks of "human megalomania" and the prospect of "regenerating humanism", or to "pursue hominization by humanisation" – in the possibility, to speak with Heidegger, of "poetically inhabiting" this planet (if we knew what "poetically", here, meant).[42] In a time when *before* humanity threatens to coincide with *after* humanity, literally, *materially*, "the post-human future", indeed, "is likely to resemble the pre-human past".[43]

[41] And certainly not about to leave prehistory behind as Augé seems to insinuate, s. above.
[42] Cf. Edgar Morin, *L'Identité humaine (La Méthode 5: L'Humanité de l'humanité)*, Paris : Seuil, 2001, pp. 274-5. Cf. Martin Heidegger, "…poetically man dwells…", *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter New York: Harper and Row, 1971, pp. 213-229.
[43] Fernández-Armesto, *So You Think You're Human*, p. 165.