Conclusion: Becoming *In*human

> [W]hat if human beings, in humanism's sense, were in the process of, constrained into, becoming inhuman …? And …, what if what is 'proper' to humankind were to be inhabited by the inhuman?[1]

Julian Murphet regrets the "ardency of tone" in today's "inhumanism", which seems to have lost the sense of "satire" present in Lyotard's "genre or mode".[2] What the contemporary inhuman (or the current theorising of the posthuman) lacks may be a good measure of "wit, laughter and engaged militancy", since without them, even the most critical critique of humanism will inevitably remain too humanist in its earnestness, too universal in its seriousness and its claim for justice, responsibility, equality and 'humanity'. In doing so, it will be betraying the irreducible plurality and singularity of 'people'. However, even satire I would argue cannot ultimately escape taking responsibility unless it indulges in dwelling in radical nihilism. In my view, it is difficult not to also read a certain despair into Lyotard's (admittedly provocative) proposal to see the human as (always already) "inhabited by the inhuman", and humanism as a process constrained by (always) "becoming inhuman". The serious (and perhaps sobering) question nevertheless remains: would it have been possible (is it possible still) to be human 'otherwise'? This prospect is precisely what has been driving the investigation into *before humanity* and all the other humans *before* humans. As Clay Finlayson says, with regard to the Neanderthals: "It is sobering to think that there have been alternative ways of being human, and that some of the options vanished despite good design, and that such a fate might have easily awaited us round some unexpected corner of our short history. Indeed, it may await us still".[3] Between our irrecoverable origins and our uncertain future there might just be enough time to rethink the human without humanism – which is what I take Lyotard's inhumanism to mean and which I would prefer to call, more constructively and maybe less dramatically, critical posthumanism.

So You Think You're Becoming Human?

The historian Felipe Fernández-Armesto in his "Brief History of Humankind" singles out conceptuality as the greatest menace to humanity's survival. In his words: "Humanity is in peril: not from the familiar menace of 'mass destruction' and ecological overkill – but from a conceptual threat".[4] Primatology, the animal rights movement, the paleoanthropological and evolutionary uncertainty about 'when we became human', the explosion of the biological category of 'species', artificial intelligence and biotechnology – all produce an erosion of the idea of 'humanity' and undermine confidence in the historically quite recent category of the 'human', according to Fernández-Armesto. He is certainly right in worrying about the conceptual integrity of what it is and what it means to be human. Nevertheless, he also displays a deep trust in what he calls the human 'spirit' (or, more precisely, "the imaginative discovery that life is animated by spirit", which elevated our ancestors out of 'primitive' materialism).[5] In doing so, he joins the long list of those who, in the face of some 'posthuman' future, choose to trust some mysterious form of 'human nature' to guarantee some form of (human) continuity, in short, a trust in the continued re-articulation of humanism. This trust, ultimately, is based on a form of sophistry, namely the *before humanity* conundrum: it relies on our

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[1] Jean-François Lyotard, *The Inhuman: Reflections on Time*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 2.

[2] Julian Murphet, "A modest proposal for the inhuman", *Modernism/Modernity* 23.3 (2016), 656.

[3] Clive Finlayson, *The Humans Who Went Extinct: Why Neanderthals Died Out and We Survived*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 2-3.

[4] Felipe Fernández-Armesto, *So You Think You're Human? A Brief History of Humankind*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1.

[5] Fernández-Armesto, *So You Think You're Human?* p. 165.

inability to establish a clear distinction between *before* and *after*. Since we do not know how and when we became human, we also do not and cannot know how and when we will cease to be human, as Fernández-Armesto explains:

> How much our nature has changed before our descendants cease to be human is a question we are not yet ready to answer. In this respect it resembles a question about when, in the course of evolution, our ancestors became human – which is also unanswerable at the present stage of our thinking and knowledge.[6]

Fernández-Armesto clearly thinks this is a temporary stage (maybe even a question of 'choice') – which means that, in the end, he is not too worried about the conceptual threat to 'humanity', after all – since: "For now, if we want to go on believing we are human, and justify the special status we accord ourselves – if, indeed we want to stay human through the changes we face – we had better not discard the myth, but start trying to live up to it".[7] But how is one to live up to a myth of which one ignores both the beginning and the end, or its true 'nature', for that matter? Or, to put it differently, what exactly is Fernández-Armesto trusting, if not some diffuse conceptuality without concept that says that somehow 'we will know', somehow we will (have) become human (because we just have to)? Given the irreducible plurality at the beginning, during and at the end of the process our 'hominization', nothing seems less certain. Nothing is guaranteed by the irreducible ambiguity of *before* and *after*.

Post/Anthropology – Before and After Humans

> It might be thought, as morality is essentially anthropocentric, our extinction would have to be a bad thing. That just begs the question. Our morality, perhaps all morality, is *anthropogenic*, but it need not be anthropocentric.[8]

While reading the evolutionary 'ancestor's tale' we were cautioned by Richard Dawkins against a very confusing *dédoublement*: "When you see 'before', remember that it really means after! When you see before, it really means before. And the same for 'after' and after, *mutatis mutandis*".[9] However, Dawkins's valiant effort to distinguish between 'before' and '"before"' and between 'after' and '"after"', unfortunately, does little else but highlight the constitutional ambiguity at the heart of any *before* (and *after*, regardless of the number of inverted commas around them). One could go as far and add to the endless anthropological attempts to distinguish the human from other animals another exceptional 'meme' which runs like this: the human is that animal which constitutively (i.e. necessarily, but also strategically) confuses *before* and *after*. This is so because humans see themselves both as subject *of* and subject *to* 'becoming' – they are thus always humans-in-the-making. Humans 'project' themselves, literally, by seeing themselves as projects. Humanism, one might conclude, is, first and foremost, 'projectural'.

The number of titles containing the phrase 'becoming human' is therefore not surprising. In one of these books carrying the title, Chad Wellmon provides a critique of Immanuel Kant's foundational

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[6] Fernández-Armesto, *So You Think You're Human?* pp. 169-70. A similar kind of intellectual disengagement can be seen in Alan Weisman's post-apocalyptic 'trust' in posthuman times when he says: "The only real prediction you can make is that life will go on. And that it will be interesting". Cf. Weisman, *The World Without Us, p. 232.*
[7] Fernández-Armesto, *So You Think You're Human?* p. 170.
[8] David Wood, "Homo sapiens", In *The Edinburgh Companion to Animal Studies*, eds. Lynn Turner et al., (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018), 302.
[9] Richard Dawkins, "The Conceit of Hindsight", *The Ancestor's Tale: A Pilgrimage to the Dawn of Life*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004), 14.

gesture of modern philosophical anthropology, namely Kant's question: "*Was ist der Mensch* [What is man]?"[10] Wellmon argues that modern anthropology is founded on an impossible double imperative, namely that of defining 'human nature' (i.e. the metaphysical and empirical question of what the human *is*) and of establishing a moral trajectory (i.e. the transcendental, normative or moral question of what the human should *become*). It is this foundational crisis (of the combination of being and becoming) that, strictly speaking, accompanies the eighteenth-century emergence of (Enlightenment) modernity, which "sees itself as condemned to draw its norms and very self-understanding from itself".[11] Modernity and its self-reflexivity is thus, according to Wellmon, from its very beginning based on an anthropological mode of thought: "Anthropology's crisis of self-recognition epitomizes the critical project of modernity that since its self-proclaimed inception has been obsessed with its own operations".[12] Its double claim on empiricism and transcendentalism means that anthropological modernity is "the epoch in which the human being is condemned to justify itself".[13] Kantian anthropology is from its inception *pedagogical* (i.e. normative and teleological) in the sense that "it was meant to orient and guide the individual towards becoming human. Anthropology was pedagogy for the human race".[14] However, due to the erosion of the boundaries drawn between the human – as both subject and object of its own self-reflexivity – and its others, outlined by Fernández-Armesto above, anthropology, and in particular its (humanist) pedagogical thrust, have run into trouble and, today, are no longer self-legitimating.

A variety of stances in such a post-anthropological environment have been emerging. I can only here provide a sketch of some symptomatic and representative positions, which all reconnect with the temporal confusion at work in the idea of *becoming* human – both in the sense of 'how did we become human?' (i.e. the mystery of a time before *humanity*) and 'what is becoming of the human?' (i.e. what lies *before* humanity now?). There is, first of all, following Günther Anders, the sense of human 'obsolescence'[15] and a return of the Nietzschean question of the 'overman' in the contemporary guise of the (technologically enhanced) 'posthuman'. Following this trajectory the question of philosophical anthropology (what is man?) becomes: to what extent is the human (still) enhanceable, or perfectible? Or, in other words: up to what level of enhancement is a human still 'human'? All this is happening in the absence of a clear definition of what the human *is* or may *be*, of course. What lies before *humanity* is thus the uncertain future of technology and the teleology of technological becoming (i.e. cyborgization, supersession and transcendence), which means nothing else than that the human is ultimately what needs to be overcome. Another way of putting this would be to ask who (or what) comes after the human? Coming after, is here to be taken in the double meaning of (evolutionary) succession, as well as: who or what is chasing (going *after*) the human? In this sense, that which is coming after the human, in fact also stands *before* it, facing it?[16]

[10] Cad Wellmon, *Becoming Human: Romantic Anthropology and the Embodiment of Form*, (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010).
[11] Wellmon, *Becoming Human*, p. 2.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 3.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 6.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 8.
[15] See Günther Anders, *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen*, volume 1: *Über die Seele im Zeitalter der zweiten industriellen Revolution*, (München: Beck, 1956); volume 2: *Über die Zerstörung des Lebens im Zeitalter der dritten industriellen Revolution*, (München: Beck, 1980). See also Christopher Müller's translation and commentary in *Prometheanism: Technology, Digital Culture and Human Obsolescence*, (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016).
[16] Cf. the analogy with the question asked by Eduardo Cadava, ed., *Who Comes After The Subject?* (New York: Routledge, 1991). See also Norbert Bolz's thoughts on "Was kommt nach dem Menschen", In *Was ist der Mensch?* Eds. Norbert Bolz and Andreas Münkel, (Munich: Fink, 2003), 201-12 and Bolz's introduction, pp. 11-

Essentially, what remains more or less intact on this *trans*humanist trajectory, however, is the idea of human exceptionalism and some form of anthropocentric projection into the future, even if, paradoxically, that future were to be a 'world without us'.

Animal studies has different ideas regarding anthropocentrism. The question of what it means to be human from a postanthropocentric animal studies perspective becomes an ethical and ecological one. The ethologist Domique Lestel, for example, in one of his latest interventions on the critique of the modern relationship between humans and animals asks: "A quoi sert l'homme? [what's the point/use of the human]?"[17] In a bitingly ironic, satirical style, Lestel attacks "le papy de Königsberg [the grand-dad from Königsberg]" (i.e. Kant), who committed the original anthropological 'sin' of determining that "unlike other animals, man is useless, every man is an end (to) himself, etc.", which leads Lestel to propose a counter-definition of (Western) 'man', namely as "a means that takes itself for an end".[18] The self-legitimatory anthropocentric view established by 'European humanism' is not only bad news for nonhuman animals but also for humans themselves, according to Lestel:

> By giving extraterritorial status to the human, and by making it the end of everything, European humanism has placed man in danger of death. The human exists as such through a life shared with other living beings. ... The posthumanist currents, contemporary or older, say nothing else, after all. The future of man is a machine. If man is useless, he can at least serve to eliminate himself.[19]

The technological 'posthumanist' (or, rather, transhumanist) vision of a post*anthropos* scenario is of course unacceptable to animal studies since transhumanism strives to eliminate whatever remains of human *animality*, animal biology, or 'wetware', through technological enhancement – a desire that ultimately wants to cut the chord with 'the living' [*les vivants*] as such. In trying to overcome the human, 'posthumans' (in the transhumanist sense) nevertheless still act in some perverted interest of 'self-preservation': "Whatever they claim, posthumans still try to save, not the human for sure, but *whatever may be human in the human*. Well, good luck, guys!"[20] – this is Lestel's ironic valediction. In sum, the only thing that the human may still be 'good for' – and this is Lestel's postanthropo*centric* proposal – lies in an 'unlearning to be human' or in human retraining, so to speak. This would be a diversion built into the original anthropological pedagogical project, namely, to become once more a part of 'nature'.

In a similar vein, Matthew Calarco (following Giorgio Agamben) proposes to 'jam' the 'anthropological machine'.[21] Agamben's notion of this anthropogenic 'machine' is based, in Calarco's words, on a reliance "on the human-animal distinction that serves as the foundation for Western political and metaphysical thought".[22] Jamming this anthropocentric process of 'becoming human' is therefore what lies before *humanity* today. This project of 're-humanization' (as in 're-routing'), however, would also project us outside of anthropocentrism, in the sense that such an anthropo-de-centred human would be called upon to finally take on its full ethical and ecological responsibilities.

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20. Cf. also my contribution to Sherryl Vint's edited volume *After the Human: Culture, Theory, and Criticism in the 21st Century*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

[17] Dominique Lestel, *A quoi sert l'homme?* (Paris: Fayard, 2015).

[18] Lestel, p. 8.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 103.

[21] Matthew Calarco, *Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 79-103.

[22] Calarco, *Zoographies*, p. 79. See also p. 92: "This machine can best be understood as the symbolic and material mechanisms at work in various scientific and philosophical discourses that classify and distinguish humans and animals through a dual process of inclusion and exclusion".

What does it mean to be human, in this context, is to, first of all, show humility, solidarity and 'care' (not only for fellow humans, but also for nonhumans). Following this rationale, we find ourselves not so much before a 'posthuman' future, but, as Edgar Morin would argue, before a 'new prehistory'.[23] Already in 1973, in *Le Paradigme perdu: La nature humaine*, Morin set out the task for what he called a '*fundamental* anthropology' facing such a re-prehistoric situation:

> Fundamental anthropology must reject any definition that makes man an entity, either supra-animal (the anthropological Vulgate) or strictly animal (the new pop-biological Vulgate); it must recognize man as a living being in order to distinguish him from other living beings; it must go beyond the ontological alternative nature / culture. Neither pan-biologism, nor pan-culturalism, but a richer truth, which gives human biology and human culture a greater role, *since it is a reciprocal role of one [i.e. biology] over the other [i.e. culture]*.[24]

This early intervention by Morin already anticipates a resolution of the postanthropological dilemma of 'what is to become of the human' *after* or outside anthropocentrism. The entanglement of (human) biology and culture has become ever more obvious since. However, Morin's call for a fundamental (or, as one might also call it, 'deep') anthropology might in the end exacerbate the problem of human exceptionalism. A postanthropology, however, if one were to take its drift literally, understood in its most radical sense, would inevitably have to become an anthropology *without* humans. It would require a human 'devoid' of all its humanistic characteristics, "a humanity without humanism", as Jean Luc Nancy writes,[25] or a human that, from now on, understands itself as 'inhuman' or 'unhuman'.

Inhumanism, or, Becoming Inhuman

In *L'Homme sans*, Martin Crowley tracks the semantic 'stripping process' that anthropology has always been engaged in: "l'homme sans [man without] … everything that one has to subtract from man so that he can be what he is".[26] This "man without qualities"[27] might be said to constitute the true subject of a negative anthropology (or 'negentropology', as Morin called it)[28] – the only one that remains available, once all those characteristics that used to make man 'exceptional' (language, culture, bipedalism, tool-use, laughter, music, etc.) are subtracted, so that "le propre de l'homme" would consist of its exposure to the subtraction of everything the human was supposed to have as "propre".[29] Crawley goes on to use this absence or lack (of qualities), which is not a lack of 'any/thing'

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[23] There is a similar view in Marc Augé's, *L'Avenir des Terriens; Fin de la préhistoire de l'humanité comme société planétaire*, (Paris: Albin Michel, 2017). It is quite clear that the injunction to contemporary (i.e. 'planetary') humanity to finally step out of its 'prehistory' is precisely what *Before Humanity* has been arguing *against*. It is precisely because "l'anthropologie est un humanisme" (Augé, p. 133) that, today, one has to embrace a (critically) posthumanist, postanthropocentric and postanthropological perspective, since, as Kathryn Yusoff puts it, 'the human' has to recognize, that it "is riven by the torques of non/inhuman forces in the establishment and maintenance of identity. In a time of extinction, such recognition might constitute an understanding of ecological survival as dependent on these inhuman forces" (Yusoff, "Geologic subjects", p. 389).

[24] Edgar Morin, *Le Paradigme perdu: La Nature humaine*, (Paris: Seuil, 1973), 313.

[25] Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Muses*, trans. Peggy Kamuf, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 71.

[26] Martin Crowley, *L'Homme sans – Politiques de la finitude*, (Paris: Lignes, 2009), 15.

[27] Cf. Robert Musil's novel, *The Man Without Qualities*, trans. Sophie Wilkins, (London: Picador, 1995); as well as Ivan Callus and Stefan Herbrechter, "Humanity Without Itself: Robert Musil, Giorgio Agamben and Posthumanism", In *Towards a New Literary Humanism*, ed. Andy Mousley, (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2011), 143-160.

[28] Morin, *Le Paradigme perdu*, p. 213.

[29] Crawley, *L'homme sans*, p. 16.

but rather a constitutional lack that cannot be filled or remedied, as the starting point of what he calls a new 'politics of finitude' based on the solidarity between human and nonhuman animals and the experience of 'divestment'. The specifically human task, following Crawley (who, in large parts, here follows Jean-Luc Nancy), would be to become 'human' by embracing, not 'animality' (which would be an abdication of responsibility and withdrawal into victimization and passivity), but 'inhumanity', by which he obviously does not mean engaging in 'inhumane' behaviour but rather a very specific project of 'unthinking' or 'unlearning'; or, in other words, a deconstruction of anthropocentrism and humanism.

This also takes us back to Lyotard's 'inhuman' and 'inhumanism', with which this brief conclusion started. Lyotard, notably, differentiates between two forms of 'inhumanity': "The inhumanity of the system which is currently being consolidated under the name of development (among others)", and which "must not be confused with the infinitely secret one of which the soul is hostage".[30] Lyotard goes on to implant this inhumanity of the (individual human) soul within human 'neoteny':

> What shall we call human in humans, the initial misery of their childhood, or their capacity to acquire a 'second' nature which, thanks to language, makes them fit to share in communal life, adult consciousness and reason? That the second depends on the first is agreed by everyone. The question is only that of knowing whether this dialectic, whatever name we grace it with, leaves no remainder.[31]

Lyotard here clearly articulates an important aspect I have been tracking through the phrase *before humanity*, namely the fact that hominization is a process that every individual has to go through afresh, a cultural evolution every single specimen of the species has to re-enact in order to become 'fully' human *despite* having been biologically 'born' as human. *Before* humanity is thus the state every human child finds itself in. As Lyotard writes, the child is the *most* human due to its 'misery' (its neotenous exposedness, defenselessness, helplessness) but also to its 'potentiality'. In many ways, the child is the epitome of Crawley's '*homme sans*': "Shorn of speech, incapable of standing upright, hesitating over the objects of interest, not able to calculate its advantages, not sensitive to common reason, the child is eminently the human because its distress heralds and promises things possible".[32] The cruel irony, for Lyotard, is that the 'human system', which humans create to 'educate' the child into becoming (fully) human (let's call this 'humanism', Lyotard suggests) depends on *and* has to eradicate the (first) 'humanity' of the child. This is what the 'inhumanity of the system' seems to require for its own and the child's (further) 'development'. Humanism thus has these two sides to it, following its logic of development: it is that ideology which demands 'child development', on the one hand, while on the other hand, the other humanism, one might say, the one which takes the first humanity of the child seriously, would in fact be an 'inhumanism' for which the development of 'becoming human' might be too high a price to pay. This irresolvable double imperative of anthropology, being *and* becoming human, which also powers and feeds the anthropological machine, always at work in the phrase *before humanity*, is ultimately what prompts the ongoing deconstruction of humanism – the "remainder of the dialectic", as Lyotard remarks.[33]

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[30] Lyotard, *The Inhuman*, p. 2.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

[33] In very different ways the following works could be seen as pursuing a similar objective: Keith Tester's *The Inhuman Condition*, (London: Routledge, 1995); Iain Chambers's *Culture After Humanism: History, Culture, Subjectivity*, (London: Routledge, 2001); and Gerald L. Bruns's *On Ceasing to Be Human*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).

If this sounds very similar to the (equally ironic) injunction Nietzsche throws at 'us' humans by inviting 'us' to 'become who we are', this is certainly no coincidence. As Steven Connor put it in his foreword to yet another volume entitled *Becoming Human*:

> For no human being can simply be, and leave it at that. The nature of human beings, it is often said, is not to be but to subsist in a state of *becoming*, by which is meant coming about, coming-to-be, being in transit, being on the way to what one will have been.[34]

The impossible demand, as Connor puts it, is that "to become human is always to become more, or less, than human", and Nietzsche's imperative does not really help, of course, since "to be what you are becoming is to attempt to will and be in advance what it is you will end up having been".[35] No wonder that the temptation would be to either 'subtract' ourselves from the tiresome task of becoming (human), or, indeed, to press ahead and become 'posthuman' (by sheer will so to speak). Both escape routes do not come with unwanted side-effects, however, as Connor insinuates (with a strong echo of Michel Foucault's famous statement about man's disappearance, at the end of *Order of Things*): "If the face of the human is being effaced in the sand, it may be possible to say of the human that nothing becomes it so well as the manner of its taking leave of itself".[36]

Before Humanity certainly does not want to shirk 'our' responsibilities, but it deliberately resists the temptation to cut through the aporia of the *before* – i.e. that the human is always 'becoming' and at the same time always too late for the event that this may entail. However, I hope to have shown that 'business as usual' in the face of 'technology, ecology … taking over' cannot be an option. Instead, to quote Paul Sheehan (quoting Emmanuel Levinas): "If rather than being human we are, more modestly, *becoming* human, then we do better to speak not of 'man's inhumanity to man' but, in Emmanuel Levinas's phrase, of 'what occasionally is human in man'".[37] And although I may not directly have addressed the other 'inhumanity' here – Lyotard's "inhumanity of the system",[38] what I derive from my reconceptualization of human prehistory in the face of the posthuman is not unrelated to Bernard Stiegler's vast project of rewriting the history of anthropology from the point of view of technics, namely the hope of establishing a "noopolitics of becoming non-inhuman", as Ben Turner puts it.[39]

In a way, I also share Edgar Morin's sense that we might be in the middle of a 'second prehistory'[40] – this time, however, without the 'tragic humanism' that Morin seems to be implying when he speaks of 'human megalomania' and the prospect of 'regenerating humanism', or when he proposes to 'pursue hominization by humanization'. Returning to the human through prehistory so to speak may still contain the prospect of 'poetically inhabiting' this planet (if only we knew exactly what Heidegger

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[34] Steven Connor, "Foreword", In *Becoming Human: New Perspectives on the Inhuman Condition*, ed. Paul Sheehan, (Westport: Praeger, 2003), ix.

[35] Connor, "Foreword", p. xi.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. xvi.

[37] Paul Sheehan, "Introduction", *Becoming Human*, 11.

[38] If one follows Bernard Stiegler's argument, a critique of today's 'systemic inhumanity' would consist in keeping open the "history of technological possibilities of anticipation – which is the history of the different mirror stages in which humanity reflects itself". Cf. Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time 1: The Fault of Epimetheus*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 159. See also Ben Turner's illuminating comments in "Life and the Technical Transformation of Différance: Stiegler and the Noopolitics of Becoming Human", *Derrida Today* 9.2 (2016): 177-198. Stiegler, incidentally, also refers to his own project as a 'néguanthropologie' – a contraction of negentropy and anthropology (which echoes Morin's choice of word above), e.g. in Bernard Stiegler and Ariel Kyrou, *L'emploi est mort, vive le travail, entretien avec Ariel Kyrou*, (Paris: Mille et une nuits, 2015), 116.

[39] Turner, "Life and the Technical Transformation of Différance", p. 194.

[40] And certainly not about to leave prehistory behind as Augé seems to insinuate, s. above.

here meant by 'poetically').[41] However, in a time when *before* humanity threatens to coincide with *after* humanity, literally, *materially*, the posthuman future, indeed, "is likely to resemble the pre-human past".[42] Whether this repetition would resemble a tragedy or a farce remains, of course, as ever to be seen.

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[41] Cf. Edgar Morin, *L'Identité humaine (La Méthode 5: L'Humanité de l'humanité)*, (Paris: Seuil, 2001), 274-5. Cf. Martin Heidegger, "… poetically man dwells …", *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter, (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 213-229.
[42] Fernández-Armesto, *So You Think You're Human*, p. 165.